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2‘Peugeot’s biggest challenge at Chrysler will undoubtedly
come from the 9000 workers at the Linwood, Scotland, plant.
A hard-boiled bunch even by British labor standards.’
Source: Mitchell Library [hereafter ML], Linwood Box 10, N. White and A. Collings,
‘The Battle of Britain’, Newsweek, 23 (1978).
3Abstract
This thesis investigates the nature of work culture and industrial relations at the Linwood
car plant during the period 1963-1981. In Part One, Chapter One provides an overview of
the historical debate over the use of oral testimony as well as introducing the methodology
employed within the oral history project encompassed within the thesis. Chapter Two
provides an analysis of the nature of work at the Linwood car plant and the ways in which
this impacted on behaviour and attitudes in the workplace. This is further developed in
Chapter Three where the focus is on organisational mischief, and consideration is given to
the nature, consequences and explanations for this behaviour. The analysis developed in
Part One, focuses on the dominant explanations for problematic industrial relations based
on the notion of a ‘clash of work cultures’ due to an absence of intrinsic rewards in
automated assembly-line work. Within the thesis such dominant narratives are not entirely
supported by the Linwood sample, as a wide variety of attitudes towards work are
exhibited, leading the thesis to question the validity of the categories of intrinsic and
extrinsic reward.
In Part Two of the thesis there is a shift in focus as the analysis concentrates on
structures of authority at Linwood and the impact on industrial relations. Chapter Four
gives consideration to the influence of historical contingency on management decision-
making. Part of the 1976 government rescue package was a Planning Agreement
incorporating employee participation in management decision-making that articulated with
the Labour government’s manifesto commitment to industrial democracy. Yet throughout
the different phases of ownership, interactions between management and workers at the
Linwood plant explored in this thesis reveal a dichotomy between the rhetoric and reality
of industrial democracy and worker participation. The final chapter of the thesis offers an
exploration of shop floor industrial politics, and causes of strikes, to highlight the
narratives of tension underpinning interactions at Linwood. The thesis provides a nuanced
approach, highlighting variety of experience and importantly a complex interplay of
interests shaping work culture and the nature of industrial relations in the car plant.
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Linwood Plant
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Introduction
Source: http://www.scran.ac.uk
Accessed 1 September 2009.
The Duke of Edinburgh and Lord Rootes at the official opening of the Rootes factory in
Linwood, May 1963.
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Introduction
A new era
When Prince Phillip officially opened the new Rootes Group car plant at Linwood on 2
May 1963, it was perceived as a remedy for unemployment levels associated with
Clydeside. Providing jobs for over 5000 workers The Scotsman celebrated the
announcement of the location of the new Rootes factory with the headline: ‘Linwood
opens a new era’.1 Indeed in the late 1960s the plant was described in the Robertson
Inquiry ‘as an important symbol of industrial regeneration’2, a statement which was
supported in the press as an, ‘opinion widely held throughout Scotland’.3 The Linwood
plant offered a significant source of employment in the local labour market and in the late
1970s was the largest single employer in the Paisley ‘Travel to Work Area’.4 When the car
plant closed in May 1981, the resulting 4800 redundancies ‘represented the biggest single
mass redundancy ever experienced in Scotland’.5
The popular public discourse is dominated by the image of poor industrial relations
between management and workforce offered as the primary explanation for the closure of
the plant. Contemporary media reports on industrial relations at Linwood described the
workforce as ‘strike-prone,’6 ‘nation-wrecking mercenaries’,7 and ‘a hard-boiled bunch
even by British labour standards’.8 Although it is twenty-eight years since the plant closed
and there is little physical evidence of its existence, these perceptions prevail in public
consciousness. In 2006 a tabloid newspaper offered the following commentary on the
history of the plant:
the Rootes car plant in Linwood was driven into the ground by a cavalier
workforce, bad management and trade union control.9
With a few notable exceptions the existing partial secondary literature on the car plant
provides limited detail on industrial relations.10 This has been impeded by the tendency to
                                                 
1 The Scotsman, 1 October 1960.
2 Report of the Court of Inquiry under Professor D. J. Robertson into a dispute at Rootes Motors Limited,
Linwood, Scotland, Cmnd 3692 (HMSO, 1968), p. 18.
3 The Times, 23 May 1969.
4 Manpower Services Commission, Closure at Linwood: A follow-up survey of redundant workers
(Edinburgh, 1984), p. 5.
5 Ibid., p. 3.
6 The Times, 31 October 1975.
7 Daily Mail in Jim Higgins, The Lessons of Linwood, (February 1976), originally published in the Spectator.
http://www.marxists.org/archive/higgins/1976/02/linwood.htm
Accessed 14 September 2009.
8 ML, Linwood Box 2, N. J. White and A. Collings, ‘The Battle of Britain’, Newsweek, 23 (1978).
9 Evening Times, 29 April 2006.
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focus on reasons for the failure of the plant.11 Although existing literature cites poor
industrial relations as a contributory factor to the closure of Linwood, little is known about
the experiences and attitudes of those who worked at the plant. The focus in this thesis is to
shift away from an examination of the reasons for the closure of the Linwood plant and,
given the positioning of plant workers within the dominant explanations of ‘failure’,
provide a more nuanced approach to understanding their workplace experiences and
industrial relations. Oral history interviews will be use to re-examine this dominant
discourse on industrial relations at Linwood. A thematic approach is employed in the
thesis, which presents a qualitative case study of work culture and industrial relations in
the car plant through subsequent phases of ownership from Pressed Steel to Rootes, then
Chrysler Corporation, and finally Peugeot SA.
Thesis Outline
The thesis is comprised of two parts, Part One: Reconstructing the Factory and
Part Two: Structures of Authority. William Knox links industrial relations problems in the
car plant to the workers’ failure to adapt to automated-assembly production.12 This view is
shared by Hood and Young who attribute industrial conflict within the car plant to a ‘clash
of cultures’ between craft-based bespoke production, an embedded feature of Scottish
traditional industrial work experience, and the stark contrast of automated assembly.13 It is
a classic or common-sense assumption made about the Linwood car plant: rooting
explanations for ‘poor’ industrial relations in experiences of work. However, such
arguments are based on assumptions about the west of Scotland labour market. To date
there is an absence of empirical evidence to substantiate such claims with limited
information available on the labour policies of the various owners of the car plant, and
                                                                                                                                                    
10 On the role of regional policy in the history of Linwood see: D. Sims and M. Wood, Car Manufacturing at
Linwood: The Regional Policy Issues, (Paisley College: Department of Politics and Sociology, 1984).
Also N. Young and S. Hood have written ‘The Linwood Experience: Chrysler and Peugeot Citroen in
Scotland’ in Scotland, the Multinationals and the Third World ed. by S. Maxwell (Edinburgh: Scottish
Education and Action for Development, 1982), 123-36, S. Hood and N. Young, ‘Chrysler &  Peugeot in
Linwood’, in Multinationals in Retreat: The Scottish Experience, ed. by N. Hood and S. Young
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 61-80, and N. Young and  S. Hood Chrysler UK: A
Corporation in Transition (New York: Praeger, 1977). More recently Jim Phillips included an analysis
of the industrial politics during the Rootes Group ownership at Linwood in The Industrial Politics of
Devolution: Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).
11 Jim Phillips, The Industrial Politics of Devolution: Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s (Manchester: MUP,
2008), p. 14.
12 W. Knox, ‘Class, Work and Trade Unionism in Scotland’, in People and Society in Scotland, Vol. III,
1914-1990, ed. by A. Dickson, and J. H. Treble, (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992 [1998 edn]), 108-37 (p.
128).
13 Hood and Young, ‘Linwood Experience’, p. 125.
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virtually nothing on the employment or geographical background of the workforce. One of
the central aims of this thesis is to further explore this assumption and in going beyond
organisational perceptions and management rhetoric to offer an analysis of why workers do
what they do.
The three chapters in Part One aim to identify the experience of work, in the main
for those working on the shop floor. The ‘bottom-up’ analysis will be achieved through an
exploration of the individual experiences of Linwood workers through oral history
interviews, within the context of theoretical considerations, which will be used to inform a
re-examination of industrial relations at Linwood as well as seeking to understand the
motivations of the workers, to describe their experiences of work, and to identify how they
made sense of their work.
Chapter One will explore the development of the method of oral history and discuss
the research methodology adopted within this thesis. Oral history material is used primarily
from a reconstructive perspective, something which has come under criticism within
certain circles in academia. Its value in this thesis is it can provide the opportunity to
explore the ‘perceptions and the realities’ of the experiences of working at Linwood.14
Chapter Two will turn to an investigation of the variety of ways in which both
individuals and the collective seek to satisfy their interests within the workplace. There
will be a re-assessment of the ‘clash of cultures’ discourse using evidence from the oral
testimonies. Furthermore, the thesis will unpick the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic
reward as utilised by the Goldthorpe et al., Affluent Worker research.15 By doing so,
questions the validity of two distinct categories of reward. Primary source material will be
utilised to support the supposition in this thesis that intrinsic and extrinsic rewards do not
exist as distinct entities.
The predominant production mode of assembly and sub-assembly track work, as
well as the introduction of the system of Measured Day Work, articulate with the classic
Marxist analysis of alienation.16 The thesis will challenge Marxist interpretations of
alienation and offer a more nuanced analysis of workplace relations, and crucial to the
                                                 
14 Ronnie Johnston and Arthur McIvor, ‘Oral History, Subjectivity, and Environmental Reality: Occupational
Health Histories in Twentieth-Century Scotland’, in Landscapes of Exposure: Knowledge and Illness in
Modern Environments, Osris 19 (2004), 234-49 (p. 247).
15 John Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: industrial attitudes and behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1968), p. 14.
16 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, (New York: Prometheus Books, 1988), p. 71.
Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and His Industry, (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1964 [1967 edn]).
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worker, the role of autonomy. Focusing on the locus of control, the contention is that
worker autonomy may be prioritised in the realm of production or in the wider realm of the
factory environment.
In Chapter Three the focus will be on understanding the underpinning motivations
of workers engagement in organisational mischief. Utilising oral testimonies and
documentary evidence produced on the shop floor, the multi-faceted reasons for this type
of behaviour is explored and in doing so further challenges Goldthorpe’s identification of
intrinsic and extrinsic reward. The contention promoted is ‘workers’ are not an
homogenous group, and concepts devised to categorise behaviour undermine the variety of
experiences and interests at play in the car factory and that these are dynamic.
Part Two: Structures of Authority provides a shift in focus to structures of authority
and power relationships in the Linwood car plant. Chapter Four examines the character of
management at Linwood. Utilising Ramsey’s ‘cycles of participation’ theory in the
analysis of the primary source material, the chapter concentrates on the structures and
strategies of management in labour relations with consideration given to the political
economy.17 Pay negotiations and employee participation receive particular attention and
are considered within particular historical contingencies, because these were conceived by
management as a compromise between unitary values, expressed at times during the car
plant’s history, and policies shaped by organisational pluralism aimed to give employees a
‘voice’ within the branch plants.
The analysis will be located within historically contingent factors that shaped the
cycles of participation, revealed as coercive attempts at industrial democracy when
political and economic expediency was necessary. The thesis explores a crucial problem
prevalent in industrial relations between management and workforce during the various
phases of ownership at Linwood namely, the dichotomy between management rhetoric and
reality. A dichotomy that appeared to sustained information asymmetries between
involvement and influence in consultation initiatives at the plant and undermined the
functioning of trade unionism.
The final chapter provides a bottom-up analysis of industrial relations within the
car plant, drawing upon trade-union documentary evidence supplemented with the oral
                                                 
17 H. Ramsay, ‘Cycles of Control: Worker Participation in Sociological and Historical Perspective’,
Sociology, 11 (1977), 481-506.
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testimony of members of the Linwood workforce. The discussion will consider the
contested nature of trade unionism in the plant; the role of shop stewards and analysis of
their functioning in the plant by management and shop floor. Crucial differences in
understanding between the stewards and management will be identified as well as between
stewards and the workers they represented, as well as exploring the power of the shop
steward system. This chapter highlights that the interplay of diverse interests at Linwood
fed into an undercurrent of tension which manifested itself in different ways.
The thesis challenges the common-sense perception, depicted in contemporary
press reports and by politicians, that strikes and industrial unrest were attributed to political
militancy agitated by an autocratic shop steward system.18 The contradictions of shop floor
‘militancy’ are examined within the context of historical solidaristic contingency,
managerial intransigence and inflexibility, divergent interests of the workers, as well as the
functioning of shop stewards. The thesis contends that during its eighteen-year history,
through different phases of ownership, the Linwood car plant was the site of a coalition of
interests that at times was insensitive to the inherent tensions that sustained the prevalent
undercurrent of potential for disputes.
The focus of the thesis is the years between 1963 and 1981 as these were the years
from the official opening until the closure of the plant. At times throughout the thesis
reference is made to earlier periods, in particular when discussing Pressed Steel, so as to
provide additional context to support the analysis. The following synopsis of the Linwood
car plant is provided to enable access to the chronology of its history.
From Imp to Sunbeam – A brief history of the Linwood car plant
The dawn of the new era of industrial development was marked by the launch of the
Hillman Imp, the first car to be made in Scotland since 1928.19 Yet, the optimism
surrounding the production of this vehicle was short lived. Three weeks after opening, the
first unofficial strike occurred, and by the end of 1964 Linwood was operating at only a
third capacity, subsequently a four-day week was introduced. The unofficial stoppages at
the plant continued throughout the plant’s history.
                                                 
18 Will Hutton, The State We’re In (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 91.
19 H. Turner, G. Clack, and G. Roberts, Labour Relations in the Motor Industry: A Study of Industrial Unrest
and an International Comparison (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1967), p. 28.
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The Rootes Group plant at Linwood was built opposite a Pressed Steel Company
Limited site which produced car body shells for manufacturing at Linwood. The Pressed
Steel Company Limited purchased the plant on the North Side of the Linwood site from
the Ministry of Defence in 1947 and in the early 1960s not only produced car body shells
for Rootes but also Volvo, British Motor Company and Ford. After Rootes opened
manufacturing buildings on the South Side of the site it then purchased the Pressed Steel
Factory in January 1966. At this point it was renamed Rootes Pressings until it became
incorporated under the single management of both the North and South side of the
Linwood plant and on 1 January 1968 renamed Rootes Motors (Scotland) Limited.20 The
North Side of the Linwood Plant became responsible for producing car body shells for
Rootes manufacturing sites throughout the UK. Other sites owned by Rootes in the late
1960s included car plants at Crowley and Ryton (Coventry), a Commercial Vehicle plant at
Luton, parts division at Stoke (Birmingham), and offices and a design centre at Whitely
(Coventry).21
The Hillman Imp did not sell as well as expected. Production costs were high, in
part because parts had to be transported between Linwood and other Rootes factories. Most
significantly, the car engine was manufactured using component parts from Linwood,
assembled into engine parts at Stoke before returning to Linwood to become fitted into
Hillman Imps.22 Production of the Imp stopped in 1976.
In 1964 the Chrysler Corporation gained a strategic holding in the Rootes Group.
Chrysler was experiencing problems in its American market and wanted to expand into
Europe. Chrysler took over full control of Rootes in 1967 and in 1973 established its
subsidiary Chrysler United Kingdom (hereafter Chrysler UK).23 Initially the Chrysler take-
over saw investment with new cars launched including the Hillman Hunter and The
Avenger, the use of three-shift working, and an increase in the workforce to 8000 by
1974.24 However, the company’s UK market share declined to 6.6 per cent by 1975 from
                                                 
20 Report of the Court of Inquiry under Professor D. J. Robertson into a dispute at Rootes Motors Limited,
Linwood, Scotland, Cmnd 3692 (HMSO, 1968), p. 4.
21 Fraser of Allander Institute [hereafter FAI], Papers of Cliff Lockyer, Box 11, ‘Linwood’, Company
Pamphlet produced by Rootes Motors Scotland Limited.  Not dated but estimate this was produced
around 1969.
22 Robert J. Allan Geoffrey Rootes’ dream for Linwood: Pictorial look at a landmark in British car
manufacture (Oxfordshire: Bookmarque Publishing, 1991), pp. 22-5.
23 Manpower Services Commission, Closure at Linwood: A follow-up survey of redundant workers
(Edinburgh, 1984), p. 9.
24 Talbot Action Committee, Linwood, The case for full employment  and NO CLOSURE: The Workers [sic]
Answer, March 1981, p. 14 and Manpower Services Commission, Closure at Linwood: A follow-up
survey of redundant workers (England, 1984), p. 9.
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Rootes’ previous share of 12.6 per cent in 1964.25 This has been attributed to ‘unpopular
products’26, poor cost-efficiency due to productivity and industrial relations issues as well
as external factors such as the recession of the mid-1970s, rising inflation, international
competition in the car market, and events such as the oil crisis in 1973 which were all
problematic for the owners of the Linwood plant.
Towards the end of 1975, whilst the Linwood work-force was on a three-day week,
Chrysler entered into discussions with the UK government and by January 1976 a rescue-
package was agreed however, this resulted in over 1300 redundancies.27 The company
gained a contract with Iran to provide CKD (Completely Knocked Down) car kits and the
Chrysler Sunbeam was launched in 1977, but changed to Talbot Sunbeam when the
Chrysler European divisions were sold to Peugeot SA in 1978. Peugeot decided to rename
the UK operations as Talbot and part of the takeover included 1300 redundancies in
September 1979. However, there were further redundancies and short-time working after
1979:
the Iranian contract was suspended and in May 1980 a further 1300 were made
redundant. To prevent a further 2700 redundancies, as a result of falling sales, the
company had been operating a three day week under the Temporary Short Time
Working Compensation Scheme since August 1980.28
Initially, upon announcement of the closure on 11 February 1981, the workforce
voted to begin a campaign against the closure of the factory.29 Yet when the company
made a final redundancy offer, the rank and file at a mass meeting in 1981, against the
opinion of the shop stewards’ Talbot Action Group, voted to accept the closure of the
plant. In November 1981 Talbot organised a public auction of machinery and equipment
amidst two protests against the company’s ‘asset-striping’ organised by the Labour Party
and the Scottish National Party which included trade unionists, politicians and former
employees.30
                                                 
25 Charles K. Hyde, Riding the roller coaster: a history of the Chrysler Corporation (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 2003), p. 200.
26 Ibid.,  p. 200.
27 Jim Higgins, The Lessons of Linwood, (February 1976), originally published in the Spectator.
http://www.marxists.org/archive/higgins/1976/02/linwood.htm
Accessed 14 September 2009.
28 Manpower Services Commission, Closure at Linwood: A follow-up survey of redundant workers (England:
Manpower Services Commission, 1984), p. 9.
29 Sims and Wood, p. 64 and National Library of Scotland [hereafter NLS], P.1a.6511 PER, Talbot Voice,
Issue 1, 1981.
30 The Times, 17 November 1981 and NLS, P.1a.6511 PER, Talbot 10 day auction sale Catalogue.
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Source Material
A range of documentary material has been utilised in the research within the thesis. This
has included sources in The National Archives, Modern Records Centre, National Library
of Scotland, Rootes Archive Centre and Paisley Central Library. Two particular collections
significant for the thesis are held at the Mitchell Library and the Fraser of Allander
Institute in Glasgow. Both collections are of personal papers with the former existing as a
collection of material donated to the Mitchell Library by Linwood Transport and General
Workers (hereafter TGWU) shop steward convenor Jimmy Livingstone.31 This collection
is extremely valuable, not only due to the apparent lack of consultation, but also the variety
of documents within the records. In particular, shop stewards’ diaries and notebooks,
minutes of shop stewards’ meetings, leaflets, various company agreements and trade union
documents have been illuminating.
Copies of some of the papers within this collection also exist within the later
source, the Papers of Cliff Lockyer. Cliff Lockyer conducted research on the Linwood car
plant following the closure of the factory and he was able to obtain documentation from
the closing factory. This source therefore comprises primary documentation from the site
as well as the notes of the team undertaking research into Linwood at the then Department
of Industrial Relations, University of Strathclyde.
Both of these collections have not been catalogued, and lack an index. Furthermore,
whilst some items have been numbered and filed, this has not been a uniform process.
Material appears to have been moved between boxes as there is limited continuity in terms
of the content of the boxes.32 A significant number of the documents are not dated and in
some there is an absence of information on job titles of individuals mentioned in diaries
and company documents. It must be noted that the diaries and minutes are hand written,
furthermore, much was written in short hand and note form.33 Despite such issues these
two sources comprise a wealth of material that has been extremely useful for this thesis.
                                                 
31 All material from the collection has been referenced ML (Mitchell Library), name of document, number of
item or file if given, box number, page number.
32 Within this thesis when the consulted material has a clear item number or file name this has been identified
in the footnote references yet many documents do not have this identification mark. Thus, the
inconsistencies in the footnotes reflect the sources rather than the author.
33 The quotes taken from diaries have been referenced as they appeared in the original document. Incorrect
spelling in the sources has been noted by the use of [sic] however, changes have not been made to
punctuation and abbreviations used such as ‘Thurs’ for Thursday, ‘sect’ for section and ‘opp’ for
operator.  As the source material is not over fifty years old, the quotes have been anonymised to protect
any individuals mentioned.
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As well as these documentary sources the thesis included a small oral history
project. The rationale for inclusion was that interviewing former workers would enable a
‘bottom-up’ approach to experiences of work and industrial relations within the car plant.
Whilst the oral history sample is to some extent limited, it has been useful in illuminating a
range of perspectives and experiences, and has also proven to be largely consistent with the
documentary material.
20
Chapter One
Source: http://www.scran.ac.uk
Accessed 1 September 2009.
Worker on the assembly line at the Rootes factory.
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Chapter One
Oral History: reconstructing and interpreting the world of work
1.1 Linwood Lives: George Wilson
So if you could just tell me about your experiences of Linwood, generally.
It was one o the best jobs ah’ve had in ma life. Ah came out, ah was a slater and
plasterer, went in there, ah was in Chrysler for [pause] how many year? Eh, just
must have been five years; just under five years ah wis in Chrysler tae the day it
shut down. An it wis just the patter o the people in it. They could, the job ah wis
doin you were only, it was night shift an you were only workin five hours oot the
ten hours. An out that five hours you, you were only workin two, that sort o thing.
Ye know, it was, was a great job that way. Then the, the pay at that time, coming
off the roofs an that an goin on ae the lines was phenomenal. An ah wis doin ma,
wit ye call, the overtime sheet; ah had the overtime sheet so ah wis gettin all the
overtime that wis goin as well. An ye didn’t, ye didnae have tae work it, if ye know
wit a mean. As long as you had the sheet you didn’t have to work it, so you’re
getting all the overtime. But it’s just in the place, ah imagine, apart fae the strikes,
some o the strikes were, they was, when we were oot fur ten weeks because
somebody, a boy was peeing out the back door. Ye know it’s that stupit, an we
were out for ten weeks. Now there is toilets an so, but as soon as K Building shut
down that’s the rest of the line aw shut down so ye have to go oot on strike wi
them. An if ye didnae go oot on strike they were after you. Don’t get me wrong,
there’s a lot o hard men in there, lot o, lot o, hard men fae Glasgow in there. But no,
it was one o, ah enjoyed it, ah enjoyed everyday, ah enjoyed goin tae ma work doon
there, ye wouldnae believe it an aw, aw ah wis doin was workin on a line drillin
holes. But ah enjoyed, naw ah enjoyed goin doon there everyday ae ma work.
Compared tae what ah wis doin in the roofs, in that, goin oot in the cold weather
lying on top o roofs an that. Ye were goin in there and yer nice and warm. Even the
summer, ye’re goin, ye know ye’re coming oot, ye know yer breaks that wis goin,
so aye no, it wis one of the best jobs ah’ve ever had. Less o a world o people, met a
lot of good people in it.34
George Wilson worked as a semi-skilled operator in L Building, which was on the North
Side, otherwise known as the Pressed Steel side, of the Linwood car plant. The above
excerpt comprises the entire free narrative section of Wilson’s interview.35 In comparison
to the other twenty-two interviewees within the sample Wilson provided the shortest free
narrative lasting one minute, forty-four seconds. Whilst his narrative is relatively short it
provides a succinct overview of what he felt about work at Linwood:  in which he
                                                 
34 Oral Testimony, George Wilson, Interview 1.
35 ‘[F]ree narration’ is a term used by Luisa Passerini where she developed the method of collecting life
histories in two phases. In the first stage she allowed participants to speak without interruption about
whatever they felt was important, and this was followed by an interview in which Passerini asked
questions. ‘Work, Ideology and Consensus Under Italian Fascism’, The Oral History Reader, ed. by
Rob Perks and Alistair Thomson, (London: Routledge, 1998 [2002 edn]), 53-62 (p. 58).
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juxtaposes his work at Linwood with his previous experiences as a slater and plasterer, to
establish that he enjoyed the increased wages and continuity of employment that had not
been guaranteed in his previous job. There is some suggestion as to the themes that emerge
as dominant discourses later in Wilson’s interview: first of all his assertion of personal
autonomy when he mentions the overtime rota, and secondly the negative memory within
his testimony in the reference to strikes, with a hint to the power he assigns to the shop
floor trade union figures and the manifestation of this power in exertion of pressure on
workers to stop work and strike.
Such testimony provides the historian access to a personal experience of working at
the Linwood car plant. Yet this raises fundamental questions about the usefulness of
testimony as an historical source. It is interesting that the single negative aspect Wilson
chooses to mention is strikes; especially given the dominant public discourse is that the
Linwood plant was beset by problematic industrial relations. This suggests dialogue
between the public discourse and Wilson’s individual memory. It also indicates Wilson’s
awareness of potential subjects that the interviewer would be interested in and so
constructed his narrative accordingly. Alternatively, Wilson’s mention of strikes in the free
narrative section of his interview could be evidence that these were a dominant feature of
working life at Linwood, and comprised an important negative element of individual
experiences. The use of oral testimony in writing history has been the subject of much
debate and the purpose of this chapter is to provide an historiographical overview of the
key elements of the debate, and to identify the methodological implications that influence
the use of oral testimony in this thesis.
Existing literature on the history of the Linwood car plant draws mainly upon
documentary source material: for example, parliamentary papers, strike statistics, and
newspapers.36 In this thesis the detailed examination of work culture and industrial
relations at Linwood is enriched by an oral history project involving the collection and
analysis of oral testimonies of former workers of the plant. In general, the use of oral
testimony in historical studies of work has been in conjunction with documentary sources
and essentially features as an additional source of information with which to reconstruct
the past. While this can be illuminating it is also subject to the criticism that individuals
may not be representative, or that oral history accounts can be subject to faulty memory or
                                                 
36 Literature such as Young and Hood, Chrysler; Sims and Wood, Car Manufacturing and Phillips, Industrial
Politics.
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bias.37 This has resulted in much debate on the use of oral history and more recently it has
been argued that the primary use of oral histories should not be so much about
reconstructing the past, but instead the process should concern the evaluation and
interpretation of memory, subjectivity and narrative structures.
To begin with, the main developments of the debates surrounding oral history will
be identified, before a review of the existing historiography of studies using oral history to
examine work. Following this is a discussion of the methodological issues, including the
format of the oral history project, the interview schedule, sample and reflection on the
interview process. This will highlight that conceptual awareness and reflective analysis are
essential in any project involving oral history, yet the use of oral testimony to reconstruct
the past may have been over-criticised due to the polarisation of debate on the use of oral
history into reconstructive versus interpretive. An analysis of oral testimony can
incorporate elements of both aspects of the debate and will be of value to current
historiography not only on Scottish work culture and industrial relations, but also on the
development of the practice of oral history.
1.2 Oral history in the reconstructive mode
Early practitioners of oral history supported the use of testimony in conjunction with
existing documentary sources; considered a method best utilised to ‘throw oblique shafts of
light upon conventional sources, rather than used in isolation’.38 The methodology was
somewhat politicised: it was viewed as a tool by which the historian could access groups
hitherto omitted from official historical record. As Tosh highlighted, the practice of oral
history is underpinned by two assumptions: that the testimony of ‘those from below’ poses
a threat to professional written history; and that the practice of oral history presents a
democratising of knowledge thus undermining the ‘monopoly of an academic elite’.39
Within research areas such as industrial relations, it has generally been accepted that so-
called ‘official sources’ such as parliamentary papers and trade union records will present
the view of the dominant groups such as the government, management, and trade union
                                                 
37 Paul Thompson has been particularly critical of the assumed priority of documentary source material as not
only are many documentary sources originally derived from, or utilise, oral sources, for instance Royal
Commissions, but also evidence such as statistics is affected by ‘the social attitudes of their period’ in
terms of the definition and recording of information. The Voice of the Past (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1978 [2000 edn]), pp. 118-124.
38 T. C. Smout, ‘Scotland: The State of Oral History’, Oral History, 2 (1974), 11-14 (p. 14).
39 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History (London: Longman, 1984 [2000 edn]), p. 198.
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leadership.40 Therefore, labour historians, seeking to uncover the history of ‘rank and file’
trade unionists, formed part of wider movement towards re-writing the history of groups
within society that arguably had been marginalised or misrepresented in historical record.
Oral history has been identified as a method by which voice could be given to the
voiceless, as a means of investigating historical processes or experiences currently ‘hidden
from history’. 41
Academics using oral testimony to reconstruct the past were  influenced by the
priority ascribed to positivism within social science research methods and sought to defend
oral history as objective social science research. Reflecting upon the development of oral
history research in America, Yow claims that academics were driven by a desire to:
show that our method was rigorous, disinterested pursuit of truth and therefore
respectable. As interviewers, we were simply observers of verbal behaviour.42
However, there were staunch critics of the use of oral history within academic research. It
was labelled ‘a slippery source’ and was not widely regarded as epitomising academic
rigour. 43 As Grele comments:
The dominant tendency has been to be overly enthusiastic in public print, and
deeply suspicious in private conversation.44
As scholars who used oral history attempted to proclaim the positivist aspects of the
method, so concepts from within the positivist social science tradition would be used to
criticise the method.45 The reconstructive use of oral history has been criticised on two
counts: validity, specifically the extent to which an individual testimony is representative
of more generally experienced developments; and reliability of memory. While there is
scepticism of long-term memory, theories related to this type of memory are relatively
underdeveloped, which has resulted in much criticism of the use of oral history
testimonies. However, the critique of positivist approaches to historical research - that there
                                                 
40 Trevor Lummis, Listening to History: The authenticity of oral evidence (London: Hutchinson, 1987), p. 18.
41 Green and Troup, Houses of History, p. 231 and Arthur McIvor and Ronald Johnston, Miner’s Lung: A
History of Dust Disease in British Coal Mining (Studies in Labour History) (England: Ashgate, 2007),
p. 8.
42 Valerie Yow, ‘ “Do I like them too much?”: effects of the oral history interview on the interviewer and
vice-versa’, Oral History Review, 24 (1997), 55-79.
43 Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (London: Abacus, 1969 [2007 edn]), xi.
44 Ronald J. Grele, ‘Movement Without Aim: Methodological and Theoretical Problems in Oral History’,
Envelopes of Sound: The Art of Oral History (New York: Praeger, 1985 [1991 edn]), pp. 126-54, p.
127.
45 There is continuing debate as to whether concepts specific to more quantitative methods should be used to
critique qualitative research. Jennifer Mason, Qualitative Researching (London: Sage, 1996 [2002
edn]), pp. 38-39.
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is a real truth that can be uncovered by objective study, and by implication there are real
facts to be uncovered using methods such as oral history - contributed to a new
methodological awareness within the discipline of oral history.46
1.3 Assimilating subjectivity
This new awareness made virtue of extant criticisms of oral history. Important was the
recognition that an oral history interview is not a ‘value-free’ situation.47 The influence of
the intellectual development of post-structuralism and postmodernism is evident as there
was a shift towards endorsing human subjectivity into the analysis of oral history material.
No longer was it fundamental to proclaim objectivity: but instead a key strength of oral
history is in providing access to the subjective aspects of historical events through
individual narratives.48
The assimilation of subjectivity resulted in the evolution of interpretive models of
oral history, influencing the development of oral history as a theory focused on ‘memory
and subjectivity, and the narrative structures which provide the framework for oral stories
about the past’.49 This new conceptual awareness stemmed from the realisation that the
construction of individual narratives within an oral history interview is a ‘dynamic’ process
as well as retrospective. Thus influenced by both past and present as opposed to being a
recollection of ‘things as they were’.50 Academics using oral history must be aware that the
process of interpretation and re-interpretation of memory is constant and that individual
memories will be:
filtered through subsequent experience. They may be contaminated by what has
been absorbed from other sources … they may be overlaid by nostalgia … or
distorted by a sense of grievance.51
Furthermore, the testimony produced is influenced by the interaction between interviewer
and interviewee thus directing attention to the inter-subjectivity element of this dynamic
process. Hence, it is important to identify the varying influences on memory when
analysing oral history transcripts.
                                                 
46 Passerini, ‘Work, Ideology and Consensus’, 53-62 (p. 55).
47 Lummis, Listening to History, p. 51.
48 Kathryn Anderson and Dana C. Jack, ‘Learning to Listen: Interview techniques and analyses’, in Oral
History Reader, ed. by Rob Perks and Alistair Thomson, (London: Routledge, 1998 [2002 edn]),157-71
(pp. 157-171, p. 169).
49 Green and Troup, Houses of History, p. 230.
50 Lummis, Listening to History, p. 19, p. 123.
51 Tosh, Pursuit of History, p. 199.
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Passerini advocates the use of a conceptual approach to explore the cultural and
psychological pressures that influence individuals’ narratives of the past.52 All of the
individual narratives are in a sense true. The function of oral history analysis is to
deconstruct testimony, identifying influences on the narratives and the nature of this truth:
‘in which sense, where, for which purpose…’.53 Whilst analysing narratives on the anti-
fascism movement in Italy Passerini became aware of the importance of ‘silences’ in the
oral transcripts. She argues that the silences of interviewees, for example through omitting
information, can be understood as evidence of ‘a scar, a violent annihilation of many years
in human lives, a profound wound in daily experience’.54 She also considers the impact of
the past on memory as well as the narrative structures that are produced in individual
testimonies. It is evident that the focus of such studies is not to seek factual information in
oral testimonies, rather to consider the influences on individual narratives. As Alessandro
Portelli highlights there are no ‘false’ oral testimonies – that is testimony that contain
incorrect factual information when compared to other sources – on the contrary:
the diversity of oral history consists in the fact that “wrong” statements are still
psychologically “true”, and that this truth may be equally as important as factually
reliable accounts.55
Thus, the benefit of oral sources for the historian is in seeking to understand the
motivations of individuals in the past as well as how they make sense of their actions both
at the time and in the present. Analysis of narratives allows some insight into how
historical events or eras impact on individuals. For example, oral testimonies on strikes
may not provide any more detail on actual events than existing documentary sources, but
oral testimonies can uncover the psychological dimensions of the strike. So the shift from
the reconstructive to interpretive uses of oral history has resulted in a new theoretical
awareness succinctly described by Portelli, ‘what is really important is that memory is not
a passive depository of facts, but an active process of creation of meanings’.56
                                                 
52 Passerini, ‘Work, Ideology and Consensus’, 53-62 (p. 53).
53 Green and Troup, Houses of History, p. 232, p. 236.
54 Passerini, ‘Work, Ideology and Consensus’, 53-62 (pp. 59-60).
55 Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and other stories: form and meaning in oral history (New
York: State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 51.
56 Ibid., p. 52.
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1.4. Interactions between public and private memory
In seeking to understand wider historical processes through interviews, it is necessary to
consider the contextual influences on the production of narratives. Within interpretive
theories of oral history attention has been directed to the influence of dominant cultural
discourses on the construction of testimony with a focus on concepts such as the ‘cultural
circuit’ and ‘composure’. 57
 Penny Summerfield’s work has been central to the cultural analysis of oral
testimonies. In her post-structural analysis of women’s memories of the Second World
War, she points to the impact of dominant collective discourses on the construction of
personal narratives.58 She goes further than suggesting historians must take into account
societal discourses, as she considers the construction of individual narratives as a ‘cultural
practice’ and there will always be a process of interaction and negotiation between
individuals and the dominant discourse.59 For example, within her oral history research
investigating women’s memories of the Second World War, she found that some
interviewees, when recollecting their experiences of motherhood and entering the labour
market, constructed their narrative with reference to relevant dominant discourses such as
the ‘1950s discourse of motherhood’, which at times led to discontinuity between the
personal narrative and the public discourse due to ‘contradictory elements’ of discourses
that women had to negotiate.60
Anna Green is critical of Summerfield’s approach and argues that such analyses
seek to link the narratives of individuals with discourses to the extent that they cannot exist
independently of ‘dominant cultural scripts or unconscious psychic templates’.61 As a
result such approaches fail to acknowledge the agency of the interviewee in being able to
identify the dominant narratives and investigate ‘how and why ideas, values and beliefs are
critiqued, reassembled, juxtaposed or rejected’.62 Yet Polly Russell argues that Green’s
critique of Summerfield’s work sets up the individual influence and the collective cultural
                                                 
57 Penny Summerfield, ‘Dis/composing the subject: Inter-subjectivities in oral history’, in Feminism and
Autobiography: Texts, Theories, Methods ed. by Tess Cosslett, Celia Lury and Penny Summerfield
(London: Routledge, 2000), 91-106 (p. 95, p. 99). Alistair Thomson similarly found that his oral history
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dominant cultural portrayals associated with Anzac Day. Alistair Thomson, ‘Anzac Memories: Putting
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58 Penny Summerfield, Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1998), p. 15.
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60 Summerfield, ‘Dis/composing the subject’, 91-106 (p. 99).
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scripts as two polarised entities, therefore disregarding the reciprocal interaction between
them reflected in oral testimony.63 Individuals have to negotiate powerful dominant
collective cultural scripts, but the agency of individuals can be equally powerful, and this is
evident in the role of the individual in shaping and changing these collective discourses.
Furthermore, Russell advocates Graham Smith’s theory of ‘transactive memories’ in which
he not only recognises both of the above elements in shaping testimony but also the
importance of experience.64 This debate over the cultural circuit and individual testimony
serves to highlight the variety of influences on the construction of narratives.
Summerfield’s reference to composure draws in a psychological perspective to the
cultural interpretive theory. Influenced by Grele who devised the idea of composure to
describe the processes by which individuals create a ‘usable past’, she identifies two types
of composure: the first being that individuals are able to compose a narrative about
themselves, and secondly a narrative or life story with which they feel at ease.65
Summerfield has described her experiences of oral history interviews where participants
have struggled to negotiate discourses, which has resulted in ‘discomposure’.66 Similarly,
Alistair Thomson’s work on the Anzacs examines the effect of discourses on the
construction of individual narratives and the composure sought by his interviewees. With
his focuses on both individual memory and collective memory he argues that media
accounts and fictional representations of Australian soldiers of the First World War form
part of the ‘national myth’ that has affected the individual life stories of Anzac veterans.
For Thomson interviewees will not achieve composure when their individual narratives do
not ‘conform with public norms or versions of the past’.67 Thus the desire to achieve
composure is linked with the continual revision of narrative and life story by individuals.68
The concept of composure highlights that in an oral history interview the
interviewee may present the version of events they think the interviewer wants to hear.
Portelli notes the common experience within interviews of participants seeking
confirmation that they are giving the interviewer the information they want.69 In addition,
it must be recognised that the discourses of the period in which the interview occurs may
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65 Green and Troup, Houses of History, p. 234.
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be different from the time being recalled and the interviewer must be sensitive to this and
consider the way this affects oral testimony.70 On the one hand, Lummis suggests that a
change in the dominant discourse may prevent interviewees from disclosing certain
opinions such as racist views, if they were once held.71 On the other hand, the influence of
contemporary discourses and subsequent events may not always be concealed. Portelli
argues that individuals are capable of composing narratives that contain attitudes different
from their contemporary held attitudes, for instance Terni factory workers who
acknowledged that:
Violent reprisals against the executives responsible for mass layoffs in 1953 may
have been counterproductive, but yet reconstruct with great lucidity why they
seemed useful and sensible at the time.72
The role of the historian in the interview process is to try to unpick how the
individuals represent themselves. Sometimes this may lead the researcher to ask what
Anderson and Jack term ‘unsafe’ questions about how people feel. Such questions can
produce a state of discomposure in the interviewee.73 Summerfield claims discomposure
can also occur when the historian changes the research frame so that questions are asked
about issues out with the interviewee’s prepared memory frame. She argues:
Discomposure results from a variety of inter-subjective processes, one of them
involves the relationship between the research frame and the memory frame, which
may well not fit.74
Thus, Summerfield assigns great significance to the inter-subjectivity between the historian
and the interviewee. The inter-subjectivity process in oral history can be affected by
seemingly minor details such as clothing, accent and posture of the historian undertaking
the interview.75
Since the 1970s the method of oral history has been developed through its use in
more interpretive studies. The entire process of interviewing human subjects must be seen
as reflexive and dynamic, although this does not mean that there can be no reconciliation
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between both the reconstructive and interpretive uses of oral testimony. The debate over
discourse highlights the benefits to oral history of giving consideration to the cultural
sphere and particularly the importance of discourses in the construction of testimony. Yet,
that is not to render insignificant human agency and the process of interplay and
negotiation between individuals, collective discourses and personal experience, and inter-
subjectivity within interviews. An important strength in oral history analysis is to
deconstruct the process of the creation of narratives, allowing exploration of the subjective
realm of narratives and individual historical consciousness. However, equally, oral
testimony can continue to be used in reconstructive historical research if, similar to using
any form of historical data, the source is used carefully and with respect to the variety of
influences on narratives. Much historical research that employs oral testimony in a
reconstructive sense does this alongside the use of additional documentary material and /
or adopts a process of triangulation through which the testimony is compared to
documentary material, which then, in turn, influences further questioning.76 The
reconstructive use of oral testimony allows the examination of the individual experience of
historical processes and the analysis of the motivations behind decisions and actions ‘that
in the aggregate influenced history but are nowhere written down’.77 When interpreting the
testimony it is possible to use oral testimony in a reconstructive sense, whilst being
sensitive to these reflexive and interpretive issues.
The following historiographical review examines the use of oral testimony to
examine work, and in particular Scottish work cultures. The brief overview focuses on
academic research that uses oral history, be it as a reconstructive tool or in an interpretive
manner, contributing to knowledge and debates on a variety of historical themes relating to
work. However, there are publications such as ‘“Hard work, ye ken”: Midlothian
Farmworkers’ and ‘Bondagers: Eight Scots Women Farm Workers’ where Ian MacDougall
recorded the testimony of women farm workers to then publish the details of the everyday
lives of the women in their own words.78 There is no analysis provided to accompany these
edited testimonies as the texts have been published to make public the words of these
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women who completed jobs that are no longer being done.79 These types of publication are
very different from academic oral history research projects that provide analysis of the
testimony. The following discussion of oral history will focus on some examples from
recent oral history projects on work. Whilst some of these studies have made significant
scholarly contributions in using oral testimony in a reconstructive sense, there are also
studies that have combined reconstructive and interpretive approaches in the analysis of
testimony. A brief examination of the use of oral testimony in exploring the world of work
demonstrates the value of combining different elements of the method.
1.5. Using oral testimony to explore work
The early post-war period has been described as a ‘watershed’80 or ‘golden age’81 in British
sociological research; in particular, industrial sociology. Academics undertaking
sociological studies of work at this time sought to access the personal experience of the
working class to explore experiences of work, the impact of technological change, the
concept of orientation to work, and the inter-relationship between work, family life and
community, and social class developments through participant observation, interviewing
and surveying.82 The democratising purpose is evident with publications such as Coal is
Our Life and Working for Ford, where the authors aimed to present working-class
experiences using testimony. Yet, these studies tended to reveal very little about the
research methodology applied83 and simply incorporated testimony into the analysis with
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limited methodological reflection,84 or adopted survey and structured interview methods to
interview representative samples of workers, in order to compile data relating to the
attitudes and opinions of workers that could be aggregated and from which trends could be
discerned.85 There is an evident link between the format of these later studies,
incorporating structured interview / survey material, and the influence of positivism within
social science research. Whilst these would not necessarily be referred to as oral history,
they are examples of early social science research that utilised testimony, and / or
investigated attitudes and opinions towards social processes at work, to write history.
Despite the aforementioned debates, testimony can be used in a reconstructive
sense to examine the history of groups that are marginalised from historical record. An
area in which testimony has been used in conjunction with existing sources is industrial
relations: in particular, significant contributions have been made through the reconstructive
use of testimony in examinations of the nature of industrial militancy, and in particular,
industrial organisation. One example is the work of Fred Lindop, who utilised oral
testimony as a method of accessing the history of the unofficial action of dockers and the
influences on the nature of the unofficial organisation during the post-war period. Within
his research he has highlighted not only the importance of unofficial organisation in the
docks but also, that despite a collective solidarity amongst dockers, there were also
divisions within this workforce.86
Kenneth Brown’s study of the firm Meccano between 1964 and 1979 sought to
explore the relationship between the economic performance of the firm, management, and
trade unionism. This study used existing documentary archives alongside questionnaires
that were completed by twenty-two former employees and interviews with ‘some senior
managers’.87 Significantly, this study draws attention to the power of the organised
workforce to resist managerial changes, relating to the introduction of new technology and
work practices, so much so that at times the ‘workers successfully defended existing labour
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intensive practices’, utilising stoppages as a tool to instigate industrial bargaining.88
However, Brown argues that the high costs and low productivity at Meccano were largely
due to the failure of management to take responsibility for implementing these changes.89
In this research, the use of testimony supplemented the existing documentary material by
providing greater detail of industrial relations in practice.
Within labour history there has been significant attention directed to the study of
the impact of changing technology and the resulting debate over deskilling. This has
brought about academics utilising testimony to explore these processes that can be related
in a wider sense to labour process theories and the nature of control and individual
autonomy within the workplace. Cynthia Cockburn instigated an oral history project with
employees of the British printing industry. She paid particular attention to men who had
worked as hot metal compositors, as this skilled group had a high degree of craft control,
and had therefore been able to resist the introduction of new technologies until the mid
1970s. She used their testimonies to explore the reaction of long-term print workers to
technological change: ‘“You [now] learn to tap key for letter, key for letter, like a robot.
They try to turn you into an optical character recognition machine”’.90 The usefulness in
this testimony is that it draws attention to the personal experiences of this transition. The
testimony can be used to highlight that there were workers who displayed resentment
towards the new technology and the level of deskilling but there were equally workers that
displayed instrumental attitudes towards their employment.91 Furthermore, while over time
productivity improved with the introduction of new electronic print composition,
mechanisation and the introduction of new technology did not necessarily mean that
workers were subjugated to the machine and simply adopted the new working methods.
Cockburn’s research indicated that workers adapted these new working methods and
devised their own methods of working and personal strategies to work the new
machinery.92 These findings are similar to the research of Nichols and Beynon who found
that in a chemical plant, attempts by management to change the organisation of work and
systems of pay by implementing a New Working Arrangement, the inclusion of oral
testimony analysis details that the response of workers was to ignore the new arrangements
through complete resistance, or by adapting the work methods and organisation as
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prescribed by management.93 Therefore, oral testimony has been utilised to contribute to
debates over the effects of technological change and deskilling by exploring how these
changes were experienced, resisted, or accommodated on the shop floor.
One of the most interesting uses of oral history has been to question assumptions
that are not always supported with research. The supposition of the solidarity of the
working class can be challenged by the testimonies of workers. McKinlay’s research on
John Brown’s shipyard on Clydeside reveals the potential for divisions within the
workforce. The workers within the yard did not exist as one equal group: in fact there were
overt divisions between workers because of the various groups of men involved and also
very clear notions of hierarchy. Awareness of this hierarchical distinction in the yard
becomes apparent within the testimonies for example, tradesmen spoke of looking down
on the riveters. Similarly to the riveters, the plating gang was paid by piece but its
individuals were considered above riveters in the workplace hierarchy.94 Demarcation of
the labour force indicates that there was not an entirely homogeneous working-class
experience but instead that there were divisions: this has implications for debates about
working-class collective identity and solidarity.
To an extent it was the nature and organisation of work itself that manifested itself
in a divided workforce. In their study of music in wartime munitions factories, Korczynski
et al. note that there was a lack of ‘wider corporate’ feeling among the workforces in
factories.95 Workers recalled singing in small immediate work groups, which ‘reflected and
expressed the fragmentary nature of the work itself.’96 Similarly, gangs within the
shipyards had the responsibility of hiring their own labourers, a process that reified
divisions within the workforce: a significant division was based on religious
discrimination. Oral testimony provides the historian access to such behaviour that is
hidden in other source material on the shipyards.97 These divisions within the factory or
industry workforces are extremely significant as they can be used to challenge the
perception of a polarised ‘them and us’ model of industrial relations and furthermore,
highlighting divisions within the labour movement, which potentially contain the seeds of
failure of some working-class struggles. An early oral history study of the Upper Clyde
                                                 
93 Nichols and Beynon, Living with Capitalism, pp. 135-6.
94 Alan McKinlay, Making Ships Making Men: Working for John Brown’s- Between the Wars (Clydebank:
Clydebank District Libraries, 1991), p. 24 and Alan McKinlay, ‘Making Ships, Making men: Working
for John Brown’s between the Wars’, Oral History, 19 (1991), 21-28 (pp. 25-26).
95 Marek Korczynski et al., ‘“We sang ourselves through that war”: Women, music and factory work in world
war two’, Labour History Review, 70 (2005), 185-214 (p. 188).
96 Ibid., p. 189.
97 McKinlay, Making Ships, p. 25.
35
Shipbuilders (hereafter UCS) is extremely important in this respect. In this reconstructive
use of testimony of workers involved in the UCS work-in of 1971-1972 little is revealed
about the methodology however, the historical themes that are uncovered suggest useful
lines of enquiry. In particular, there were key divisions within the workers in the yard,
linked with the apparent trade union authority that was described as ‘dictatorial’ as well as
the perception that union leaders had been ‘bought off’. These workers were so significant
as to pose a threat to the success of the work-in:
within the struggle in the yards there were apparently profound contradictions
between the views of various groups towards each other and towards the work-in,
which had serious implications for the conduct and success of the work-in as a
tactic in industrial conflict.98
Using oral testimony in conjunction with existing documentary evidence can
provide alternative and at times competing perspectives on historical processes. Arthur
McIvor and Ronald Johnston have made use of oral testimony to explore the history of
occupational health focusing on heavy industries such as mining, shipbuilding and
construction. As they highlight, the history of mining is based on ‘written evidence’ such
as the Annual Reports of the Inspectorate of Mines and employers’ minutes. Such sources
have produced what can be called an ‘official history’ and provide top-down perspectives
on events in history as the sources have been informed and produced by management and
government bodies rather than workers themselves. Johnston and McIvor argue, they were
motivated to organise an oral history project due to:
Dissatisfaction with the existing literature, which tended to [either] ignore the
sufferers’ perspective, to depict workers as relatively passive victims…99
Hence, the use of oral testimonies of mine workers allows their opinions and
interpretations to form part of the evidence in the analysis of occupational health and work
culture. McIvor and Johnston have shown that the evidence from official sources seems to
contradict the evidence produced in oral testimonies.100 One example they use refers to
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dust suppression methods that were implemented as the National Coal Board became
aware of the health risk of inhaling dust coming off the coalface. The Mines’ Inspectorate
reports noted that while dust suppression methods were available, workers did not use
them and did not wear masks that were provided. However, from oral testimonies a picture
emerges in which masks were not always provided for the workforce, masks and dust
suppression methods were ineffective, and inspections were not always adequate with
inspectors obscuring harmful results. 101
At the same time, oral testimony also provides a deeper insight into how workers
viewed themselves and the context within which such safety procedures were
implemented. McIvor and Johnston draw attention to the evidence from oral testimonies
that suggests the drive towards productivity influenced the response of workers to their
work environment. Miners tended to be aware of the risks involved down the pit but such
risks were perceived as an inherent aspect of work and, in order to maximise wage packets
and work faster, health and safety regulations were ignored.102 On the one hand such
evidence appears to support the prevalent discourse in the inspectors’ reports in which
accidents were blamed on the ‘negligence’ of workers as opposed to that of
management.103 On the other hand, the testimonies of miners also indicate that
management was not devoid of responsibility in its push for productivity. Miners recalled
management which ‘condoned certain practices’ and would clear up accident scenes before
mines inspectors arrived.104 Therefore, the oral history of workers has produced evidence
that challenges the content of official sources, and as such provides the opportunity for an
analysis of different interpretations of the history of working conditions and occupational
health.
Oral testimonies of Clydeside workers suggest workers put themselves at risk to
long-term health problems, encouraged by what McIvor and Johnston call ‘machismo’
attitudes.105 Yet this competitiveness was not simply fuelled by peer pressure: in fact
McIvor and Johnston have identified the display of a ‘production orientated masculinity’
by management in asbestos industries on Clydeside. They argue that while there was
awareness of the risks of working with asbestos, there exists evidence of firms that told
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their workers it was harmless and failed to offer them protection. Management exploited
the machismo masculinity dominant on Clydeside until the 1970s in order to prevent
workers from openly questioning conditions.106 The ‘machismo’ work culture sustained the
image of dangerous and hard working conditions as natural, where any questioning or
rejection of such conditions could have resulted in ridicule and a questioning of one’s
masculinity.107  The impact of this macho masculinity is evident in narratives where
workers construct a ‘heroic discourse’, displaying pride in the harshness of the working
environment.108 The composure of such narratives reveals that there were twin pressures
on the workers of Clydeside, namely ‘the intertwining of capitalist exploitation and
masculine values’.109 Therefore, the oral history evidence has implicated the management
in debates about occupational health, whilst also suggesting a cultural explanation for the
culpability of workers.
McIvor and Johnston are also aware that the situation of respondents at the time of
interviewing will affect the oral testimonies they provide. Of the miners they interviewed
many had long-term health problems and illnesses because of working in the pits.
Furthermore, as some of the interviewees were actively seeking compensation this could
affect the testimony provided, as the individual may be keen to shift blame onto
management and the government rather than on themselves. McIvor and Johnston argue
that when interviewing individuals with disabilities or illnesses it is crucial to be aware that
individuals are:
Not only reflecting on their past, but were trying to make sense of how the past has
impacted on their present circumstances. Their testimonies then, are a constant and
complex interplay of the past upon the present and the present upon the past…110
A narrative or discourse of working-class masculinity characterises the studies of
McIvor and Johnston. Other oral history analyses of work identify other discourses or
narratives. Murphy’s analysis of work in post-war Australia highlights that the composition
of the narratives is influenced by subsequent experience, the memories of parents’
experiences of work, and comparison with the Depression. Therefore, as individuals were
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recalling their experiences of work during the 1950s - a period Murphy describes as ‘the
high tide of a breadwinner model of work, family and masculinity’ - this affected the
narratives. One of the most dominant discourses to emerge amongst working-class
participants was that of security, which Murphy attributes to the influence of memories of
the Depression that were contrasted with the post-war prosperity.111 Therefore he shows
awareness when using testimony that participants’ views on work were therefore not
simply reconstructions of the past, but narratives shaped by retrospective reflection and
subsequent experience. 112
The theoretical debate over the use of oral history has affected the analysis of
testimony relating to work. The shift towards more interpretive theories of oral history has
directed the attention of the historian to memory, subjectivity and narrative. However, that
is not to suggest that there is no longer any use of oral history evidence as a reconstructive
tool. As Thompson has noted, few historical sources lack bias, and much documentary
evidence is based on the spoken word and has been open to the subjective influence of the
individual or group compiling or indeed composing the source.113 McIvor and Johnston
argue that one of the main uses of oral history is ‘the way hidden aspects of human
experience that are little documented can be illuminated’.114 Therefore such evidence has
the dual function of giving the historian access to both the ‘perceptions and the realities’ of
the experiences of work.115 Furthermore, the importance of using oral testimony in
examining the history of work is not only in terms of providing detail on experiences of
working but, as Hutchison and O’Neill note:
A job is not only the key to a person’s standard of living, but in important ways is
the basis of personal identity and self respect.116
Thus to study individuals’ experiences and perceptions of work provides clues to their
motivations and identity.
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1.6 The use of testimony in studies of work in car manufacturing: key
themes
Before going on to discuss the format of the oral history project on Linwood, it is worth
identifying significant themes in historical studies of work. The previous section provided
a brief overview of some of the more recent studies using oral testimony, in order to
highlight the influences of the theoretical debates on the development and application of
the method. This section will make reference to studies that have used oral testimony to
explore work specifically in the car industry, in order to identify some of the main themes
that have received the attention of academics.
From the 1950s academics used interviews and survey methods to examine the
experience of mass-production processes, division of labour, and the organisation of work,
as well as the wider social class implications resulting from changes in the nature of
work.117 One of the earliest studies of the automobile industry in America was Charles
Walker and Robert Guest’s The Man on the Assembly Line.118 This study included
interviews with a sample of 180 automobile workers and they provided aggregated data in
order to explore the ‘adjustment’ of workers to the ‘new surroundings’ of mass automobile
production.119 They were motivated to undertake this research due to the development of
industrial technologies and the widespread implementation of mass-production methods in
America and the resultant changes in the experience of work due to the extreme division of
labour associated with predominantly semi-skilled or unskilled process work otherwise
known as ‘specialised’.120
This study is important in that it directed attention to issues that became key
features of later sociological studies in America and in Britain such as job satisfaction, skill
and control, in particular, over pace of work. These are enduring themes, recurring in the
testimonies of the ex-Linwood workers interviewed for this thesis. Much of the impetus for
such studies of the car industry in American was the shift to flow line work organisation
and the beginnings of assembly-line technology, which controlled the pace of work. This
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change within the workplace was facilitated by the Taylorisation of work involving the
deconstruction of jobs into smaller, repetitive tasks. The Walker and Guest study looks at
this development by interviewing workers who had no experience of this type of work.
This early study provided information on the experiences of those involved in this
development and also identified that job satisfaction was not necessarily contained within
the job itself but could be external to the job.121
This idea of rewards existing as external to the job process was developed in post-
war sociological studies in Britain which utilised the concept of orientation to work. One
of the most succinct explorations of the idea of orientation to work is outlined by
Goldthorpe et al. in The Affluent Worker study on workers at Luton.122 Their study, which
included car workers, found that the workers who enjoyed their job the least were those
who worked on the assembly line, due to the lack of ‘intrinsic rewards’.123 This was an
orientation to work that was in evidence through pride or degree of satisfaction in work
that was typical of craft attitudes. The research was motivated by a desire to examine the
‘embourgeoisement thesis’, that is, as workers began to earn ‘to provide enough income to
support a relatively affluent life-style’ they would adopt middle-class identities and values.
Goldthorpe et al. established that individuals had a particular ‘orientation’ to work, trade
unionism and leisure.124 Goldthorpe and his co-authors rejected the thesis of working-class
‘embourgeoisiement’ and continued to argue that an instrumental approach to work was
evident among the ‘new working class’ at Luton, in that workers were not concerned that
the work they undertook was not intrinsically satisfying. This attitude was subsequently
reflected in their relationship with trade unions. Their study revealed that only a very small
minority of workers were union members, which they attributed to a ‘moral conviction’.
They contended most workers joined unions due to an obligation to do so within certain
plants, or because of the attitude that ‘union membership pays’. This instrumental
experience of membership was reflected in the low participation of trade unionists in
branch activity and elections and the greater involvement in shop steward elections, which
resulted in the growth of ‘unionism of the workplace’.125 This can be compared to Beynon
who argues that instead of a thriving working-class trade union consciousness, what is
                                                 
121 Walker and Guest, Assembly Line, p. 58.
122 Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: industrial attitudes, p. 38.
123 Ibid., p. 14.
124 R. Bocock, Consumption (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 26.
125 Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker: industrial attitudes, pp. 98 – 102.
41
more evident in the car plants during the post-war period is a factory or plant
consciousness.126
Huw Beynon’s research on industrial relations and work culture at the British Ford
Halewood plant took the form of an overt participant observation study in which he used
discussions with individual workers to explore experiences and perceptions of working at
Halewood. Whilst he did not undertake oral histories as the basis of his project, by using
the testimony of workers his study illuminates different facets of Halewood life, in
particular investigating industrial conflict relative to the ‘the frontier of control’.127 One
such area is the experience of work on the assembly line and how individuals perceived
this.  Discussions with workers reveal resentment towards this type of work as the pace
was determined by management rather than workers. He notes that in this characteristically
unstable industry, while management was keen to maximise production by controlling the
speed at which workers worked, the perception of some workers was that they had to slow
down in their work in an attempt to control the supply of labour. One worker argued: ‘If
we all worked flat out it would be dead simple what would happen. Half of us would be
outside on the stones with our cards in our hands…’.128 Therefore, oral testimony can
allow the historian access to the perceptions of the workers in such situations, that
management productivity drives would not be supported by a workforce that was aware
that working quickly one week could mean a lack of work, layoffs and short-time working
the next.
While Beynon looked at shop floor experiences at Ford, Ken Starkey and Alan
McKinlay conducted a study of management experience in the company, with a
comprehensive oral history project involving interviews with ‘over one hundred Ford
managers’ in Europe and North America seeking to explore the experience of managers
who worked for Ford and their understandings and negotiation of the collective corporate
management culture within the firm.129 The interviews allowed examination of the shift
from the traditional Fordist corporate culture to the new managerial approach that was
labelled ‘Participative Management’. Their research investigates how individuals
experienced and negotiated these developments in managerial strategy and human resource
management. It highlights that despite the apparent success in implementing this new
corporate culture - which consisted of changes in employee involvement and interaction
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compared to the traditional management strategy - the individual subjective experience
which was in fact more unbalanced due to the radical change in the way in which
individuals understood the organisation.130 So both studies of Ford are useful in
highlighting the advantages of exploring the testimonies of employees – both workers and
managers - who experienced change at work. Official documentary sources of the
organisation or trade unions do not provide access to the subjective experience of these
processes.
Oral testimony has been used to explore particular subject areas, processes or firms
when there has been a lack of existing documentary material or when access to official
sources, for instance company archives, has been refused. Len Holden found himself in
this situation when he decided to complete oral history interviews as part of a study of
industrial relations at Vauxhall in Luton between 1920 and 1950.131 He was motivated by
the assumption that industrial relations at Vauxhall were relatively problem-free and used
oral testimony to explore the context, implementation and reception of management
schemes introduced during this era. In doing so, he noted that while initially the firm
adhered to an overt anti-union policy, this developed in the later inter-war period and into
the 1940s in a ‘more paternalistic and subtle manner’, owing to the influence of particular
management figures at that time.132 The oral testimony evidence suggests that at Vauxhall
it was primarily the skilled unions that were organised within the factory, therefore
unskilled and semi-skilled process workers were not unionised. This related to twin forces
of the skilled workers resisting non-trade union membership and employer resistance to
further union organisation.133
Another study which utilises oral history to explore a group marginalised in history
is Steve Tolliday’s study of the organisation of women car workers. This article is based
upon the reconstructive use of testimony to explore the process of unionisation of women
car workers. In doing so Tolliday examines the various influences on recruitment and in
particular emphasises the importance of historically contingent factors in contributing to
periods of union recruitment. Importantly, he concludes by acknowledging that despite the
ability of women ‘to generate militant collective action in response to managerial
offensives’ this was something of a reactionary, transient, militancy from which women
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were not able to firmly establish themselves as important and permanent actors within the
trade union owing to a lack of support from trade union movement as a whole.134
1.7 Linwood car plant oral history project
1.7.1 Purpose
In this thesis oral testimony is used to supplement existing documentary material on
Linwood, as well as a method by which to explore the attitudes and motivations of a
sample of former Linwood employees, in particular their individual accounts of working at
the plant, detail on work culture, and wider historical processes. The oral history evidence
is used in reconstructive and interpretive ways and new evidence about the nature of
autonomy and industrial politics is uncovered. This is interpreted through reflection on
issues associated with inter-subjectivity, composure and validity.
Of key importance is the inclusion of primary evidence related to the balance of
control within the factory: in discussing their work at Linwood interviewees expressed the
ways in which they sought personal autonomy in the workplace which can be compared to
a more politicised struggle for control associated with shop stewards and convenors.
Furthermore, the dynamic of control on the shop floor does not manifest itself as a simple
dichotomy of managerial control met with worker resistance existing as distinct entities.
Discourses emergent within the testimonies highlight the complexities of power relations
within the factory and that while there were divisions and different methods of achieving
control within the workforce, similarly there were occasions when divisions within
management were evident. One example related to the contingent factor of high demand
and resultant higher production targets, meaning local management or foremen were forced
to concede over issues in order to ensure continuity of production. Another emergent
discourse identifies the collusion of senior shop floor convenors and management in
engineering strikes during periods of short-time working. These issues were linked with
historically contingent factors such as the level of employment and cycles of production
within the car industry. This sensitive equilibrium nurtured a volatile workforce owing to
the inconsistency in accepted behaviour or working habits: management, unions and
workers could each use this to their advantage if the contingent factors were in their
favour.
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Central to the research was to analyse how people viewed their working lives, their
experience of the impact of technology and industrial restructuring, as well as their
perceptions of management, supervision and ultimately industrial relations issues. As
Cockburn states: ‘What people experience, the way they deal with events and the meaning
they make of their lives is the bedrock of history.’135 Therefore, arguably qualitative
interviewing is likely to produce data that will be more valuable to the above research
questions than existing documentary material on the car plant.  The qualitative data
produced in the interviews is one form of historical evidence that will give an added
dimension to the existing documentary sources.
1.7.2 Research Aims and Interview Schedule
Based upon the Master of Philosophy Dissertation completed in 2005 and a subsequent
review of literature on work and industrial relations, some pre-existing themes and debates
were recognised as significant for this thesis.136 From an initial review of secondary
literature on work and industrial relations four broad research questions were identified:
1. To examine attitudes to work at Linwood and workplace behaviour.
2. To identify the main causes of strikes and industrial unrest in the Linwood car
plant.
3. To explore the changing relationships between workers and management in the
specific historical contingencies of the 1960s and 1970s.
4. To evaluate what Linwood, as a case study, can contribute to existing literature on
Scottish post-war economic and social development during a period of industrial
restructuring.
These research questions were deliberately general so as not to limit the topics to be
covered in the oral history interviews. From these questions a semi-structured interview
schedule was devised, which was split into the categories of occupational background,
daily experience of work, management, trade unionism, and termination of employment.137
As the oral history research was inductive it was decided that rather than a specific format
and particular wording of questions the schedule was devised merely as a guide and
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memory aid for the researcher. The interviews were reflexive in that the topics that the
interviewee wished to discuss were prioritised before the topics on the schedule so as not
to impose a framework of discussion upon the interviewee. However, the interviewer did
still attempt to cover all of the topic areas on the schedule so that comparisons could be
made between interviewees.
1.7.3 Sample
It was initially decided that a non-probability convenience sample of twenty-five to thirty
interviewees would comprise a manageable and meaningful oral history project which,
used in conjunction with the existing documentary and secondary evidence, would enable
exploration of the issues raised by the above research questions. A criticism of
convenience sampling is that little is known about the population as a whole from which
the sample is drawn.138 However, the chosen method of sampling was mainly dictated by
the lack of information on Linwood employees.139 For an oral history project on a specific
factory, a random sample would usually be identified and drawn from the population, or
workforce as a whole. In the case of Linwood, little is known in terms of details about the
workforce, owing to a lack of documentary records on employees. Since it was impossible
to undertake a random sample, it was decided to recruit a convenience sample.
The recruitment of interview volunteers was achieved through information posters,
press campaigns, and word of mouth. Posters were put up in Linwood community library
and all local libraries in the Renfrewshire Council area, local bowling clubs and the
Linwood Welfare, Recreation and Social Club. On two occasions a small advert for
volunteers was placed in the Sunday Post as well as a short article in a local newspaper, the
Paisley Daily Express. In her study of women coal surface workers, Angela John
highlights that individuals who volunteer to be interviewed were those who enjoyed their
work the most.140 Arguably, wanting to tell his or her story motivates anyone that
volunteers to be interviewed. Therefore, an interviewee may be interested in telling their
life story as they enjoyed their work, equally someone who hated their work could be
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motivated to tell their story so as to set the record straight in their eyes. John attempted to
counteract this by using a snowballing sampling technique.141
Following the initial interviews with individuals who responded to the poster and
press campaigns, the method of sampling developed into a ‘snowballing’ sampling
technique in two ways: first, where personal contacts of the researcher were utilised in
order to identify and recruit interviewees; and second, where those that had been
interviewed recommended former workers and provided contact details or introduced the
researcher to potential interviewees. All participants that volunteered to be interviewed
were selected and the researcher accepted that they had worked at Linwood.142
 Lummis pointed out: ‘A balanced view of industrial relations and working
conditions could emerge only through interviewing all sections [of the workforce]’.143
Therefore, it was a further aim to obtain a somewhat representative sample that reflected
the composition of the workforce as a whole. It was envisaged that the research subjects
would represent both sexes, be representative of different types of work, as well as
experience of work in different sections of the car plant. In particular, managers and staff
from personnel and the Industrial Relations Department were sought, so that the thesis
could also explore the experiences not just of shop floor workers. This was particularly
difficult to achieve, in part related to the lack of knowledge about the living Linwood car
plant population, as well as relating to the convenience and snowballing sampling
technique.
At an early stage there developed problems with recruiting interviewees: there was
evidence of reluctance to take part in recorded interviews by residents from within
Linwood. A visit to the local Linwood Welfare, Recreation and Social Club within the
village of Linwood, led to just one participant agreeing to be interviewed, furthermore,
another volunteer that lived in the Linwood area, agreed to be interviewed, following a
word of mouth recommendation, until discussing their involvement in the project with
former managers and deciding to withdraw from the research. Due to delayed response in
recruiting interviewees and thesis time constraints the decision was made to complete the
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oral history interviews by the autumn of 2007. The result was a sample of twenty-two
interviewees the majority of whom were interviewed on two or more occasions.
There are two main types of bias in the sample: gender and job classification. The
sample is gender biased as only one woman agreed to be interviewed. In one interview the
wife of the male interviewee was present and contributed to the interview; coincidently she
had experienced temporary contract work in the car plant wages office.144 This gender bias
is problematic; in particular as there is no opportunity to explore the experiences of women
who worked on the shop floor. This nevertheless partly reflects the likely gender
composition of the workforce: there were fewer women working on the factory shop floor,
and women tended to be concentrated into secretarial jobs and catering and cleaning.145 A
second important weakness of the sample is the lack of representation of management.
While the sample includes foremen, who were perceived by shop floor workers as
management, as well as staff employees, one top-level manager was interviewed. This
makes it difficult to evaluate the managers’ experiences of work and interpretations of
industrial relations, forming a gap in the historical literature. There was little that could be
done to resolve this issue, in the main relating to the lack of documentary information on
company employees who could potentially be traced. Furthermore, it is highly likely that
Rootes and Pressed Steel managers are elderly or deceased, Chrysler introduced many of
their own American managers who potentially returned to American after working at
Linwood, and indeed top plant managers who worked at Linwood before it closed may
well have sought employment opportunities in the car industry in the Midlands or
internationally rather than staying in the west of Scotland.146 All of these factors combined
to make it difficult to recruit and represent managers within the sample.
The discussion at the beginning of the chapter highlighted that one source of
criticism of the oral history methodology was to question the extent to which it is
representative. With the shift to interpretive analyses of oral testimony this criticism is not
seen as important as the nature of these studies is to examine historical processes in a
specific context and the way the events are experienced, remembered, and reconstructed in
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Linwood, The case for full employment and NO CLOSURE: The Workers Answer [sic], March 1981, p.
45.
146 This was the case for interviewee Adam Fleming who left Linwood before it closed to pursue a career in
Solihull with Land Rover. Within his testimony he referred to another Linwood manager who moved
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an interview environment by particular individuals: therefore the data is highly specific and
is not necessarily to be transferred into other social situations. Equally, within the literature
on social science research methods there has been debate over the applicability and the
usefulness of the concept of validity, part of which is generalisability, as a method of
assessing the value of qualitative research. Whereas some academics argue that elements of
the life sciences; reliability, validity and generalisability, should be applied to all social
science research.147 Others, such as Bryman highlight that first of all this criteria need not
necessarily be useful in assessing the quality of qualitative research. Secondly, that
qualitative methods lack external validity that is, that there are limitations to the extent to
which the findings of a specific research project can be ‘generalized beyond the specific
research context’, does not mean that the research is not useful.148 Qualitative research is
not always about identifying experiences that can be applied to the wider population;
research findings do not have to be generalisable. One of the aims of the thesis was to
explore the way in which former Linwood workers experienced, remembered and
constructed their social world of work in the factory; the interviews were useful in
exploring meanings associated with working at the car plant. However, another key aim of
the thesis was to reconstruct the history of work culture and industrial relations at Linwood
to seek to explore historical processes that are not necessarily documented elsewhere, or to
provide a different interpretation of historical processes than is available elsewhere. The
sample of interviewees is useful, if not representative, due to the range of oral histories that
are encompassed within the study. First of all the interviews provide a source comprising
rich and vivid testimony allowing the analysis of experiences of work at Linwood from the
perspective or life view of the interviewees. As Bryman states, the purpose of qualitative
research is establishing ‘an understanding of behaviour, values, beliefs, and so on in terms
of the context in which the research is conducted’.149 Secondly, the range of oral histories
is sufficiently close to standard themes to offer testimonies that are credible and
convincing however, these require qualification, which is why the analysis of the
testimonies is combined with the analysis of documentary, and published sources.
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1.7.4 Format
The oral history interviews took the form of a single-issue interview therefore, the
interviewee was recruited on the basis that they had worked at the Linwood car plant and
that purpose of the interview was to explore their personal experiences. The aim was to
carry out a two-part interview with each interviewee. Passerini adopted this technique
where she conducted her life stories in two stages; first of all she allowed a free narration
according to the interviewees’ desire, before going on to ask specific question concerning
daily activities.150 The form of the oral history interviews started with the participant being
granted the opportunity for free narrative. Prior to the interview, for example when
arranging the details of the interview, it was attempted to minimise discussion of the
interviewees’ experience and the project research aims. In practise this was difficult to
achieve as some of the interviewees wanted to know more about the dominant themes
within the research and specifically what topics were of interest.151 Furthermore, due to the
necessity to ask the interviewee to complete the necessary informed consent and copyright
clearance forms prior to commencing the interview there were three occasions where the
interviewees spoke about their experiences prior to the start of recording, one of which was
due to having lunch prior to beginning the interview.152
Due to the decision to encourage a reflexive interview the researcher simply told
the interviewee that they were interested in their experiences of work at Linwood in an
attempt to minimise the impact of a research agenda on the interview. The free narrative
section was entirely unstructured and the participant was simply be asked to speak about
work at Linwood. Whilst the wording of this question was not entirely consistent between
interviews, this tended to be either, ‘Tell me about work at Linwood, generally’ or ‘Tell me
about your work at Linwood on a day-to-day basis’. A few of the interviewees appeared
uneasy with simply being asked one general question and if they expressed a need for
further prompting or confirmation about what I wanted them to discuss, they were
prompted with statements such as: ‘How did you come to work at Linwood?’ The majority
of the interviewees adopted a life story approach to this narrative where they started by
discussing their occupational background and how they started at the plant through to
when they left the plant. Yet, some of the interviewees started by discussing the job itself
                                                 
150 Passerini, ‘Work, Ideology and Consensus’, 53-62 (p. 58).
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highlighted the interest in the personal experiences of work at Linwood.
152 Oral Testimony, Dan Nelson, Interview 1; Oral Testimony, Andrew McIntyre, Interview 1; and Oral
Testimony, David Bright, Interview 1. Furthermore, in the first interview of the project there was no
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and then moved on to wider factory life including anecdotes relating to their relationship
with other workers, information related to what could be called the wider work culture, and
industrial relations. This free narrative technique enabled the identification of dominant
narratives relating to the overall topic. For example, at the start of this chapter there is a
brief discussion of George Wilson’s free narrative in which he drew attention to enjoying
his job. His narrative suggests personal autonomy as well as his negative response to
strikes and shop steward strength: all of which are themes developed further throughout his
testimony. The free narrative also served to provide the researcher with information that
informed the wording of questions later on in the interview.
The free narrative section was followed by a semi-structured interview with pre-
determined themes and events being discussed, through questions asked by the researcher.
As mentioned above, the interview was highly reflexive as the initial priority was to
discuss the dominant topics raised by the interviewee before pursuing topics on the
schedule. To assist as a memory aid the interviewees were also shown photographs of
various processes on the shop floor and were also asked to identify their place of work on
an aerial map of the Linwood plant.
The key ethical considerations involved in the research related to informed consent,
anonymity and confidentiality.153 Prior to the oral history interview participants were
provided with an information sheet and asked to sign a consent sheet. This is not a binding
signature and if individuals changed their mind they were informed that they could retract
their consent. Before commencing the recorded interview the researcher’s priority was
ensuring the informed consent of the interviewees and in particular that the interviewees
were aware of the interviewer’s identity including the institution at which the PhD was
being undertaken and an indication of the focus of the interview. Part of the informed
nature of this consent is that participants were made aware that they could withdraw from
the research at any stage or refuse to answer questions during the interview.
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1.7.5 Interpretation
Halpern highlights that personally undertaking an oral history project rather than utilising
existing oral sources gives added value to the analysis as involvement in the oral history
project allows the researcher to consider the ‘critical dialogue’ of the interview process and
can allow for a completely different interpretation, than reading existing interview
transcripts.154 It is important to identify the discourses that emerge in oral testimonies,
what has informed them or have been omitted, and whether narratives have changed over
time. The prevailing discourse cultivated within the contemporary press was that the
Linwood plant was plagued by workplace militancy that contributed to the inefficiency of
the plant and eventual closure. The discourse of industrial militancy was prominent in the
free narrative section of the interview however, did not dominate all free narratives.
This discourse reflecting the dominance of industrial militancy feeds into a wider
narrative that was constructed mostly by shop floor production workers, of all skill levels,
that can be labelled a narrative of chaos. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two of
this thesis but the construction of this narrative portrays a work culture in which: work was
not completed efficiently; workers would sleep at work or walk away from their job;
consequently there was a lack of respect for doing work properly; there was a culture of
alcohol; the trade unions were militant and powerful, the management was weak and
ineffective; and the plant was associated with under productivity and poor quality products.
Therefore, the discourse of industrial militancy feeds into a wider narrative of chaos where
the power dynamics related to volatile industrial relations meant that little could be done to
resolve labour and production issues.
To some extent the construction of this narrative is influenced by the interviewees’
perceptions of the interviewer and presumed topics of interest to the interviewer. For
instance, four of the interviewees had written down notes prior to the interview and used
these notes as a memory aid to shape their free narrative.155 The focus of these notes
tended to be on details relating specifically to work including the date they started, which
company, which area and any promotion or movement to a different job or part of the
plant. The compilation of these notes is useful as it prompted the memories of these
interviewees and in referring to their notes it made the researcher aware of the areas they
thought were important. However, in two interviews the existence of pre-conceived notes
actually served to stifle the flow of the interview. In both of these interviews this was
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caused by the interviewee beginning to talk about their experiences of Linwood prior to the
researcher being able to talk through the ethical and informed consent sheets and turn on
the digital recorder. Thus when the researcher asked the first question of the interview, to
stimulate the free narrative, this was something of a false free narrative due to the
repetition and this resulted in the two interviewees seeming to behave in a rather unnatural
manner: Dan Nelson’s body language suggested he was exasperated with repeating
information he had already told the researcher and he lifted his notes and read from the
paper, not entirely verbatim, but this was not the free flow narrative envisaged by the
researcher; and Andrew McIntyre referred to his written notes and spoke to the digital
recorder rather than to the researcher.156 The free narrative section of his interview started
almost as a pre-prepared speech that he was to perform and in doing so he made no eye
contact with the researcher. Whilst, these two free narratives affected the natural flow of
the interview, the researcher felt it was important to ask the interviewees to re-state
information they had already given so that the recording would contain some of the initial
narratives that the interviewees had mentioned to the researcher.
Furthermore, prior to the first interview Andrew McIntyre had provided the
interviewer with information related to his work through three emails sent prior to
arranging the interview. From these emails it is evident that McIntyre had preconceived
notions of what would be interesting to a student of Glasgow University looking for
Linwood workers who would be willing to share their experiences. The first email opened
with:
Hi there, I saw your poster in the Johnstone library, requesting tales about the car
factory.  I worked there for 11 years ,so here goes. All the tales are allegedly as I
remember them ,so please don't get this old age pensioner sued for libel!157  
The email went on to describe the start of his employment at the Pressed Steel side of the
car plant and his movement into other areas. The language he used to describe the work
environment is almost poetic, as is the rhythm of the email that also contributes to the
feeling of much activity:
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When I first started I was ushered through the Press Shop where big rolls of steel
like  giant metal toilet rolls were fed into huge presses which stamped out car body
parts in a cavernous dark stinking noisy building.  Over the yard from here was a
building where the car bits were welded into recognisable car shapes. Lots of little ,
and some big,tracks zig sagging around the place. Lots of noise and sparks and
people and robots working away.  The cars then moved next door on an overhead
track into the Paint Plant, where I spent the best part of 11 years, man and boy, just
trying to survive.  It was horrendous. I was used to working out doors and the Paint
Plant was like one of Dante's circles of hell .  No out side light was allowed to
dispel the gloom, in case it affected the paint colours. The air was full of fumes
from the chemicals used to clean the bare metal of the cars,and from under body
dip, primer and final coat paint tanks and sprays. The cars were sent on a journey
through street length ovens ,to dry the paint , and the heat and fumes from the many
fuel oil burners used to heat the ovens was  bad.  The noise was appalling . A
mixture of screams from  multiple high pressure air hoses, thunder of air
conditioning plants moving the fumes about and the grind crash bang of the
machinery which transported, tilted, lowered and raised the cars.  … Across the
road in Rootes or Talbot or B.M.C. or Chrysler, or what ever it was named that
week, the engine and gearbox was fitted and the car was driven out to storage.   
Tales? Many. People in fires ,politicians visits, Yankee goof ups , people arrested,
people injured, strikes,lockouts, power cuts, people drunk,women working , men
not working.   Even a ghost story ! Well it is almost Halloween!  to be continued
when I have time.  Hope this helps, let me know and I will send more.158 
The inclusion of the hell or Dante’s Inferno metaphor was not repeated by other
interviewees in the Linwood project, but in their experience of oral history interviewing
McIvor and Johnston found this was a common reference made by interviewees who had
experienced work in heavy industries involving working with asbestos.159 In the
subsequent emails McIntyre went on to provide anecdotes related to the topics mentioned
above. He had preconceived notions about what a university student would be interested in
and this has influenced the content and structure of these emails as well as the free
narrative. Yet these emails are useful as they do provide some indication as to McIntyre’s
opinions and the meanings attributed to certain events or actions for example the
expression ‘Yankee goof ups’ gives some suggestion as to his impression of the
effectiveness of Chrysler managers.
This is similar to the notes that Dan Nelson provided the researcher. Whilst the
majority of the two-page word processed document focus on his employment history, and
some description of the area in which he worked and the products manufactured at
Linwood, his notes are split into three sections: ‘Some of the products manufactured under
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Pressed Steel’, ‘Rootes Motors’ and ‘CHRYSLER!’160 Not only is there a distinction in the
syntax, the last section focuses on criticising the Chrysler management:
I can only say there was a feeling in the factory that the yanks wanted to destroy it.
It was believed that they acquired Rootes to give them a foot hold [sic] in Europe.
It was also believed that they only wanted the Birmingham plant but not the
Scottish. On a few occasions one of the new owners could come into my
department and tell me I was sacked for no apparent reason. I got so fed up with it
that I eventually ignored the empty threat.161
Thus, similarly to McIntyre’s emails, these two pages of notes that Nelson had composed
prior to the interview are indicative as to his initial impressions as to what the researcher
would be interested in, as well as acting as a memory aid. What was interesting about these
notes is the distinction in the type of detail offered and the change in tone between
discussing Pressed Steel and Rootes management and when discussing Chrysler.
During the interviews the researcher was aware of how age, gender and class
differences would affect the dynamic of the interview: how did the participants view this
young, female, university student and how did this impact the details revealed as well as
the structure of the testimony? Within this thesis the testimony from the interviews is used
predominantly in a reconstructive sense but with consideration given to the interpretive
aspects of oral history during the process of interpretation. To highlight both the richness
and complexities of the testimony and to allow for interpretive reflection, each chapter in
the thesis opens with an exploration of the testimony of one Linwood interviewee. In this
section of each chapter consideration is given to interpretive elements such as the inter-
subjectivity of the interview testimony. It is worth noting briefly that in many of the
interviews the relationship between interviewer and interviewee mirrored a parent - child
or grandparent - grandchild relationship. As highlighted by Gieger, this influenced not only
the narratives produced by the interviewer but also the role of the interviewer.162 This
meant that at times when interviewees continued to repeat general anecdotes or positions
that the researcher felt were exaggerated, these became difficult to deconstruct and difficult
to explore the deeper understanding of such events. For example, Colin Jackson worked as
a wages clerk and whenever the researcher attempted to explore different facets of work or
explanations for certain attitudes the interviewee continually reverted back to jokingly
emphasising the amount of time the wages clerks spent in the pub and the dominance of a
culture of drinking in the factory. Jackson’s testimony may reflect the dominance of drink
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in west of Scotland work culture or particularly masculine work identity however, equally
it was felt that at times his testimony could be likened to a grandfather reiterating the
cheeky or humorous anecdotal evidence reflecting the ability of workers to ‘get one over
on management’ that are oft repeated and never fully penetrated.163 A further significant
inter-subjective issue was in the only interview that was conducted in a public setting, the
Glasgow Transport Museum, in which the researcher developed an awareness that
interviewee was attempting to shock in terms of the nature of the detail he was revealing
and the way in which he spoke about his experiences at Linwood. Further reflection on this
interviewee is offered in Chapter Three however, it seemed at the time that the setting in
which the interview was occurring and the relationship between the interviewer and the
researcher affected the way the testimony was constructed.164
It was equally important to be aware of the influence of subsequent experience or
dominant discourses on the testimonies produced. In the interviews with Bill Reid, who
had worked for just six months at the plant as an apprentice, he reiterated a dominant
narrative within academic literature: that a process of de-industrialisation saw workers
from the heavy industries seek employment at Linwood, and the resulting failure to adjust
to the different nature of work accompanied the transference of workplace militancy from
the traditional sector to new industries therefore, contributing to poor industrial relations:
Ah know that a huge amount of the personnel that came to Linwood to work in the
plant were shipyards, an ah’ve read on Linwood the books and so on and it
confirms a lot. It really just puts into place what a saw as a boy that, all the shipyard
practices came and because of that you had the union attitudes, the one man, one
job, you had the management were not to be trusted, the management are a bunch o
bastards, the management are this and the management are that.165
Bill highlighted that he had read secondary literature on Linwood and so this interaction
between the process of constructing his narrative and engagement with the cultural circuit
was taken into consideration when evaluating Reid’s testimony. The limited time spent in
the plant is just one factor that suggests one should not attribute too much significance to
the extent to which Reid was really aware of the nature of the relationship between
management and the unions, and to what extent this was mediated through or informed by
the dominant narrative of ‘them and us’ and of the transference of industrial militancy as
noted in the literature. Yet, within his testimony there is evidence of the layering of
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memories as he also had direct experience of working in the personnel department at
Linwood that informed his opinions on industrial relations:
Ah think one was as bad as the other. Ah say my experience in the, the personnel
side, if they saw a way to mess somebody around they did it, and eh ah was
amazed. Ah’m not sayin it happened all the time, but I caught, caught on a couple
of occasions, “Oh him, aye right we’ll do that”, and ah thought no wonder there’s
problems.166
This depiction of industrial relations in general is at odds with his direct interactions with
his instructor as an apprentice in the training school. Whilst an instructor is a different
position from foreman, this position could be viewed as a layer of authority closely
associated with the company. In his description of his instructor at the training centre he
speaks with pride and admiration for his instructor: ‘what a welder, he could weld
battleship plate onto silver paper’.167 Arguably, as the apprentices were taught in a separate
training centre and were not able to join a trade union, they were, to some extent immune
from the industrial politics of the shop floor. Yet, it is interesting the distinct narratives
constructed on his experience in the training centre compared to his experience on the shop
floor and furthermore, his testimony is important in highlighting the need to be aware of
different sources informing the construction of testimonies.
To conclude this introductory chapter, the above discussion of the developments of
oral history from the 1960s onwards indicates that the oral history project is of use on a
number of levels. The oral history interviews generated data that can be analysed from
‘literal, interpretive and reflexive’ perspectives.168 While much of the testimony is
analysed in a reconstructive sense and used to understand experiences of work and
industrial relations at Linwood, the thesis also gives consideration to the interpretive
dimensions of the testimony. In viewing the interview as an environment where knowledge
is constructed rather than where knowledge is excavated topics explored include factors
which may have influenced the narratives constructed in the oral history interviews, the
physical dynamics of the interview context and what implications this may have for the
analysis. Whilst the dominant use of testimony is in a reconstructive sense, the further
dimensions of the interviews have been incorporated into the examination, selection and
analysis of the testimony, as arguably the two types of uses of oral history, reconstructive
and interpretive, are inextricably linked and should not be viewed as a dichotomy within
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the practise of oral history interviewing nor can or should these be distinct entities in the
analysis of testimony.
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Chapter Two
Source: http://www.scran.ac.uk
Accessed 1 September 2009.
Workers building one of the last Volvo bodies at the factory in Linwood.
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Chapter Two
Experiences of Work I: A Clash of Cultures?
2.1 Linwood Lives – Andrew McIntyre
The paint plant ah worked in eh [pause] ye couldn’t see the sky. Ye weren’t
allowed daylight in case it affected the paint so ye were in a claustrophobic
environment, away from daylight. … There was tracks on the ground where cars
were moving along eh, dragged round on chains and bogies. The cars were sprayed,
cleaned, and painted in various chemicals and paints. They were eh a lot of men
scrubbing and sandpapering the various finishes on the paints. A lot of air hoses,
compressors, fans, big ovens, spray-paint booths, various colours of paint, the, the
place was humid, an hot and noisy and tasted and smelt horrible. Ah, I was an
electrician so, the electricians were in a cage for their base in the middle of this
paint plant built, built on top of a tank of under-body dip chemicals.169
Andrew McIntyre worked as a skilled electrician in the paint plant on the North Side of the
Linwood factory between 1964 and 1975. Over three oral history interviews his detailed
recollections of working on the North Side of the plant - originally owned by Pressed Steel
Fisher170 - provide a personal narrative that gives both a descriptive insight into the plant
environment and the significance of autonomy. The value he placed on his skill at times
meant defending decisions he made in the course of his work that resulted in a clash of
opinion between himself and other workers or management. In the excerpts below
McIntyre details the incident that resulted in his decision to leave his job at Linwood that
includes a defence of his skilled background:
This particular time on the night shift ah got sent for, an one o’ the blokes, “ah’m
no workin’ the machine. Ah’m gettin shocks of ae this.” … So it wasn’t known
whether this man was gettin’ a shock off of static electricity or off of the actual
machine. … The night shift gaffer … came along, this was a large brutal man who,
his word was law … he had a very brutal manner and eh, eh, told me briskly tae get
this machine back, ah’d switched the machine off while ah was goin’ for test
instruments, tae test it. An he told me briskly, “get the machine back on”. Eh an ah
explained, “No, somebody’s gettin a shock. Ah’m gonna test it, it will probably test
alright. Once ah’ve tested it ah’ll put it back.” “Put it on now. Ah’m tellin you put it
on.” An by this time some o the other workers had gathered round about, there’d
been a crowd because it’d be big entertainment. Instead of the usual boring, doing
things every minute, ye do this every minute, ye do this every minute, ye do this.
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Anything at all was entertainment. … By this time there was a crowd had gathered
and the gaffer’s authority was at risk. He’d told me ae do somethin in front a eye
witnesses; ah’d refused to do it. An ah explained again, as best ah could eh, “Ah
was goin for the test instruments. That ah would put it on, if ah was happy that it
was safe to do so.” Eh, “Put it on, ah’m tellin you, ah’m the gaffer. If you don’t put
it on, you’ll get your books.” … Ah said, “Well you put it on if you think it’s safe
to do so.” Ah said, “Ah’m not puttin it on, if you think it’s safe to do so, put it on.
If anybody’s hurt ah’ll tell the court it was you that put it on an ah’ve got x amount
of witnesses here.” But he wouldnae put it on. He finally agreed, eh, “Do what ye
like.” 171
The above excerpt from the free narrative section of McIntyre’s testimony introduces a
discourse that arose at different stages in his interviews, which can be labelled as ‘pressure
of production’, and also exists in the testimonies of other interviewees.
The pressure on foremen to maintain production meant that they in turn put
pressure on shop floor employees whenever there was a halt in production.172 For some,
including McIntyre, at times this pressure resulted in a disregard for the opinion of the
skilled workers and their adherence to proper work procedures in favour of compromised
workmanship that would ensure the continuity of production, but involved a risk to the
safety of other workers173, or led to the production of poorer quality cars.174 Following this
experience McIntyre recounted being told to report at nine in the morning – after the night
shift – to meet with two day-shift foremen:
… they’d said, “Ye should a done what yer told he was tellin, ye’re here to do as
yer told” and ah emphasised that ah was nowhere ae do as a was told. Ah wis, ma
skills were being bought, ah wis there tae sell ma skills eh doin what  a thought was
safe for maself and other people an get the job done. Ah wasn’t there to do as a wis
told. Ah wis never anywhere to do as ah wis told. “Yes ye are.” “No ah’m, not. It’s
the Nuremberg trials ye’re told yer not there to do as yer told.” Eh bla bla bla, ah
remember quoting Nuremberg at them. It’s a shame, what they were tryin’ to do
was to find a way oot cause they’d been stuck wi this problem by the night shift
gaffer. It was more at risk fur them if, his authority was undermined because awe
these guys on night shift woulda been more wild than they were, eh he had tae keep
this position o bein a threat, so that they wouldn’t just go an sleep all night. So it
meant that ah was the one that was gonnae have to carry the can. So ah got dragged
ontae the day shift, which meant a cut in the wages. Ah, lasted the day shift about a
fortnight, every dirty job they could think up, they couldn’t sack me because ah
hadn’t done anything wrong an if ah, they tried to, ah would a fought it with awe
the things. … Eh, so anyway, after about a fortnight, every dirty job ye were, goin
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home even filthier an dirtier than usual an all the odds an ends. Eh, they’d given me
a fortnight, ah’d looked about an got myself another job so at that point ah, handed
in ma notice an left.175
Whilst this oral evidence may not be a direct reconstruction of the exchange between
McIntyre and the foremen in that his verbal insubordination may be reconstructed as overt,
and he may be overstating the degree of his autonomy at work, the constructed narrative
reveals what McIntyre would liked to have said, thereby providing clues as to the meanings
he associated with his work at Linwood. Such exchanges between workers and supervisors
occur in ‘power-laden situations’ where it may not be possible for the worker to reveal
their true opinions on a situation.176 Consequently, as suggested by James Scott, while in
the ‘public transcript’ it may not be possible to out-rightly disobey the orders of a foreman,
the ‘private transcript’ – a form of infrapolitics wherein ‘resistant subcultures of dignity
and vengeful dreams are created and nurtured’177 – allows the worker the opportunity to
express dissenting opinions and challenge the authority of the foreman. It is plausible then,
that the oral history interviews can provide the opportunity for disclosure of the ‘private
transcript’, and as stated in Chapter One, used to explore the ‘perceptions and the realities’
of the experiences of working at Linwood.178
2.2 Clash of Cultures
Jim Tomlinson has argued that ‘Poor industrial relations remain at the heart of many
popular views about the difficulties of the [car] industry’.179 In the Introduction to the
thesis it was highlighted that a disproportionate number of unofficial strikes occurred at
Linwood and contributed to poor industrial relations. Such strikes tended to be directly
related to events on the shop floor; seemingly an instantaneous response by the workforce.
The prevailing dominant narrative tends to attribute the ‘failure’180 of Linwood to difficult
industrial relations arising from a clash between work cultures: craft-based bespoke
production, an embedded feature of Scottish industrial work experience, and automated
assembly. Such an explanation is put forward by Lee:
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Industrial relations were very poor. Established forms of work in central
Scotland…had been hard but varied. Their replacement with easier but boring and
repetitious work did not provide an easy or attractive exchange for the workers.
The level of the performance of the workforce turned out to be poorer than
expected by the employers and led to redundancies and short-time working, which
further eroded morale, within a decade.181
This is a classic or common-sense assumption made about the Linwood car plant:
rooting explanations for ‘poor’ industrial relations in experiences of work. Yet, recent
critical discussions within histories of work have highlighted the heterogeneity and
diversity of experience.182 Therefore, in order to understand why such strikes occurred it is
necessary to examine the nature of work in the car plant and through the narratives
constructed in oral history interviews analyse how people viewed their working lives and
subsequently reconstructed their employment situation in the car plant. The narratives
constructed by the interviewees will be used to engage with the concept of a clash of
cultures and the argument that deskilling occurred. Consideration will be given to the
usefulness of the Goldthorpe et al., ‘affluent worker’ model, and the conclusion that
assembly-line workers in particular seem to have been driven by extrinsic rewards such as
‘better pay’.183 The Goldthorpe study noted that there were diverse ‘patterns of satisfaction
and deprivation’ related to the relationship that workers had with their job and also the
meanings that were attributed to work.184 While the focus of the Linwood oral history
interviews was work and not an exploration of sociability or family life, this chapter
provides some comparison between the oral evidence of Linwood workers and the
Goldthorpe model.
Additional sources used in this chapter include material from the Papers of Cliff
Lockyer at the Fraser of Allander Institute including a collection of notes from research
undertaken at the University of Strathclyde in the 1980s. The collection contains a card
index created by one of the researchers, Lesley Baddon, with one card allocated to each
year. Drawing upon material from documentary sources such as newspapers, company
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handbooks, personnel records, and oral history interviews, each card includes notes on
personnel, employment figures, and strike activity.185 Due to the lack of company
documentation in archives this was a useful source but caution was exercised, as there
were inconsistencies in the card index.
The chapter is structured to initially give consideration to the existing
historiography relating to work and industrial development in Scotland, including a brief
description of the regional policy initiatives that underpinned the decision to locate the
Rootes factory at Linwood.  Secondly, an examination of work will be placed within the
context of the deskilling thesis before finally offering an analysis of everyday experiences
and attitudes towards work. This reflection on the nature and perceptions of work at the
plant provides for an exploration of whether the Linwood car factory ‘embodied
dehumanised and deskilled processes of industrial assembly’, which conflicted with the
craft-based culture of the west of Scotland and in turn contributed to troubled industrial
relations.186
2.3 Perceptions or Misconceptions?
In public discourses the Linwood car plant is synonymous with industrial conflict, with
contemporary commentators using terms such as ‘a hard boiled bunch’ to describe the
Linwood employees.187 In the 1950s and 1960s there were high levels of industrial conflict
with Scotland being ‘one of the most strike-prone parts of Britain’.188 Indeed within the
Scottish car industry alone there were over three hundred strikes between 1963 and
1969.189 The supposition of a more militant workforce in the West of Scotland – in
comparison to the rest of Britain – is a legacy of the inter-war period referred to as the
‘Red Clydeside’ era.190 Consequently, in the late 1950s, amidst media speculation over the
potential development of the motor industry in Scotland there were references in the Daily
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Record and the Scottish Daily Express to the ‘strike happy’ nature of Clydeside workers.191
In existing academic literature these perceptions of the workforce underpin prevalent
explanations of industrial conflict in Linwood and more general industrial histories of
Scotland. For example Payne suggests that the car plant was ‘plagued by industrial
disputes, vitiated by the inexperience of the management and the labour force’.192
Moreover, although Young and Hood observe the existence of various reasons as
contributory to the problems at Linwood, they point to the corollary between industrial
conflict at the plant and problems associated with the transition from traditional to modern
and subsequent implications for jobs, skill, working environments, and labour
organisation:
the background of the labour force, many of whom came from the traditionally
militant ship-building and coal-mining industries; the very different production
techniques in the motor industry as compared with those in more traditional sectors;
and failure to make adequate provision for the necessary retraining and re-
orientation of workers’ attitudes.193
Young and Hood’s assessment endeavours to provide reasons for such militancy but is
weakened by an absence of occupational histories. In addition, the dearth of literature on
the nature of work within the Linwood car plant has impeded an understanding of the
behaviour of the Linwood workforce.
Goldthorpe noted that a particular trend in post-war industrial sociological research
was the study of the car-assembly worker with the assembly line perceived to be ‘the
classic symbol of the subjection of man to the machine in our industrial age’.194 In light of
more recent industrial history such research appears to be confined to 1950s and 1960s
theorising as there is limited development of the theoretical debates or indeed situation of
these debates that could advance an understanding of the workers’ response, particularly
with regard to changes in the nature of work and the working environment in the post-war
era.195 Given that over the course of the late twentieth century demands on the labour force
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and transformation in the working environment are likely to have influenced experiences
of work, apart from some Anglo-centric literature,196 in the main, British historiography of
work has omitted reflection on developments since the 1960s.197 In particular within the
Scottish historiography there is a dearth of research on the nature of work and the focus in
existing publications has tended to be on either a specific industry in an attempt to explain
industrial politics.198 This is somewhat surprising given the experience of work, and indeed
what constitutes work, has fundamentally changed as industry has responded to macro-
economic developments in the global economy, changing technology, and new forms of
work organisation and working environments. Indeed Newlands summarised the effect of
such changes in the Scottish economy as ‘transformed’ from one led by Clydeside heavy
industry to a financial services Edinburgh-centred economy.199 A development also known
as the shift ‘from ships to chips’.200
An exception to this trend in the literature is Knox’s Industrial Nation, with its
focus on the de-industrialisation of the heavy industries presents an overview of Scotland’s
working history and associated social and political developments.201 Even so, Knox offers
limited discussion of the experiences of workers following the contraction of the staple
industries; failing to adequately consider what replaced the steel, coal and shipbuilding
industries, and the subsequent impact on the displaced working-class labour force, nor
importantly how they understood changes in their working lives. Since the 1960s the
combination of regional development policies and multinational companies seeking access
to foreign markets led to a growth in the establishment of branch plants in Scotland. Hood
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and Young’s account of foreign direct investment in Scotland and the implications of
multinational ownership, highlights the implications for work organisation, skill and labour
management.202 Traditional industries based upon predominantly craft-based bespoke
production have been replaced by factory-centred, automated assembly line as well as call-
centre customer service and financial services employment. The key point here is, in order
to understand attitudes towards work, and indeed orientation to work in post-war Scotland,
the notion of ‘transplanted identities’203 has to be analysed within the context of industrial
restructuring. This chapter begins to address these gaps in Scotland’s working history, in
particular commenting on the 1960s and the 1970s as the transformation in work was
beginning to take effect and accelerate. The following discussion will first of all provide an
overview of the process of industrial restructuring before using oral source material to
explore the implications of this process for the worker.
2.4. Linwood and Industrial Restructuring
Following the Second World War Scotland experienced consistently higher rates of
unemployment compared to the UK as a whole; perceived as being the consequence of
lower rates of growth and contracting dominance of the traditional industries such as
shipbuilding and engineering. The focus on regional policy was a political response to
address this situation and encourage diversification in the Scottish economy by attracting
new industries to Scotland. Although the 1934 Special Areas (Development and
Improvement) Act identified Clydeside and North Lanarkshire as one of four designated
special areas in the UK with high levels of unemployment, it was not until the Distribution
of Industry Act in 1945 that Glasgow and Dundee were incorporated into the pre-war
special area – re-named a development area.204 Harold Macmillan’s Conservative
government ‘encouraged’ industrial development by directing investment to such areas;
primarily by refusing Industrial Development Certificates to firms that planned to build in
‘prosperous areas’.205 Such interventionist governance occurred in the midst of what John
Foster terms a ‘political battle’, wherein support for policy initiatives became polarised
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into two power groups namely, the ‘traditionalists’ and the ‘modernisers’.206 The
background to these developments has been well-documented elsewhere but highlighted
here to locate the origin of the decision to establish car manufacturing at Linwood. 207
Although there was a lack of demand for strip steel within Scotland and the
Colville family – a dominant influence within the ‘traditionalists’ interest group – was
against the funding of the mill at Ravenscraig, along with the car factory at Linwood it was
envisaged as a key element of the post-war managed economy. Conceived as a joint
venture whereby Linwood would provide a market for strip steel from Ravenscraig, both
seemingly offered diversification and dispersal of industry that would contribute to longer-
term industrial growth. In spite of this, both ventures epitomised all that was problematic
with regional policy. The focus on employment was driven by immediate financial
expediency rather than a coherent strategy of long-term economic growth. For the
government, on balance, an annual loss of up to five million pounds was less than
expenditure on unemployment benefit and associated financial assistance.208 Following the
threat to finance a rival company the Colville family conceded to government pressure.209
For the Rootes Group, refused an Industrial Development Certificate for the proposed
expansion at its existing operations in Coventry, England, establishing the plant at
Linwood was beset by the ‘handicaps of geography’ and the ‘increased distribution costs’
related to opening a plant north of the border.210 Thus Rootes was directed to Linwood not
through commercial viability, but as part of a major regional policy strategy to tackle
unemployment associated with the decline in heavy industries and as a crucial tool in the
restructuring of industry in the west of Scotland that would contribute to industrial
growth.211 Rootes announced its intention to open a new factory at Linwood on 30
September 1960.212 It was the only car-manufacturing site in Scotland in the 1960s - a
smaller British Motor Corporation factory produced commercial vehicles at Bathgate.
Establishing the car industry in Scotland and providing a market for Ravenscraig
countered the demand on government expenditure rooted in the perception of Scotland as a
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‘liability’ that needed attention for ‘political or social reasons’.213 While acknowledging
the high employment rate in Scotland in 1960s, particularly in Glasgow and surrounding
areas, the Toothill Report in 1961 was critical of the government’s approach. Despite the
obvious bias in the chairing of the committee, Toothill, a director of Ferranti electronics
firm, was a proponent of the modernisers’ case and recommended the modernisation of
Scottish industry through diversification in science-based industry and greater inward
investment in the form of branch plants. The report was critical of the financial ‘prop up’
of inefficient traditional industry and instead supported modern new industries offering
employment outside traditional industrial centres.214 By the time Toothill provided his
report legislation was already in force that enabled the expansion of such initiatives
bringing together both industrial developments with social housing. Linwood and the
surrounding areas were affected by such policies, which meant the provision of both new
housing and a job for the new Linwood workforce.
2.5 The Linwood Workforce
For many of the workers employed at the plant from the early 1960s, the majority of work
is believed to have constituted a sharp contrast with previous employment. Clydeside
workers not only had a militant reputation but were also used to traditional working
methods that allowed for a degree of independent working and individual craftsmanship.
This was in contrast to the routinised demands of assembly-line production in the car plant.
Knox suggests that it was the failure of car workers to adapt to assembly-line production
that formed the basis of many of the industrial relations problems in the late twentieth
century.215 As noted above, this view was shared by Hood and Young who argue that one
of the key reasons for industrial conflict within the car plant was that production
techniques in the car industry were different from those in traditional industry.216 The
‘clash of cultures’ narrative assumes that a large section of the Linwood workforce came to
the plant having worked in the traditional industries. Yet such arguments are based on
assumptions about the West of Scotland labour market. To date there is an absence of
empirical evidence to substantiate such claims with limited information available on the
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labour policies of the various owners of the car plant, and virtually nothing on the
employment or geographical background of the workforce.
Although there are no official employment figures for the Linwood car plant, Sims
and Wood cite the workforce as growing to as many as 7000,217 while Hood and Young
claim employment levels at the plant ‘fluctuated widely’ going from 7500 in 1979 to 5000
in 1981.218 Such figures are at variance with those suggested in documentary material
collected from the plant on its closure, as well as Department of Employment figures and
press reports used to compile the afore-mentioned card index of company details by
researchers at the University of Strathclyde. While the figures are incomplete, in particular
those from the 1970s, the researchers note that after the opening of the factory in 1963 the
workforce fluctuated between a minimum to 1723 and 2376 on the Rootes’ South Side.
Pressed Steel Fisher owned the North Side operation and employed between 4162 and
4809 workers.219 The peak periods of employment at the plant appear to be 1973 when the
workforce totalled 9000 and 1978 when it appears as if 9500 were employed.220
Comparing these to figures produced by a Manpower Services Commission survey after
the plant closed, this detailed the Linwood workforce comprising 8000 in 1974, a drop in
the workforce to less than 6000 in 1976 and then a rise to over 8000 by 1978.221 The
closure of the plant led to around 4800 redundancies.222 Whilst there are disparities in these
figures, the pattern of employment levels is fairly consistent. That conclusive figures are
difficult to ascertain is not only due to an absence of systematic records of employment but
also reflects the existence of periods of short-term working and cyclical employment
patterns resulting in lay-offs and then re-hiring. Indeed, following the Peugeot SA takeover
at Linwood there were 1300 redundancies and from August 1980 the company operated on
a three-day week.223 What has become apparent is the plant was a significant source of
employment in an area that was experiencing contraction of the labour market due to the
decline of traditional industries. Thus, Sims and Wood note the importance to the
employment market of a factory this size: ‘proportionately the Linwood workforce of
7,000 was to Scotland what a 77,000 workforce was in England’.224
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Underpinning the clash of cultures narrative is the assumption that with the decline
in the traditional industries in the West of Scotland, Linwood was the destination for those
leaving shipbuilding and engineering where craft skill and bespoke production
predominated. There is a correlation between the contraction of coal mining and
shipbuilding and the opening of the factory at Linwood. Figures published in 1973, based
on National Coal Board data, indicate that with the exception of one year, the numbers
employed in Scottish coal mining consistently fell between 1963/4 and 1971/2. Notably,
the largest annual decreases in employment figures were between 1963/4 and 1964/5 of
3800 and between 1966/7 and 1967/8 of 5900, dates that coincide with the opening of the
Rootes factory and the Chrysler takeover.225  With reference to industry more generally
Murray stated:
it is clear that most of the decline in traditional sectors (mining and quarrying,
metals, agriculture) took place during the earlier periods (early to mid-sixties).226
This pattern was explored in the oral testimonies and points to the existence of
mixed skill profiles and a range of occupational backgrounds at the car plant.227 Only two
individuals from the sample group had shipyard experience prior to working in the car
plant, although one of these, Peter Gordon, a pattern maker in a Govan shipyard who
became an inspector at Linwood, claimed that many had left shipbuilding to work at the
plant. He recalled his foreman’s response to his decision to seek work at Linwood as: ‘not
another one … off to join the bonanza’.228 After completing his national service then
working for an optical firm, Archie Watson worked in the Unit Machine Block and he
partly concurs: ‘… there was one fella that actually came from Singers in Clydebank and
there was a lot of people … that came from Clydebank and some o them came from
shipyards, some came fae Singers or whatever’.229 Similarly, Anna Anderson’s husband
had previously worked in the Singer factory in Clydebank before working at Linwood and
she also referred to her uncle: ‘John got a job in Chrysler and he was a sheet-metal worker
from Yarrows’.230 Thus there is evidence to suggest that Linwood did provide a source of
employment for those in the traditional industries on Clydeside. Consequently, the
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Linwood factory employed people from environments, and indeed specific factories,
associated with industrial militancy.231
What is also apparent is that the majority of interviewees had varying occupational
backgrounds including non-industrial roles such as a hairdresser, shop workers and
butchers.232 Indeed within interviews themselves this array of backgrounds is commented
on:
Out with inspection ye had eh, candlestick makers, brick eh brick, bakers and
candlestick makers you name them. Came from all airts and pairts … ah know a
guy who was a tailor an he ended up in the soft trim on the North Side. And he was
a tailor to trade.233
This was similar to Dan Nelson’s explanation of the background of the Linwood
workforce:
some came from engineering backgrounds but an awful lot of people came from,
from the working in different, different industries, ye know they could be anything,
they could a been, butchers, bakers candlestick makers, anything.234
He then considered the background of engineers:
some of them came from the shipyards, I know that … engineering on the
shipyards, some of them came from that, and various other places. Probably some
from small factories like myself.235
Others from the sample group emphasised that the Linwood workforce comprised people
from every occupational background and trade.236 The evidence throughout the collection
of oral testimonies points to a diverse workforce from a range of occupational backgrounds
including individuals from the contracting traditional industries as well as people with
trades from non-industrial environments. For employees who had previously worked in the
                                                 
231 The Communist Party’s largest workplace branch was Rolls Royce on the Hillington Industrial Estate.
John McIlroy, ‘Notes on the Communist Party and Industrial Politics’, in British Trade Unions and
Industrial Politics, Volume Two, The High Tide of Trade Unionism, 1964-1979, edited by John
McIlroy, Nina Fishman and Alan Campbell, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 216-258 (p.237) and Glasgow
Labour History Workshop, ‘ A Clash of Work Regimes: ‘Americanisation’ and the strikes at the Singer
Sewing Machine Company, 1911’, in W. Kenefick and A. McIvor (eds) The Roots of Red Clydeside
1910-1914? Labour Unrest and Industrial Relations in West Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald
Publishers, 1996), 193-213.
232 See Appendix Two.
233 Oral Testimony, Barry King, Interview 1.
234 Oral Testimony, Dan Nelson, Interview 1.
235 Oral Testimony, Dan Nelson, Interview 1.
236 Oral Testimony, Dan Nelson, Interview 1.
72
traditional heavy industries work at Linwood posed a distinct change. However, work
culture at Linwood posed a complete change to many of the employees due to the scale of
the enterprise. Also, significant numbers had not worked in an industrial environment.
Therefore, the experience of a clash of cultures is far broader than simply a clash between
craft and automated assembly.
2.6 Attraction to Linwood
A motivation to seek work at the plant is revealed in the following testimonies:
the money. Everybody at that time, the money was the attraction to Linwood. Mair
money. There was people workin in Linwood wi trades like mechanics, painters,
joiners, ye had every, every trade worked in Linwood on the assembly line because
of the money.237
This observation was also revealed in Mike Berry’s comment:
you had bakers, hairdressers, butchers all the, most, quite a bit, a few shop workers
where they were looking for, most of us were looking for extra money to tell you
the truth.238
Similarly Douglas McKendrick’s statement at the start of his free narrative, draws attention
to the importance of the proportionately high wages compared to other industrial workers
in the west of Scotland:
Well ah jist, got a start, a wis lucky tae get a start in Linwood.  Eh, because they
were payin good money at that time.239
The sample is limited but the evidence suggests that workers moved from craft
backgrounds into various jobs at the car plant:
It was the money that drew everybody. You know in ma section of the line …
which was maybe what, maybe two hundred and fifty, three hundred yards long in
ma, ma section o the line. I could have built a house startin right from draining,
from the drainage to the concrete foundations to the plumbing to the brick layin to
the joining to the slatin, you could, they were all there, all tradesmen.240
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This apparently applied to time-served workers who pursued semi-skilled or unskilled
work at the plant, for whom money was recurrently emphasised as the key extrinsic reward
attracting workers to Linwood, ‘Ye know, it was, was a great job that way … the pay at
that time, coming off the roofs an that an goin on ae the lines was phenomenal’.241
Some participants gave more detailed information about the difference in their
wages.  For example, Archie Watson, who was employed as a sub-assembly operator in the
Unit Machine Block from 1963:
What was the attraction of Linwood?
It was more money! Ah was only getting six pound a week…at that time, an that
was me, ah was, ah was, twenty-wan-year-old an only getting six poun a week…so,
aw it was diabolical, but anyway, got that, so ah eventually went out tae Linwood
an they offered me…what was it eight and a half pound a week, ah think it was, to
start off wi.242
The interview material highlights the extrinsic reward of high wage rates comparative to
alternative employment in the region as a determining motivation for seeking work at
Linwood.243 It reflects similar findings in The Affluent Worker research, which indicates
the prominence of pay as an important factor in attachment to work and in attracting
people from different trade backgrounds. The excerpts above are mainly from a part of the
interview in which the attraction to seek employment at Linwood was explored, rather than
attachment the job, but are indicative of attachment that interviewees had with their jobs.
Most of the interviewees identified wages as the attraction to Linwood but layers of
explanatory factors emerged within the personal narratives. As Douglas McKendrick
recalled:
bricklayers, electricians, glaziers, slaters, joiners they were all there because they were
all in and their money was guaranteed. They weren’t getting rained off ye know. See
that’s a bad thing about the building trade ye know, ye could get rained off.244
This indicates that whilst pay was an important attraction, for some tradesmen this could
have merged with the belief that the car plant offered job security and consistency of
employment. Mike Berry, who earlier mentioned that most workers were looking for extra
money provides an additional layer of meaning when he states:
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Eh the car plant eh, tae tell you the truth well ah didn’t know much about it an the
attraction was, ah was gettin finished at a reasonable time at night instead of workin
late in hairdressin and the biggest attraction of all was lookin for eh more money to
look after the family and ma, ma wife, yeah.245
This resonates with Rodger McGuinness’ testimony. McGuinness was a line operator who
worked fitting headlining on cars, and in his free narrative stated that it was the high wages
that made him perceive the job as a ‘great job’:
You know so that was a great job. It was the best paid job I’ve ever had in ma life
as well, because I don’t think there were any jobs nearer, near that kind of money
ye got in there.246
Further on in the interview he then states:
when ah went in there, ah really thought it was a job for life … Thing is, you were
getting, money was excellent, and as ah say, as a guarantee for life. So ah wouldnae
get anywhere near that money as a butcher as ah would in Linwood. So, for
security wise Linwood, ah thought was the best move.247
However, later in the interview, when asked directly about the attraction to Linwood he
stated that in comparison to another job opportunity at the Post Office he chose Linwood
as the hours were more favourable.248 Such testimonies reveal the multifarious complexity
of the Linwood workforce in that it was a combination of factors that attracted
McGuinness including the higher wages, long-term job security and the hours of work.
Similarly, Iain MacDonald’s narrative highlights the layers of reasons attracting
people to Linwood. He joined Rootes in 1963 as a material handler: ‘oh Linwood, oh was
’bout just the money. That wis all.’ He spoke of hearing about the wages being paid at
Linwood prior to working there, ‘They were payin big wages, well double what ah was
gettin … an no bein a tradesman, well that was the place tae go’.249 Having married in
1958 he sought better wages - the move from a pump engineering firm in Paisley saw his
wages increase from nine pounds a week to about seventeen pounds. He also made
statements stating that in the previous job he, ‘couldn’t get on with the man that was the
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manager’ and that he had, ‘had enough’ of the job suggesting there were additional push
factors influencing his decision to work at Linwood.250
Higher wages was not a single unifying reason for seeking employment at the plant.
Also, having previously worked in a highly skilled position in a small company, skilled
coach trimmer Barry King’s move to the rectification section of Rootes in 1962 meant a
fall in his wage:
The money was probably a wee bit better than the, the, money offered in the rest of
the area and, eh, Linwood brought the, what would you say, brought the sort of
level of wages  up in the Renfrewshire area, it was quite low at that time, an ah’m
not sayin that we were well paid, as ah said, ah pay, ah got paid ten pounds, ten
shillings and believe it or not I, when ah moved from Ke, eh Kelvin Coach
Trimming, an then eh, up in Cowcaddens, a worked for SMT and ah was earning
fifteen, sixteen pounds a week. An ah was on bonus when a worked in the body
shop along with panel beaters and eh, ah would eh do write-offs, Vauxhall Crestas
maybe written-off, ah would change all the trim from one car into a new body shell,
right eh ah wis, earnin about fifteen quid a week but a was on bonus. So ah dropped
down to ten pound ten … to go to rectification to do ma own job again hoping that
there would be a future, hoping that would be me for life.251
He further develops this theme of longevity and the notion of security for the future later in
his interview. When asked directly about the attraction to Linwood he stated:
Future. Hoping, hoping that ah would eh [pause] probably, point being eh, wee bit
more comfort, better working conditions, cos ah worked in SMT an it was a body
shop an ah wis up the stair and the front door was always open through the winter.
An the wind howled through an you were frozen to the marrow. … so ah thought
well tae hang, aw tae hang, this is gonnae drive me nuts, this is murder, ye know?
So that was the reason ah said “ah’m gonnae go fur a new factory” because brand
new, clean, heatin … ye know?252
He associated the opening of the factory with future security of employment as well as
seeking an improvement in his working conditions. The Linwood factory was portrayed in
promotional material and the media as the advent of a modern, new era representational of
the development of new industries as outlined in the Toothill Report. There is a sense of
this feeling in Dan Nelson’s testimony. When asked about the attraction to Linwood he
explained that Linwood was a larger factory associated with new opportunities:
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Well, ah felt there was more opportunity there for me … because it was a big big
concern ye know, and it was, medium to sometimes even heavy, ye know, there
was a whole range of, there was light engineering, medium engineering, heavy
engineering and ah wanted that broader experience in engineering. That’s what ah
wanted to do.253
An added incentive accompanying employment at Linwood, in particular in the
earlier years of the factory, was the provision of social housing. Encouraged to move from
Glasgow the ‘overspill’ from Drumchapel, Clydebank and Easterhouse, re-location to areas
surrounding the factory presented the prospect of both a new house and a relatively highly
paid job.254 Interviewees Anna Anderson and Craig Wallace explicitly labelled themselves
as ‘overspill’, in that their families had moved out of the city as part of the overspill
policy.255 Similarly, Andrew McIntyre, after marrying, decided to seek work at Pressed
Steel, which involved moving from Castlemilk to new social housing in Johnstone.256
In the post-war period housing policy recommendations were influenced by central
planning initiatives such as the Clydeside Advisory Plan of 1946. Instigated by the Scottish
Office in 1943, the plan recommended a linkage between industrial developments and
relocation of the urban population outside the traditional urban centres. Within the city of
Glasgow there were significant levels of overcrowding and this was made more severe by
bomb damage during the war.257 Irene Maver argues that it was in 1952 that Glasgow city
councillors ‘reluctantly accepted the need for overspill to alleviate the chronic housing
shortage’.258 The relocation out of the city was further advanced by the Housing and Town
Development (Scotland) Act, 1957, wherein local authorities were given government
support to establish overspill policies with financial assistance from Glasgow, ‘to
accommodate families who agree to move out of the city as homes and jobs become
available for them’.259 Hence, as the factory was being built so were houses in the nearby
area for the new workforce.260 There was significant investment in social housing with
over 2000 houses built in Linwood alone as well as improvements in transport links and
infrastructure such as shops and facilities.261 The provision of new houses, with indoor
toilets and electricity and employment prospects presented the car plant as security for the
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future. When reflecting upon the impact of strikes on the community of Linwood in the
mid-1970s, the Scottish Daily Express summed up the perceptions of this new beginning:
‘They were the nouveau riche. New town, big money, and hope for the future’. Speaking to
a group of ‘Linwood wives’ the article noted:
Mary, like the Linwood wives who are left in all-electric houses that were once the
envy of their Glasgow friends, thought her future was rosy. “We went up in the
world when we came here”, she smiled reflectively. “We never had so much
money, the house was more expensive and nice, and we though we were going to
be set for life.”262
Workers sought additional extrinsic incentives related to housing and from this one can
assume a more affluent lifestyle. In their study Goldthorpe et al., argued that, ‘affluence
had been achieved only at a price’ and that the price was related to the intrinsic rewards
and satisfaction of work itself.263 Further consideration will be given to the affluent worker
model later in this chapter but it must be acknowledged that the labour market in the West
of Scotland and Luton are notably different and the motivations for seeking employment
are more complex.
Three of the interviewees who started working at Linwood as apprentices did not
frame their motives for seeking employment in terms of extrinsic needs, but instead the
desire to obtain a good apprenticeship:
Ah applied for a technician apprenticeship at Linwood ah’d, ah’d originally applied
to join the RAF and failed the medical. An ma father was a, a, a department
manager at India Tyres and he’d said tae me at the time “don’t just apply for one
job, apply for some” so didn’t get the RAF job however ah got the, the technician
apprentice job to Linwood. … So ah thought, well this is gonnae be as good as the
RAF and ah’m gonnae get a chance to work with cars. Went for ma interview,
passed the interview and subsequently got, got a start and it was a six month
contract initially.264
Bill Stewart initially constructs a narrative corresponding to the above then eventually
points to the importance of pay in influencing his decision to apply for Linwood:
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Well, I was at …at school I was good, my best subject was technical drawing. I
always wanted to be a draughtsman, I enjoyed that. … in ma, mathematics,
geometry especially and the drawing office, and working in the, in the woodwork
and metal work stuff. So obviously I was wanting to become an engineer but, but
felt I had the flair for the drawing office side of things. An I went for a couple of,
these were the days when you could get great apprenticeships, and I got
interviewed with a couple of other companies and ehm, certainly Linwood was
handy … And I picked Linwood because it was handy, that was, that was one
reason. And I knew it was [pause] one of the best paid jobs, cos it would be one of
the best paid jobs.265
This is similar to Craig Wallace’s narrative whose motives for accepting the offer of an
apprenticeship at Linwood was related to the intrinsic rewards associated with the nature of
work as well as the desire to improve his future opportunities in comparison to those of this
family:
Ah think like ma grandad’s side of the family, were just aw blue collar workers so
they’d never knew anythin else …  and eh, wi him bein an old bugger ah think the
likes of ma dad growing up “naw, don’t wanna be like him”. … Just the way you
were brought up.  … gettin an apprenticeship was a huge big thing … if you could
get an apprenticeship it gave you a good standin … and ah know apprentices
that’ve worked for me that have moved on tae, to brilliant fantastic jobs cos it gives
you a good standin and if the opportunities are there if you’ve bright enough you
can better yourself and better yourself.266
The motivations for seeking an apprenticeship are not entirely dissimilar from those
moving from other types of employment. It could be suggested that the narratives
composed by people who undertook an apprenticeship then worked in skilled positions at
Linwood and beyond may construct a narrative that prioritises intrinsic rather than
extrinsic rewards. Yet, this could be challenged as the oral testimonies suggest that there
were workers who left their trades to seek unskilled or semi-skilled jobs due to the
attraction of higher pay and apparent job security accompanying employment at the
Linwood car plant.
The oral testimonies partly support dominant assumptions about the composition of
the workforce and to an extent reinforce standard perspectives for industrial sociology
about the labour process and its tensions. In the Affluent Worker study Goldthorpe et al.,
noted that: ‘… it was the immediate relationship between men and their jobs which was the
aspect of their work most capable of producing either some feeling of personal fulfilment
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or, on the other hand, some clear sense of deprivation’,267 thereby linking the ‘nature’ of
work to intrinsic rewards. Yet the following statements also lend credence to the notion
that people were attracted by money regardless of the nature of the job and their
occupational background:
Chrysler put the, the wage barrier … on the map for people.  Before that people
were quite happy where they’re working. But people went ae Chrysler for the
money. That’s basically it, no for the job, just for the money. 268
While the above discussion has focused on the initial attraction of work at Linwood,
experiences of work differ and are determined by meanings that individuals assign to work.
As the nature of jobs is linked to satisfaction that workers’ experience, the chapter will
now turn to an examination of perceptions of work held by Linwood employees. Initial
perceptions of Linwood will include description of the physical workplace environment as
well as the types of jobs. This will be preceded by an exploration of the concept of skill in
order to address its usefulness in understanding re-adjustment to work at the Linwood car
plant.
2.7 Skill in the Context of Industrial Restructuring
Within the historiography of twentieth century Scotland, Knox provides the most holistic
discussion on the changing nature of skill. He perceives industrial restructuring to have had
negative implication for skill and consequently sets the agenda of the debate within the
deskilling thesis. 269 The weaknesses in his argument primarily lay in his focus on heavy
industry and, with the exception of a dominant craft culture, the suggestion of a somewhat
homogeneous working-class experience. Furthermore, he does not question what
constituted the skill that these craftsmen sought to defend. His explanation of industrial
tension at Linwood implies that the recruitment of men who were previously craft workers
effected a process of deskilling, all within a wider context of the degradation of skill in the
Scottish economy. The following discussion on skill will be used to shed light on how
workers within heavy industry perceived their craft character.
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2.7.1 Defining Skill
Providing a precise definition of skill is problematic. In countries such as Italy and
Germany skill has not been a fundamental attribute defended by the labour movement.
Instead workers were defined and paid in terms of grades and as determined by individual
companies.270 This is a significant difference with Britain where the defence of skill has
been a crucial element in the power balance between capital and labour, as well as
remaining important in terms of social class identity. Definition is difficult as skills tend to
be specific to systems of production. As Thompson noted, if definitions were based on
income or ‘occupational status’, despite their highly specialised knowledge and ability,
agricultural workers would be considered of lower skill than office workers.271  Bradley
argues that the notion of craft as an ‘objective view of skill’ impedes the assessment of
changes in skill.272  For example, coal hewers regarded themselves as skilled workers as
they utilised their ability to use a variety of tools to bring coal off the face as well as
understanding the character of the pit they were working in. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries exploiting the best quality and quantity of coal to meet demands
necessitated geological knowledge of the seam and friability of the coal; a knowledge
equally important when blasting down coal and associated application of appropriate
amounts of explosives, purchasing of sulphur and fuses replaced undercutting. 273 Each
method of extracting coal required both manual skill and specific knowledge, highlighting
the complexity of definitions and draws attention to the process by which jobs are labelled
as skilled when new technology and mechanisation are introduced.
More suggests that a distinction be made between ‘genuine skill’ and ‘socially
constructed skill’; the former a learned combination of skill and knowledge whereas the
latter the agency of the workforce in denoting groups as skilled, semi-skilled or
unskilled.274 Thereby the process by which a specific job comes to be labelled as skilled
can be indicative of collective worker resistance as justification in the negotiation of higher
wages. Maintaining the distinction was an imperative and for groups such as the craft
workers in the shipyards, entry to their ‘trade’ was protected by, for instance, an
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apprenticeship system. For Woods, rather than a strategy of providing necessary specialist
training, the system existed to ‘reinforce exclusive unionism’.275
2.7.2 Construction of Skill
Defence of skill has been a central tenet of the British trade union movement, with
craftsmen among the first to form collective organisations in the form of guilds to protect
the interests of their workers. In addition skill differentials were gender biased, which
meant that women’s work tended to be characterised as unskilled as craft unions sought to
restrict the employment of women.276 Increasing mechanisation and the implementation of
new technology within the traditional industries impinged on the organisation of work and
the skilled craftsman’s identity with the concept of job control. Until the post-war period
industry was labour intensive; men worked in skilled squads giving them autonomy over
the pace of work. Within the coal industry, the change from ‘pillar and stoop’ to
mechanised coal-getting meant physical strength replaced skill – affecting the division of
labour, discipline and pay as men worked in larger teams performing a more ‘specialised
role’; a process whereby the skilled miner was ‘reduced to the status of a living tool.’277 It
was a similar experience in the shipyards. For example, the reliance on the gang system in
plating was obviated with the introduction of the multiple or ‘piano’ punch. It gave rise to
more prefabricated work, some of which was done indoors and resigned the skilled plater
to semi-skilled work under a greater degree of supervision.278 Such changes in the working
environment within the shipyards prompted workers to protect their craft knowledge and
defend their skill.
As noted, protecting the status of skilled workers was achieved in part by adherence
to the apprenticeship system, albeit, rather than formal training, apprentices would learn by
observing skilled workers, picking up skills as they went along. 279 The apprenticeship
system was well-established within industries such as shipbuilding and entrance to trades
was guarded by strong trade unionism on Clydeside that protected minimum wages and
working conditions, even during the depression.280 Yet the social construction of skill is
evident in apprenticeships at John Brown’s Shipyard in Clydebank. During the depression
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in the 1930s this shipyard was dependent on apprentices as they could be paid lower wages
than skilled craftsmen this resulted in the active concealment upon completing the official
period of apprenticeship.281 This system prevailed during the inter-war period when men
maintained their apprenticeship status while undertaking the work of skilled craftsmen and
questions not only what elements of apprenticeship were simply ‘time-serving’, but why it
lasted so long. Although the significance and formalities of apprenticeship had declined, it
was a system that survived into the post-Second World War era. Hence, the introduction of
new technology and new forms of work organisation in industries established in Scotland
as part of post-war economic restructuring, seemed to be in stark contrast to the strong
craft culture on Clydeside. It is clear from the oral testimonies that the car plant, as one of
the new industries, attracted a workforce with a diverse range of skills. Combined with the
nature of work in the plant it is feasible that those from traditional craft backgrounds may
have perceived a greater need to protect their skilled status.
2.7.3 Deskilling
A whiggish interpretation of history would lead to the expectation that with improved
education and training, over time there would be an increase in workers’ skills.282 Yet
Knox argues that specialisation increased the degree of deskilling in fitting and turning
within engineering.283 Further, McIvor notes that studies by Thompson, Hobsbawm and
Foster on a variety of work groups have also rejected this interpretation of skill
development.284 Braverman is one of the major proponents of this opposing thesis.
Underpinned by Marxist ideology he believed that the application of scientific
management or Taylorism to work processes essentially constitutes the separation of
knowledge and practical application, and when combined with increasing mechanisation of
work within factories, as well as clerical work environments, resulted in a continual
deskilling process.285 Indeed as Meyer writes, in his study of work at the Ford Highland
Park plant in Michigan: ‘[t]echnical and organizational innovation displaced skill’ as
unskilled workers could be taught limited repetitive tasks and had no responsibility for the
organisation of their work.286 These workers were known as new types of specialised
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workers.287 Over the course of the twentieth century Scottish employers adopted scientific
management practices that led to a reorganisation of work methods. There is evidence of
this as early as 1911 in the Clydebank Singer factory. Kenefick and McIvor point out that
work began to be broken down into simpler, more repetitive tasks. Subsequently, rather
than workers having some control over the pace of work, machines set the pace thus the
establishment of scientific management within Singer meant the ‘dehumanising and
degrading’ of the worker, which overwhelmingly changed the experience of work.288
Furthermore, there was an increase in the number of married women in the labour market
and multinational employers, in particular American companies, sought semi-skilled
female employment for assembly work.289 Coupled with the development of factories in
new areas, such labour policies were favoured by these new industries. Indeed Lee
suggests that in a bid to avoid the ‘organised labour’ of militant skilled workers from the
traditional industries, electronics firms setting up in Scotland during the post-war period
established policies of employing women. Therefore, the evidence suggests that in new
industries employers attempted, through their recruitment policy, organisation of work and
technology, to avert recognising the traditional skilled workforce and associated work
culture.
If skill is considered as dynamic and evolves with developments in technology,
arguably perceptions of skill are retrospective and motivated by the desire to sustain
autonomy in the workplace; delineated by associated monetary value that can be used in
wage negotiations. The social construction of skill is not simply a tactic of labour.
Management’s acknowledgement of the differences between groups of workers can in
effect be a divisive approach to the collective solidarity of the workforce.290 In factories
managerial tactics such as setting the pace of work to the most experienced workers, as
well as the system of quality control, were resented among the workforce and caused
industrial agitation.291 As the dominant explanations for industrial conflict relate to the
difficulties in adjustment for shop floor workers, the focus of this thesis is the narratives
produced by this group of workers.
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2.8 Evidence of Deskilling?
2.8.1 Skill in the car plant
Assembly or flow-line work is synonymous with car manufacturing yet this perception can
be challenged as evidence from the 1971 and 1981 population censuses reveal
consecutively that repetitive assemblers comprised just 13 and 10 per cent of the car
industry’s manual workforce.292 The relatively low percentage of assembly-line workers
accords with the interviewees’ narratives of a shop floor consisting of small parts work,
inspection, material handling, fork-lift truck driving and on the clerical side wages clerks
and secretarial staff. There would have been a proportion of jobs within the car factory
identified as skilled, but it was small by comparison as empirical evidence on the
composition of the workforce at the time of Linwood’s closure in 1981 indicates; 14.3 per
cent of the 4893 employees were classed as ‘manual skilled workers’, whereas 49.3 per
cent were noted as ‘manual semi-skilled’ and a further 15.7 per cent were considered as
‘manual unskilled’.293 These figures are slightly different from the survey of nearly 4800
workers made redundant after closure which indicated that the majority of the workforce
performed manual work and that ‘79 per cent of the manual workers and 65 per cent of the
total workforce were semi-skilled’.294
Whilst these figures differ slightly, they highlight that the largest proportion of the
Linwood workforce was engaged in semi-skilled manual work. However, it is important to
bear in mind that the proportion of skilled work may have been higher in the earlier years
of the car plant. For example, it was noted in a document produced by the workforce that
from 1967 the work in the Linwood tool room started to be transferred to other locations
within the UK for example ‘Body Design, Jig Design, Die Design and Estimating,
including the body Drawing Office’.295 The same source reports that whilst in 1967 there
were 300 employees in the Linwood tool room in 1967, yet by 1981 there were just 30.296
Due to the automated control of production at Linwood many of the semi-skilled
workers were likely to have worked on the main assembly lines and sub-assembly lines.
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With reference to the work process itself, documentary evidence and oral testimonies
suggest a continual deskilling process and subsequent absence of intrinsic rewards relating
to work in concurrence with Knox’s thesis. In order to evaluate this argument
consideration will be given to the experiences of skilled work at Linwood and the link
between skill and engagement with work.
From the Rootes era there was a purpose-built Technical Training School at the car
plant,297 and through different periods of ownership various apprenticeship schemes
operated at Linwood.  Three of the interviewees started at the car plant as apprentices with
one leaving before completion of the apprenticeship.298 The youngest was Craig Wallace
one of thirty apprentices who started in the Training School in 1979. Wallace’s
apprenticeship as a fitter machinist consisted of one year in the training centre – including
day release at a local further education college – two years in Die Repair and the main
Tool Room, before completing his final two years in Coventry after the closure of the
Linwood factory.299 Thus it seems that within the Linwood car plant there was the
continued provision of apprenticeships until the closure of the plant.
When exploring their engagement with work, it is Bill Stewart in particular who
describes his apprenticeship as a, ‘Really good interesting job’.300 He started in Linwood in
1960 as an apprentice draughtsman, which took five years including two years’ workshop
experience and three years in the Press Tool Design Drawing Office.301 When discussing
work, a prevailing feature in his narrative was his respect for skilled work and his skilled
knowledge was a dominant aspect of his workplace identity. In particular he appreciated
the autonomy the press tool designers were able to assert over the designs they produced
and compared this negatively to engineering draughtsmen:
in the engineering drawing office everything had to be the right, printed the same
way, and neat and tidy whereas in the tool design office you could use your own
flair, your own printed style. You, you could look at somebody’s drawing and ye
knew that was Harry’s, that was Ian’s or that was Gordon’s because you knew their
style. And it was nice to be able to do that.302
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However, in his second interview Stewart revealed that at times the apprenticeship had
involved doing jobs that he found boring:
… and some of that was a bit boring but, because you were workin in different
departments ye know you were learning and picking up lots of different things, you
were meeting other people anyway so there was, there was good bits about it but
sometimes you got jobs which… were a bit boring… but once a was in the drawing
office that was different. You were actually given live work and design work and I
thoroughly enjoyed that.303
Therefore, despite the apparent engagement with his work, appreciation of skilled work
and his enjoyment of the job, there were varied experiences. In spite of this, a dominant
theme in Stewart’s narrative is of the prominence of his skilled identity. This is evident
when he told of the willingness of the apprentices to stay at work in their own time in order
to learn more about the job:
We actually asked if we could stay, if we could stay on at night to, to tell us a bit
more about it. So we, we were quite willing to spend our own time and he was
quite willing to sit with us an, and find, a bit, a little bit more about it especially the
more complex designs.304
This desire to learn combined with his respect for the training involved in development of
a skill is apparent when he explains:
it was a great job. I thoroughly enjoyed it …We had some guys in the drawing
office who’d come through, older than us, who’d served their apprenticeship and
had done some die design for … some of the smaller production jobs but they,
they’d developed into becoming good press tool designers and, we picked it up.305
Bill Reid presents a similar narrative in which he expressed a pride in the trade as well as a
respect for skill of those training the apprentices:
And we went to training school and we had a wonderful little man. An instructor
called Mr. O’Brien.  Dapper little gentleman … he, he had a colleague who was the
same but ah’ve forgotten his name, great sense of humour, wicked wee man, what a
welder, he could weld battleship plate onto silver paper. An he taught well an he
taught by example eh an not a wee man tae mess around with. Probably came off
the line, probably served his time, did his trade, worked for years an that’s how he
became ehm, the engineer technician.306
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The acknowledgement of skill as a laudable attribute in the workplace emerged later in the
interview when discussing the tasks apprentices had to undertake:
But those were the lovely basic skills. We learned about lead loadings. A skill
that’s long gone now other than the classic car trade. We learned about dressing
panels, and learned about little dents and so on.  And the apprentice schools were
good.307
Despite his engagement with work, Stewart expressed sympathy for what he perceived as
the different experience for line workers in the CAB with a more negative insight into their
work:
The noise it’s horrendous. Spot-welding guns battering away as well. Ah can
understand sometime it, I’m quite sure guys would purposely do something tae stop
the line. Because he just got maybe fed up with the foreman or fed up with the job
or just couldn’t take it.308
It was a similar experience for Craig Wallace’s narrative when he spent time on the shop
floor during his apprenticeship; he also exhibited a disconnection from the product he was
producing:
You’re buildin cars but you’re a million miles away from this thing that rolls off
the production line.309
It is a perception shared with Bill Reid who worked at Linwood for six months in 1971 as a
technician apprentice but decided to leave the car factory to pursue a career in the fire
brigade, as he did not like the factory. When asked to recall impressions of the Linwood
plant Bill Reid stated, ‘it was pretty horrific there’s no two ways about it’.310 Yet later on
he describes the production processes in a romanticised yet vivid way:
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And the lines were wonderful ye know, you’ve huge rows of cars, an ye’ve had all
the, the air tools runnin’ an the smells and the lights an the it wis, they were
building Hillman Hunters and Imps. Ah’ll come back to the Imps, and ah
remember, there was a very special Hunter at the time, the Hunter GLS and the
Hunter GT ah think it was that had an engine a Holby engine which sat at the back
of that part of the plant and they had brightly coloured air filters, assemblies and
you, ye know ah, ah lusted after one of these. Ah didn’t have a car, but ah wanted
the engine ye know. It was how, how stupid can you get? That was a nice
memory.311
The positive narrative and romanticised perception of the products combined with his
earlier comments on respect for skilled engineering are juxtaposed against Reid’s
comments on disliking the atmosphere at Linwood due to troubled industrial relations
which will be explored in Chapter Five of the thesis. It highlights the different levels on
which people experience their job and working environment. As a fire-fighter he expressed
the satisfaction gained from working for a public service and knowing that he was ‘saving
lives’:
when ye come down the stair wi the wee girl in yer arms an ye go, [nods] “Ah did
that.” … Workin on an assembly line gives you absolutely nothin. You just got ae
have the money. [sighs] Bugger that.312
These perceptions of assembly-line workers’ experience of work are quite different from
that experienced by the apprentices and demonstrate the disjunction between personal
experiences of work at Linwood and perceptions of work in other sections in the plant.
This was apparent in the narratives produced by all the former apprentices.
Traditional skills were sustained through the apprenticeship system at the plant but
the training points to a process of deskilling as noted in Mike Berry’s description of
welding; a skill that had been associated with the heavy industries:
And did you get training when you went into the car plant, or when you went into
Pressed Steel at first?
Oh yes, you get, you get training eh very basic, basic eh, they’ll show you what to
do and a couple of hours and you’re right into it. Welding they had to took, take
you away in for eh, a welding course which was pretty basic again. It wouldn’t pass
as a, you wouldn’t pass yourself as a, eh qualified welder, eh to get into a factories
but eh, in that, it was all, all small stuff. Eh, and as far as the trucking you got
training and they brought in, people in to train you. … That’s about all.313
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This testimony is consistent with Meyer’s findings about the similar ‘destruction’ of
traditional craft metalwork skills in Ford, ‘superintendents and foreman claimed that they
could make an unskilled immigrant into a “first-class molder [sic] of one piece in three
days”’.314
David Crawford described his job as semi-skilled. He had worked previously as a
butcher and then worked as an inspector from 1954 until closure in various buildings.
When asked about training he stated, ‘It was on the job trainin, main, mainly at that time’:
Aye some, some o them eh, came intae there, they could be bricklayers, ye got
everythin. But if they were tradesmen, they were employed eh, in the engineering
trade, they were employed as eh, trained inspectors an they worked in the machine
room, where, where it was all eh, precision work.315
Furthermore, employment of workers for semi-skilled and unskilled jobs was not
acknowledged as necessitating comprehensive or indeed structured training. The majority
of the semi and unskilled manual workers described the training as on the job training; it
consisted of watching another employee doing the jobs for a short time period and then
taking on the responsibility themselves as revealed in the following exchange between the
interviewer and Archie Watson, a process worker assembling components in the Unit
Machine Block:
How long was the training?
 [Laughing] Five minutes!
 [Laughing] Five minutes?
They jist took ye tae a machine an says right, press this, press that, press this, press
that … an that’s it. Right ok yer daen it. [both laugh] So, oh but, during the period
yeh end up daen a lot o other things as well, an ye jist pick it up as ye went
along.316
Later on in the interview he reiterates:
tell you, five minutes gettin shown how to work a machine. “That’s you. Ok? Right
start. Carry on.” [laughs] Ye don’t mess in, that’s it, flung in at the deep end.317
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The idea of being ‘flung in at the deep end’ forms part of the narrative of chaos that is
constructed by numerous interviewees, ‘we got two days of learnin how to do the headlinin
and you had tae be up to speed on the two days.318 McGuinness told of missing the training
due to being initially allocated to another section of the factory, and describes how:
Ah was more or less in at the deep end right from the scratch, “Do this, do that.
Right, do this an that.” But after about a dozen motors, ye know? You could do it
blind folded. … it was easy tae do.319
This expression of the job being easy is similar to the Douglas McKendrick’s testimony:
The man that wis doin the job, ah hud tae walk along wi him an watch him puttin
the, the see I started puttin the carpets in, ye know.  … But that was what ye did,
and ye learnt on the job. Ah mean there wis no skill attached to it … after ye’d been
doing it fur maybe three month ye could do it wi yer eyes shut. Ye know? Ye
literally could do it wi yer eyes shut … do it by touch.320
All three of these men were engaged in track work, Watson on sub-assembly, McGuinness
on the main track, and McKendrick on the main and rectification tracks, and their
testimonies highlight the minimal training reflecting the lack of technical skills involved in
their jobs. Some academics have argued that for workers who had never worked in such an
environment this new form of work could be considered as a form of re-skilling. Watson
and McGuinness had never worked in a factory environment, therefore working as a
process assembler was a form of re-skilling. Yet taking the example of Watson, as the job
comprised a small repetitive task in the process of gearbox assembly – the component parts
were delivered to him – and he was not involved in the planning of the task, the actions
involved in this process were deskilled as they reflect the division of labour as described
by the likes of Adam Smith.321
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2.8.2 The Nature of Work
At Linwood developments reflected those in other car plants with the application of
scientific management techniques and included Measured Day Work (hereafter MDW) at
the Linwood plant.  For workers who had previously worked under a piece work system of
payment in the shipbuilding and engineering firms of Clydeside the move to Linwood,
where MDW existed in the South Plant 1963 and introduced in the North Plant in 1968,
was a contentious issue.322  The response of the workforce to implementation of such
techniques is explored in Part Two of this thesis. Under this system the company issued
man assignments calculated on the number of men necessary for each task and the duration
of each job, which meant that work was timed and rated.  Conflict arose when shop
stewards and the workforce disagreed with management over the duration and number of
workers needed to complete a job. Beynon notes that within Ford Halewood many of the
workers were sceptical of these timings and they were not perceived to be scientific.323
Similarly, there is documentary evidence produced by the trade unions at the time, which
similarly makes the case that the system of MDW was not scientific.324 Shop stewards
sought to control the availability industrial – work study – engineers had in measuring
work, whilst they defended the scientific nature of correct timing and ratings for processes
and tasks. As explained by Adam Fleming, an industrial engineer who worked up to the
position of Production Manager:
Eh, and I had a good number of Industrial Engineers because we were still, we
were still working in the early days on the piece work system eh, and we were
moving off that one to Measured Day System. That was, that caused big industrial
relations problems both at Linwood and in the rest of the car companies in the
country. But, they, they recognised that when we were man, when we were
monitoring hours per car we really needed to know what the, the eh the wages bill
was gonnae be and of course when you were on piece work an other types of
systems that was something that wasn’t known so eh, it varied from week to week
so there was a big desire for everybody in the, in the car industry to go onto
Measured Day Work.325
Division of labour by management was also determined by the implementation of
technology. Braverman argued that increased automation results in increasing deskilling of
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work.326 One particular method of production that has been debated has been the effect of
flow / assembly-line production.  In this kind of production, each worker undertakes one
element of production repeatedly and the line controls the speed at which they work. With
the stages of the production process broken down to limited tasks the work was highly
repetitive and controlled by management who set the pace of the machines. Consequently,
during peak periods workers on the car-assembly line were capable of producing sixty
vehicles per hour. The technology and organisation of production in car manufacturing
meant that there was no necessity for the process workers to be skilled. Meyer refers to an
early study of automobile production that describes automobile workers as:
“shaped to meet the demands of these rigid machines. The requirements of
dexterity, alertness, watchfulness, rhythmic and monotonous activities, coupled
with a lessening of much of the older physical requirements… .”327
It seems that when discussing the experience of work at Linwood debates about deskilling
are not entirely useful as for a large section of the workforce this concept had limited
significance and the continued use of the term is reified by the process workers being
labelled as semi-skilled although some even seemed unsure themselves as to whether to
call their job semi-skilled or unskilled. McKendrick’s narrative highlights that to work on
the assembly line no skill was required and no prior experience of the job. He sated:
But there wis no, specialists until you learned, you only became a specialist there at
the job ye know.328
He therefore identifies the work as being highly specialised but when I asked how he
would define the job in terms of skill he stated:
Unskilled because you learned yourself, you learned on the job.329
The application of technology and the organisation of work meant the stages of the
production process were broken down to limited tasks. This is evident in the way shop
floor process workers described their work: McGuinness described his job working
inserting the headlining into cars:
                                                 
326 Braverman, Monopoly Capitalism, p. 217.
327 Meyer, Five Dollar Day, p. 49.
328 Oral Testimony, Douglas McKendrick, Interview 1.
329 Oral Testimony, Douglas McKendrick, Interview 1.
93
it was the best job ah ever had. … ah found it easy because ah was quite thin then
…Ye jumped from one end, tack it, a couple of tacks on it, tack it, an then jump to
the front end, pull it tight. Ye know? And then tack it, tack all down, and then a
couple of wee clips, ehm, and, and then put couple of wee crosses where the lights
would go on the dash. That means that the electricians … the ones puttin the wires
in could, could feed it through.330
Similarly Watson said:
ah brought this big tool through it an it cut a square hole an then ah went ae the
next wan an it more or less finished it at the exact size because it hud tae be very
eh…close tae the, the speculation ye know… so that’s wit a did tae start wi and eh,
but through time a learned how ae do aw the other machines an ah could do the
whole lot, fae start ae finish… And eh, ye jist continuous…ye put em in the
machine do it, put it back on ye know ye could always did an empty one an ye took
off a one tray an ye out it on ae the next wan an then when that wis finished ye goat
the next wan, an ye always hud an empty tray tae fit them on ae … An everybody
hud like an empty tray at their machines, an then when it, a full tray came along
they just put it through the machine and pit it ontae the empty wan, an then passed
it ae the next wan. An that’s how, that’s how it went, it jist went roon in circles aw
the time.331
Both excerpts indicate that their jobs consisted of limited processes and they had limited
control over the pace of work.  It is common to suggest that highly repetitive work lacked
intrinsic rewards and could become monotonous. Within the oral testimonies there were
line workers who acknowledged the repetitive and tedious nature of their work and that
whilst working it was important not to focus on the number of cars they had completed:
People just wanted to get it done and get home.  You had to switch off.  You could
go nuts if you thought, “Oh here’s another car”.332
Of the small sample of interviewees, the assembly-line workers were most likely to
juxtapose their jobs at Linwood with their experiences in previous employment which
provides some indication as to the changes they experienced in work. When asked whether
the work at Linwood was stressful, George Wilson stated that at Linwood the work was
easy and you had to ‘switch off’ before comparing this to his previous job as a roofer
where he worried about his work, for instance if there was rain he would worry about
whether there had been any leaks on roofs he had completed.333 This highlights the change
from working in a job that involved a degree of responsibility and self-regulation of work,
                                                 
330 Oral Testimony, Rodger McGuinness, Interview 1.
331 Oral Testimony, Archie Watson, Interview 1.
332 Oral Testimony, George Wilson, Interview 1.
333 Oral Testimony, George Wilson, Interview 1.
94
associated with a craft background, and working on an automated assembly line where
workers feel that their job is devoid of responsibility.
The linkage between deskilling and worker autonomy is apparent is the testimony
of Barry Stubbs who worked in the Car Assembly Building [hereafter CAB]. When asked
about work on a day-to-day basis he stated:
It was repetition aw the time. Complete repetition. Once ye got tae dae yer, know
yer job, you just went through it. Just like bein a robot. You, you were a robot.334
This narrative on the repetitive nature of assembly-line work is reinforced in a second
interview:
It was horrible. It was horrible. … Imagine bein on a track for eh, every day in life
doin sixty cars an hour. That was yer job. As soon as you went in there ye didnae
need a foreman, the line was yer foreman.335   
This participant became one of the inspection staff, but even then his job was repetitive and
this process of inspection was limited in scope. As a ‘viewer’ on final inspection he
worked underneath the high track with a checklist of twenty-one items, inspecting a car a
minute.336 This evidence and the oral narratives strongly suggest a continual deskilling
process and subsequent absence of intrinsic rewards. They support Braverman’s model of
work intensification and greater managerial control associated with both increased
mechanisation and scientific management principles. In this respect the established
explanation of conflict at Linwood holds true.
2.8.3. The nature of work revisited
Dominant narratives are not entirely supported however, by the Linwood sample, as a wide
variety of attitudes towards work are exhibited. Turning first of all to the line workers,
these participants spent less time describing their jobs and provided little reflection on the
physical work environment with the exception of their first impressions which were
usually juxtaposed with their previous working environment and job, ‘Oh ah hated it that
was ye know. That, the noise, the noise was terrible … everythin brushing, people brushin
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past you, they’re workin on the line’.337 Alternately, George Wilson stated, ‘But ah
enjoyed, naw ah enjoyed goin doon there everyday ae ma work.338 Similarly, David
Munroe claimed, ‘it was an experience. Ah enjoyed it and if ah, if the place opened up the
morrow, ah would go back to the job ah left’.339 However, he then seemed to contradict
himself when asked whether his job was interesting:
Naw it was, it was boring actually. Boring, doing the same thing day in, day out …
you’re doing the same job fur eight hours or whatever it was. And it, just a wee
machine went round aw day, aw day long.340
This apparent contradiction can be explained in the following narratives, which reveal
control over the pace of work as an important element of engagement with work in the car
plant. Therefore, both the desire for a better wage and some control over work converge as
perceived advantages to the job of line worker at Linwood.
Although tedious, the assembly-line work was considered easy and provided the
opportunity to exercise control over the workplace. All of the semi-skilled assembly
operators in the sample, with the exception of Barry Stubbs, constructed a narrative of
work as being so easy they worked faster than the dictated speed. Subsequently they could
work on vehicles further back on the line and ‘create’ time away from it. For instance,
David Munroe stated, ‘I worked with another chap right, so we worked … a half hour on, a
half hour off’.341 Likewise, Douglas McKendrick’s narrative supports the notion that
assembly workers were able to obtain job control – to some degree – in that they were able
to share their work and work back on the line to gain time. In his free narrative he stated:
Eh, because o, on the door pad section on the line wi the cars comin along it all the
time it was just repeat, repeat, repeat, repeat you could do it, ye literally did, do it
wi yer eyes shut ye know. Ah mean … ah used tae put in, eh, seven screws along
the bottom of the front and the back door on the one side ye know, an, when ye
started it was difficult, it was a difficult job to do wi all the car ye, yer mov, movin
along wi the car moving all the time ye know.342
The repetitive nature of the job on the line that was constantly moving is evident.
However, he then composes a similar narrative to George Wilson where he supports the
notion that assembly workers were able to obtain a degree of job control in that they were
able to share their work and work back on the line to gain time:
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But after yer at it a while ye just looked at the screws an they jumped in. Ye know.
An it got that, ye became so good at it, you and, see the, you an yer mate, there wis
a man doin, ah wis doin the one side of the car goin along the line, an there wis
another man doin the other side of the car goin along the line. It got, after a while
that, eh ye got so good at the job ye could do the two sides, know? So ye used to
work half hour breaks, an [pause] it was a, it was a fight tae see who got the break
eh, nearest the stoppin time, ye know, because ye could be up at the gate waitin’ tae
get out, just as soon as that horn went [claps one hand against the other] ye were
right out the gate, ye know.343
When asked ‘Did you ever feel under pressure or sort of stress?’ Douglas replied:
Oh Aye. Aye ye were under pressure; ye were under stress aye, aye. An particularly
at the last half hour of the day ye know, eh, see the thing was, everybody wanted ae
be the first at that gate ye know. Ready tae get out, an get away. A mean you’re
talkin about maybe six, seven hundred cars there ye know. Got tae get out. Took
you longer tae get from a car park in Chrysler tae the main road than it took ye tae
get from the main road to Glasgow. … But everybody wanted tae work up the line,
work further up.344
He conceptualises the stress with self-imposed pressure to work up the line; rather than
pressure directly caused by keeping up with the line at the pace set by management to
achieve production targets. It was similar to that experienced by George Wilson who
described the job as being fairly straightforward. Eventually he could work back up the
line completing his work before the machine brought it to his station on the line, ‘it was
night shift an ye were only workin five hours out the ten hours. An out that five hours ye,
ye were only workin two hours, sort o thing’.345 He worked with a ‘mate’ drilling holes on
either side of each vehicle. However, he claimed that he was able to complete both their
jobs. This allowed one to rest while the other worked, and both to work further back on the
line, enabling two hours breaks, ‘I had ma bed, underneath the tables we a’ had wur beds to
go fur a sleep … it was great’.346
Oral testimony evidence suggests such practice was commonplace and accepted by
foremen. Rodger McGuinness told of working in pairs to fit headlining on the front and the
back of the car. Eventually he was able to do both ends and the men worked in turns
enabling one of them to take a break and play dominoes or chess: ‘the foreman says to us,
“I don’t care: you can work five hours about if you like”’.347 However, McGuinness also
acknowledged that not all workers could structure their workload in such a way. When he
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started at Linwood he was initially allocated to work on the high track, a suspended track
to allow people to work above their heads on the underneath of the car, and he did not
enjoy the experience of this work:
If you’re away up on the high track, then you don’t get any time at all, but if you’re
away at the low bit of the track then you could work up and give yourself about
twenty-five minute’s break. … the ones that were on the high track itself, they
couldnae. They were streetched, and they werenae movin. They’ve gotta catch
every single one of em [car bodies] and as ah say, ah had that job for two days. In
fact, ah don’t even think it was two days … ah did it the first night and the second
night and after dinner time, ah just says, “ah cannae do this job”.348
Thus, whilst McGuinness constructed a positive narrative pertaining to his headlining job,
he responded negatively to the high track work due to both the necessity to work overhead
and also due to the pace involved in that job. The testimony of Barry Stubbs comprised a
narrative of negative engagement with his work: he ‘hated’ his work and only stayed as he
had a mortgage to pay.349 However, his testimony notes his inability to leave the line or
even negotiate the pace of work, thus denying the opportunity of some control. The level
of engagement was not necessarily rooted in the work process itself but linked to the
degree of control workers had over their time on the assembly line.
Some of the interviewees recognised that their work could potentially have been
boring but they learned to switch off from the job. Others such as McGuinness said he did
not find the job monotonous as he only did his headlining job three days a week and on the
other days he did jobs including relief work, which meant that he was not working on the
line and again could avoid having his pace of work entirely controlled by the assembly
line. Similarly, Archie Watson found that he could work forward on the line doing the
work of other operatives and this created variety at work:
Oh they say repetition got monotonous, ah never really hud that because eh…what
wid happen … ah’d be workin away … an suddenly ah’d find out there wis nothing
ae dae an the fella who wis in front o me had probably went tae the toilet or
somethin like that an never came back, so ah wid jist go ontae their machine and do
a tray, an then go back ae ma machine an dae that. So ah’d a wee break in daen
somethin else. Because a bet, ye actually could dae aw the things throughout the
whole process fae start ae finish. Ye know, although a started off on one machine,
ah was able ae do the whole lot eventually.350
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Therefore, the testimonies reveal that the theme of autonomy is significant in determining
the experience of work. Indeed this need not be perceived simply as autonomy over the
work process but also as autonomy over oneself in the workplace. Thus highlighting that
the search for control occurs as well as forming part of the industrial politics of the
organised parts of the workforce.
To return to the experiences of the skilled workers who were interviewed for the
thesis. The Linwood Lives testimony of Andrew McIntyre reveals that whilst working as a
skilled electrician within the car plant there were times that he felt the pressure to maintain
production meant that his skill was undermined. The pressure on production staff was
initiated from the top down as production targets had to be met and any stoppage of the
line could lead to lay-offs in other parts of the plant:
The press shop was a difficult one, if one of the tools in the presses had a problem,
that stopped the whole production line so you’d tae think really quickly on how you
were going to get this up and running ye know … so that was pressure, that was
real pressure.351
At times this led to significant pressure on foremen to diagnose the reasons for stoppages
and McIntyre claims he witnessed production foremen risking their health and safety by
going into warm ‘ovens’ when cars had come off the track.352
There is also evidence to support the notion that work at Linwood posed a potential
clash of cultures for skilled workers adjusting to the new working environment of a mass
production factory. This is also evident in the testimony of Barry King, who when
reflecting on his work as an inspector foreman says:
Awe ah took quite a pride in it because it was [pause] it was part of ma trade, and
it, it was good from the point of view that eh.353
But then he goes on to reveal that, in his experience, work at Linwood was lacking in
variety:
But it was ehm, how would ye say … Ye didn’t have the variety, of work, that ah
wis used to. So it was a wee bit more boring, although I enjoyed it, it was a wee bit
more boring because ye were doing the sort of same things all the time.354
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Thus also pointing to the potential for conflict for those who were working in Linwood in
their trade between their former experience of work and the work culture within the
factory. Later in his testimony King explains that one of the aspects of his job that he did
not like was the importance assigned to maintaining continuous production as this led to
tension between the inspection staff and production foremen:
They wanted figures. Production. An that was where, we had a lot o animosity with
production. Because they were under pressure from management side tae get cars
out, tae sales. Whereas, so would we inspection wise but we wanted them out in a
reasonable condition so as the customer would be satisfied because, if the
customer’s not satisfied he doesn’t buy it. So that, that sort o, we had tae, ah had tae
try an keep ma inspectors in tow an teach them right fae wrong an all this kind o
stuff, but even although they knew what was right from wrong an what was
required they would still do the opposite o what ye wanted them ae do. [laughs]
That’s human nature again ye know. …  So it was quite, eh sometime it was quite
eh, traumatic.355
Other members of inspection also comment on the tension generated due to the pressure to
continue production even if faults were highlighted.356 David Crawford worked in
inspection and claimed:
Well the thing is, is in as far as inspection’s concerned there’s always pressure on a
production line, but, it’s either go or it’s no go. An as ah used tae tell wur Yankee
friends when they wur, tryin tae pressure us an things, the thing ye’ve got tae keep
in the forefront o yer mind wi these cars, “we’re selling them, we’re not givin them
away”.357
Later on he asserts that the pressure was on the production staff rather than the inspectors
however, even if inspectors were not under direct pressure, tension arose due to the
production targets that had to be met. Therefore, the pressure on production emerges as a
dominant narrative in the oral history interviews.
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2.9 Conclusion
Oral testimony is not, of course, unproblematic or straightforward and consideration has
certainly been given to potential exaggeration of the amount of control workers had over
their work. There is evidence in the entire sample that there was constant pressure on
foremen and inspectors to increase the rate of production, which could undermine
assertions of working back along the line. Yet given the similarities between the narratives
from interviewees from different job locations within the car plant, there is a commonality
in the testimonies with foremen allowing workers back on the line as long as production
was maintained.358 It will be argued in Chapter Five that, to a large extent, workers at
Linwood displayed elements of craft attitudes in terms of ‘intrinsic rewards’ concurrent
with those of Goldthorpe et al. Hence, as Knox noted, ‘craft attitudes were, at least for a
time, kept alive in a totally different working environment’.359
Yet, those working on the track depict undertaking work that required limited skill
and seemingly provided few intrinsic rewards. Narratives related to their motivations for
working at Linwood prioritise the high wages. However, it seems that line workers like
McKendrick, Wilson, McGuinness and Munroe sought to obtain control over their pace of
work and effort required despite working on an automated line. It seems that such
opportunities to make money and gain some control over work including when they could
stop, converge as perceived advantages to a job as a line worker at Linwood. The most
negative narrative of working at Linwood was constructed by CAB Viewer Barry Stubbs,
which was related to the lack of control over his immediate work environment yet he
remained in the job due to having taken on a mortgage. Such a narrative correlates with the
alienation thesis: despite his objectification Stubbs continued at Linwood in order to ensure
he could pay his mortgage.360 This is in contrast to how some workers asserted their
autonomy through manipulating their work and by collectively organising themselves so as
to be able to achieve time away from the line. It was in this time created away from the line
that workers regained control over their person at work, through choosing to play cards,
sleep or drink thus proving that the search for autonomy is not necessarily sought within
the work process itself. For some workers, despite having their work pace determined by
technology, they were able to complete their allocated work with a degree of control over
themselves within the working environment.
                                                 
358 For example, the testimonies of Adam Fleming (Production Manager); Peter Gordon (Inspection);
Andrew McIntyre (Electrician) and Barry King (Quality Control Foreman).
359 Knox, ‘Trade Unionism’, p. 128.
360 Chris Haywood and Máirtin Mac an Ghaill, Men and Masculinities: Theory, Research and Social
Practice, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2003), p. 29.
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Whilst Stubbs seems aware of his objectification, to the extent of comparing his
time at Linwood to the film Modern Times361, the other line workers actively sought
autonomy in the production process by beating the line and creating their own time during
work hours.  Demands for greater control, autonomy and initiative by the shop stewards
and convenors are evidence of a desire for intrinsic rewards. Consequently, job control and
the speed of the assembly line were two of the key areas of conflict at Linwood.
Acknowledging skill as socially constructed allows us to question over-simplistic notions
of deskilling and to look more closely at the tasks people undertook in the car plant and
understanding of work control. What becomes apparent is that while those working on the
assembly line appeared to relinquish control, obtaining and maintaining control over their
pace of work was a central tenet underpinning the nature of work in the car plant and the
‘rewards’ associated with it. Within this varied pattern there appears to be a correlation
between background and narratives produced. The oral testimonies reveal a more complex
pattern of working cultures than that which has appeared in the literature, with a substantial
heterogeneity of experience at Linwood.  Indeed, Scottish author Jeffrey Torrington, who
had experience of working at Linwood also reflected that having seen Chaplin’s Modern
Times: ‘I was seduced by my first ever sight of the real thing: the cars on the main-track
seemed hardly to be moving at all. Why, I even saw two operators playing at chess, taking
their time about it, not being rushed’.362 The non-work behaviour of Linwood employees is
the focus of the next chapter.
                                                 
361 In Modern Times the little tramp works on a production line in which he tightens two bolts on every
component. His pace of work is determined by the line speed which is closely monitored by the
manager and the consistency of work means little autonomous thought or action is afforded to the
worker. When he stops work his body continues to involuntarily imitate the process of tightening the
bolts thus the little tramp appears de-humanised and eventually, after being dragged through the cogs of
a machine and embarking on an episode in which he attacks the factory control panel, is declared
insane. Charlie Chaplin, Modern Times (1936).
362 PCL, PC 12561 L.W., 629.222 O/S, ‘The French Disconnection’, Scotland on Sunday Magazine, 18 April
1993.
102
Chapter Three
Source: FAI, Papers of Cliff Lockyer, Box 2, newspaper and date unknown, year estimated
as 1975.
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Chapter Three
Organisational Mischief: Employee autonomy at work
3.1 Linwood Lives: Douglas McKendrick
There was quite a few alcoholics in the place, me included ye know. Eh, ah finished
up goin to the AA [Alcoholics Anonymous] ye know. And, goin to meetins, things
like that ye know. But, for a good while, eh, when ah wis in there ah, tae pit ye in
the picture ah live in Paisley hen, ye know, an ah lived quite a good distance away
from, we’re talkin about maybe four miles, maybe more away from the Chrysler
car factory but ah was so very fond of drink that ah used tae drink ma bus fare ye
know, ah, ah didnae have the bus fare. So ah finished up with an old push bike ye
know and ah cycled backwards and forwards tae ma work an, this ah put this, ah’ll
put this bit in just now eh, there wis a man used tae sit in the car park in his car in
Chrysler’s and he didn’t work in Chrysler all he did was buy stolen stuff from the
workers in Chrysler’s, ye know. An, ah used to, ah never missed a day ye know, eh
ah couldnae afford to miss a day eh, because ah needed the money for drink and ah
used tae get on ma old push bike hail, rain, snow as well you know, an ah used tae
go in there an hour early in the morning, ye know, so that ah could walk out wi the
night shift men goin out, ye know, with an alternator stuck down ma belt ye know.
An ah could get out an over tae the car park an get eight quid off o the guy that
bought the stuff, an then get back over an get ma old push bike an up tae the village
in Linwood, get ma newspaper, ma tobacco an ma half bottle. You weren’t
supposed tae get your half bottle, the laws were terrible in those days ye know, eh
it, you couldn’t buy drink until such and such a ti, time like ye know. But eh, the
man got to know me an he sold me ma drink early in the mornin. Well ah, ah
needed that half bottle o whiskey just tae be normal ye know, just tae to do ma, see
without that half bottle o whiskey ah wis sha, ah wis all over the place, ah, ah could
hardly do ma job ye know. But when ah had that half bottle, no bother ye know.
That lasted me tae lunchtime an as ah wis telling you earlier me an ma mate worked
half hour breaks, well ah always got the half hour break before the lunch break ye
know. So that ah could get out through the whole in the fence wi an alternator, over
tae the car park, eight quid ye know. Up tae the village, sometimes when ah got
back from the Ponderosa pub in Linwood eh, ah couldnae scratch maself never
mind work ye know. Ah could hardly talk, ye know. An ma mate he used tae sit me
down in the corner and cover me up wi all the old cardboard boxes and he would
work away do the job, the job the whole afternoon and just give me a shake eh
about quarter past four in time for me ae go and get another alternator and get it
down the dukes and get over to the, the car park. Ah stole more out o there than
what ah got in wages [laughs].363
Douglas McKendrick worked at Linwood from 1973 until the plant closed. He worked as
an assembly-line operator in the Car Assembly Building and later moved to the Car
Conditioning area where damaged cars were rectified. Over three separate oral history
interviews McKendrick described how he enjoyed working at Linwood and attributed this
to the relative easiness of the job in comparison to previous employment. He offers a
                                                 
363 Oral Testimony, Douglas McKendrick, Interview 1.
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candid narrative on his activities at the plant, but many of the details related are largely
consistent with the majority of interviewees and provide a suitable starting point from
which to explore ‘misbehaviour’. While many of the interviewees mentioned activities
such as drinking at work, theft, card schools and people sleeping at work, McKendrick was
the only interviewee to construct such a frank account in which, as well as sleeping during
working hours, he explicitly detailed his systematic theft of factory property in order to
fund his alcoholism. This was a highly individualistic and premeditated activity but
required the collective complicity of his nearby workmates. McKendrick is the
archetypical Linwood worker ubiquitous in popular memory, reconstructed in a
fictionalised account of the Linwood car factory written by former employee Jeffrey
Torrington, and recounted in the oral histories; that is of a highly individualistic and
opportunistic idler.364 This stereotype is depicted in the contemporary press such as the
following account given by an employee of the individuals he encountered at Linwood:
Only last week I overheard a young apprentice boasting he’d succeeded in getting
through a shift in which he’d done only one hour’s work.365
Prior to deconstructing the types of misbehaviour evident in the source material, it
is worth reflecting upon some of the methodological issues in undertaking oral history
interviews that influence the interpretation of testimony. A loose thematic schedule was
utilised in the interviews so that the interviewer could be reflexive to the topics the
interviewee raised. Many of the interviewees mentioned forms of misbehaviour without
being probed; however they tended to speak of these as activities other people were
involved in rather than themselves. While there are various influences affecting the
narratives that individuals construct, it is understandable they may have wanted to avoid
implicating, or incriminating themselves by revealing involvement in such activities while
working at Linwood. Indeed, more admissions were made off the record than in the official
recorded interview. In contrast, McKendrick was very open about his participation in such
activity, which he freely discussed in a public area of Glasgow Transport Museum.366 The
revelations during the course of the first interview of his parallel activities to work at the
plant seemed to be said with the intention of eliciting shock in the interviewer, which he
                                                 
364 Jeff Torrington, The Devil’s Carousel, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1996) & Jeffrey Torrington, Obituary
on The Scotsman Online http://news.scotsman.com/obituaries/Jeff-Torrington.4085105.jp
Accessed 16 September 2008.
365 PCL, 629.2222, REN 27, PC 669, OS, Linwood Car Plant Volume 1, Sunday Post, 21 December 1975.
366 The location was agreed by the interviewee who rejected the offer of conducting the interview in his home
or private meeting room in the museum, despite reservations held by the interviewer about the nature of
the discussion and the background noise affecting the recording.
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may have perceived as a young, middle-class female academic. Therefore, it is conceivable
that the identity of the interviewer may have had an impact on the way in which the
interviewee constructed his testimony. For example, upon being asked whether he was
worried about getting caught, McKendrick exclaimed:
Ah’m a thief hen … let me be the first to tell you intae that wee machine o yours,
Ah’m a thief, Ah’ve always been a thief. Ah would steal the sugar oot your tea ye
know. Ah’ve done time fur stealing ye know. But eh, you pick who you steal aff o.
Ye know. Ye only steal aff o [pause] insurance company things that can, the ones
that can afford it ye know.367
Yet, many of the details within McKendrick’s narrative correlate with the testimonies of
other interviewees therefore this leads to the exploration of the motives for the construction
of a narrative in which the interviewee openly declares himself as a thief.
McKendrick’s discussion on his work experience prior to Linwood reveal a varied
employment history mainly comprised of jobs that could be described as marginal
employment: chimney sweep, conductor on Glasgow Corporation tram cars, scaffolder at
Fleming and Ferguson Shipyard in Paisley and as a self-employed window cleaner. In
these jobs McKendrick linked his enjoyment of work to being able to earn unofficial wages
and boasted about the ways in which he was able to take advantage of ‘the fiddle’ in
particular in the tramcars and as a chimney sweep.368 This open endorsement of ‘fiddling’
was described as a way of making some money on the side to supplement his wages:
But the thing was, the fiddle was great ye know, same as these [points at tram 
cars]… tramcars the fiddle was great on them. … What you could make on 
the side. See. That was, everybody was a fiddler wh, eh, what you could get on 
the side.369
These references to ‘the fiddle’ and being a thief were an assertion of McKendrick’s
identity and could be interpreted as elements of working-class masculinity. Rather than the
macho culture that is identified as prevalent in the Scottish traditional industries by McIvor
and Johnston,370 McKendrick displays a working-class masculinity based on finding
                                                 
367 Oral Testimony, Douglas McKendrick, Interview 1.
368 By ‘the fiddle’ McKendrick means the appropriation of extra cash aside from the official amount he
should make during the period of work. In the trams he claimed he overfilled the tram with both seated
and standing patrons and would split the fare money for those on the top deck of the tram with the
driver.
369 Oral Testimony, Douglas McKendrick, Interview 1.
370 See Chapter One.
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individual ways of maximising economic return that perceived management control as
impotent.
He depicts his systematic theft and working while under the influence of alcohol as
a daily occurrence. A degree of caution must be exerted when analysing McKendrick’s
testimony as the frequency of theft and the economic gains from this activity as their
plausibility may be exaggerated. Receiving eight pounds for a stolen alternator at three
stages during the day would have provided a daily income of £24 resulting in unofficial
wages of £120 a week. Although these figures, frequency and the scale of this activity
seem inflated, his narrative is telling as to what he would liked to have done and what he
thought people could have done at Linwood. This also suggests that there was a lot of
activity happening on the shop floor aside from work, and that it was possible to steal, be
drunk, and sleep at work. The narrative he depicts is of the quintessential Linwood worker
that the other interviewees refer to: the work colleague described in numerous testimonies
as arriving at work intoxicated and then sleeping throughout the rest of the shift.
To evaluate underlying motivations for such types of behaviour within the Linwood
car plant, the following discussion will be structured around three explanatory approaches:
first of all related to the key concept within industrial sociology – control; secondly,
consideration of the implications of changes in terms of worker responsibility; and finally
the importance of non-structural factors affecting behaviour. The chapter will explore
labour process theory; reflecting on the position of the wage labourer within capitalism.371
The analysis includes behaviour in the wider working environment, specifically activity
that was not meant to happen in the eyes of management: both action and inaction that was
deemed inappropriate and counter-productive. Common forms of organisational
misbehaviour at the Linwood plant will be identified and motivations and meanings
underpinning such activity evaluated with consideration given to the implications for
industrial relations. In this chapter ‘organisational mischief’ will be the term adopted to
refer to such behaviour.372 Although McKendrick’s narrative differs from those of other
interviewees in the way in which it is constructed, there is a commonality of recollections
and perceptions of life on the shop floor. These will now be used to deconstruct the types
of behaviour deemed inappropriate in the workplace that occurred at the Linwood plant.
The analysis of oral testimonies and shop steward diaries illuminates the varied meanings
                                                 
371 Tony Watson, Sociology, Work and Industry (London: Routledge, 1980 [2003 edn]), p. 238.
372 Watson uses the term ‘organisational mischief’. Ibid., p. 229.
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underpinning workplace behaviour and the material challenges the perspective that all
forms of mischief are attributable to the control - resistance paradigm.373
3.2 Theoretical Framework of the Discussion
In a meeting of the Joint Representative Council of the Linwood Car plant in October of
1977, management presented a list of activities that were ‘causing concern to the
management of the Linwood Plant’:
1. Lateness and absenteeism
2. Early leaving
3. The playing of cards and other games
4. Lateness back on to the section after relief and break times
5. Breaches of the agreement concerning flexibility of labour
6. Excessive overtime demands
7. The allegation of safety hazards following breakdowns
8. Stoppages of work which were unconstitutional and outside procedure
9. The ‘blacking’ of cars because of model mix374
The list is revealing on two accounts; the inclusion of activities such as lateness, the
playing of card games and leaving work early is indicative of frequent occurrence rather
than being isolated incidents. Their prioritisation in the list suggests management perceived
these passive activities as causing greater concern than collective actions such as resistance
to demands for flexible working practices and unconstitutional stoppages. It implies that
the workers involved in such actions and inactions did not conform to the organisational
behaviour expectations of management at the plant. This delivery to the Joint
Representative Council was a management-oriented perspective focused on restricting
these variables to the efficiency of the company, rather than understand why the workers
withheld effort.
As the labelling or ‘linguistic construction’ of actions can be influenced by the
ideological viewpoint of those seeking to explore their meanings, it is first of all necessary
to define what is meant by this misbehaviour and why it has been chosen to encompass the
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behaviour discussed in this chapter.375 What constitutes appropriate behaviour at work is
defined in accordance with the formal structures of authority within the workplace.
Ackroyd and Thompson argue that Sprouse’s definition of sabotage can be extended to
encompass activity they understand as misbehaviour: “anything you do at work you are not
supposed to”.376 This behaviour is not necessarily criminal furthermore; employees may
not perceive their activities as deviant or wrong.377 However, the term organisational
mischief, as opposed to misbehaviour, can be more useful as this term encompasses the
behaviour of both workers and management within an organisation, thereby recognising
that all employees of the firm may engage in organisational mischief. Such behaviour can
be identified as that which:
 … according to the official structure, culture and rules of the organisation, 
“should not happen” and … contain[s] an element of challenge to the 
dominant modes of operating or to dominant interests in the organisation.378
Walton and Taylor provide one of the most significant academic contributions to debates
on industrial sabotage in which they defined this activity as, ‘the rule-breaking which takes
the form of conscious action or inaction directed towards the mutilation or destruction of
the work environment…’ and that this action may comprise unofficial ‘grass-roots’
action.379 Geoff Brown considered this definition too narrow; he links sabotage to the
whole context of industrial conflict between capital and labour in that the acts of mischief
are an active strategy by the labour force in conflict over shop floor control. Both of these
studies situate the activity of sabotage within the realm of debates on the labour process
and control on and of the shop floor. These early studies of industrial sabotage have
therefore served to draw attention to the usefulness in analysing mischief within the wider
context of social and technical organisation at work, and have highlighted what is
considered by Marxists to be the ubiquitous dynamic within capitalism: conflict.380
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commonly used to describe theft which is accepted amongst the workforce, even recognised by some
managers, as a significant component of earnings in certain work environments. Gerald Mars, Cheats at
Work (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982) and Jason Ditton, Part-time crime: an ethnography of
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Within his study on workers at Ford Halewood in the 1960s, Hugh Beynon
commented that:
there is every reason to expect that, in a society where most people have only their
labour to sell, a conflict over control will be a feature of work situations.381
Thus highlighting control as the stimulus of conflict as well as the importance of the
‘effort-bargain’ in influencing the dynamics of the workplace. It identifies conflict between
the interests of management and labour in the process of exchange within capitalism as
central to workplace behaviour. Richard Edwards perceives a linkage between the
processes of conflict and resistance on the shop floor, the ‘contested terrain’ and wider
class struggle:
The labor process becomes an arena of class conflict, and the workplace becomes a
contested terrain. Faced with chronic resistance to their effort to compel
production, employers over the years have attempted to resolve the matter by
reorganizing, indeed revolutionizing, the labor process itself.382
This analysis suggests that conflict and resistance are inherent processes within the
structured antagonism in capitalism. He describes the divergence of interests between
capital and labour:
Workers must provide labor power in order to receive their wages, that is, they
must show up for work; but they need not necessarily provide labor, much less the
amount of labor that the capitalist desires to extract from the labor power they have
sold. In a situation where workers do not control their own labour process and
cannot make their work a creative experience, any exertion beyond the minimum
needed to avert boredom will not be in the workers’ interest.383
Marx’s theory on the production of absolute surplus-value can be utilised to explain
this conflict of interests arising within organisations. In the process of exchange within
capitalism, the owner of the means of production purchases ‘labour power’ rather than
labour. Essentially the firm or organisation is purchasing the potential for labour, held
within the worker, as a commodity: ‘The purchaser of labour-power consumes it by setting
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the seller of it to work’.384 As the labour power has been purchased the labourer is set to
work under the control of the owner of the means of production who will then own the
product of labour and make profit from what Marx called the extraction of ‘surplus-value’.
The basis for conflict is rooted in this exchange relationship. What are not accounted for
are worker effort and the degree of labour desired by the firm, which necessitates control
of the labour process in order to maximise surplus value.
The ways in which different groups attempt to exert control within workplaces has
been a focus of orthodox labour process writers. Thompson argues that whilst there may be
occasions where ‘responsible autonomy’ alternatives seem to suggest a relinquishing of
managerial control over the workplace, upon closer inspection, in industries such as
automobile production, managerial control is sustained due to the automated production
process and scientific management.385 Within British factories this relationship has become
known as the ‘frontier of control’ and is epitomised in shop floor conflict over the effort-
bargain and rates of pay.386 For the duration workers are paid they are on management time
and in the interests of capital this time should always be ‘put to use’.387  Thus activities
such as moving away from the workstation, playing cards, sleeping, and clocking in for
one another can all be understood as the theft of time. At Linwood the application of
scientific management and MDW were applied to the organisation of work in an attempt to
retain managerial control over wages rates and the pace of work. The relationship between
time and effort is extremely important when analysing behaviour at work. In the effort-
bargain the interests of the workers and management appear polarised. The labour force
seeks ways of exerting control within the effort-bargain part of which comprises the theft
of time. When labour is put to work, management aims to achieve as high a work rate as
possible from workers on a daily basis. But, what constitutes a fair day’s work is open to
interpretation and management will attempt to achieve what it conceptualises as a fair
day’s work through controlling the workforce.
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Reference to the wider social and economic context draws attention to the different
interests of labour and capital. Beynon claims that workers who practice some form of
output restriction do so in order to monitor the supply of labour “If we all worked flat out it
would be dead simple what would happen. Half of us would be outside on the stones with
out cards in our hands”.388 This resembles the testimony of a clerical worker within the car
plant who recalled her workmate’s advice to slow down:
and ah loved to go quick. Ah really loved it. And the girl that was sitting opposite
me, she used to say, “Take yer time Anna. Take yer time. See when you’re dead,
you’ll see your thingamy going across that road there and somebody will be sittin
in your desk!” So, it never made much difference tae me. Some o them were older
women and they, you know, would sit and do it very quite slowly, and you’d be
that keen tae get up and get another bundle ye know, “Oh that’s four ah’ve done, or
five ah’ve done”.389
Anderson’s direct work narrative is positive and indicates her desire to do a job properly.
She compares herself in contrast to some of the other workers whom she believes may
have worked slowly in order to gain overtime:
If you wanted to go a wee bit slower and we thought, this is before it was the two
shift system, and we thought we could get overtime out of it. These dockets
werenae finished at the right time so we got overtime.390
She explained:
So ah, ah, ah personally didnae do it, ah might have done it near the end, but at the
beginning, cos I remember ma grandmother saying tae me years ago, “If a jobs
worth doing, it’s worth doing well”.  And, no matter what ah’ve done in ma life,
ah’ve even marked the board in a bookies years ago, and then men used tae shout
“oh God, Anna will you just write it up”, but mine’s had to be right, all beautiful
writing. [laughs] But, in Chrysler, yeah, ah, ah believe some of them did hold it
back, so as we would get some overtime. Or sometimes we got a Sunday if the
dockets werenae all through. … Yeah, you could go slower.391
When Anderson starts to discuss this example of work restriction, her use of the collective
‘we’ indicates her inclusion in the task as performed within the work group. She then goes
onto say she did not participate in this action. Situated within the economic context, the
women who worked in the office were aware of production levels and could have predicted
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periods of short-time working.  Therefore, while seemingly irrational not to do the job
‘well’ the women who restricted their output, due to being paid an hourly rate, were able to
maximise their returns. There is also the sentiment within Anderson’s narrative that there
were workers who lacked the motivation to work as fast as they could. The environment in
which the clerical staff worked was quite different from the factory shop floor, yet even
here Anderson’s narrative suggests that clerical staff would legitimate not working as fast
as they could as there was no tangible reward for increasing their rate of work. In actual
fact by working slower the employees would benefit through additional overtime pay. Her
testimony reveals a form of organisational mischief and an example of a way in which an
employee can exert autonomy over his/ her self at work. In this case, in a situation where
individuals could increase their economic return.
Anderson’s testimony resonates with the findings of Jason Ditton’s research on a
baking factory in which the workforce were able to manipulate ‘time’ to their advantage.392
In the post-war period management of British firms responded to manipulation of ‘time’ in
the workplace by attempting to improve control through the system of payment,
technology, and organisation of production. It has been argued that a piece-rate mode of
payment would incentivise workers and obviate the need for direct supervision and
disciplinary mechanisms, whereas forms of payment based on time-rates create the
necessity for workers to be disciplined through the organisation of work as there is a lack
of financial motivation.393 Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Two, Braverman’s work
on Frederick Taylor drew attention to the effect of the increasing application of technology
and associated organisation of work, and the apparent deskilling of work. At Linwood, the
predominant production mode of assembly and sub-assembly track work, as well as the
introduction of the system of MDW articulate with the classic Marxist analysis of
alienation. Rooted in the notion that human beings have an essential need, fulfilled through
labouring to produce the requirements for subsistence, and by commanding nature in order
to execute this process, specialisation gives rise to jobs that are narrowly defined, repetitive
and often boring.394 Within such systems working fails to provide satisfaction for workers
and is seen by them as providing labour for someone else who will acquire the benefits of
this exploitative relationship. Thereby, if management fails to engage the workers’
individual needs at work incentives are often extrinsic. Hence, work becomes alien to the
worker who:
                                                 
392 Jason Ditton, ‘Baking Time’, Sociological Review, 27 (1979), 157-67.
393 Nichols and Beynon, Living with Capitalism, p. 133 & Brown, Sabotage, p. 358.
394 Ken Morrison, Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought, (London: Sage
Publications, 1995 [2000 edn]), p. 92.
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does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body 
and ruins his mind.  The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, 
and in his work feels outside himself…His labor [sic] is therefore not 
voluntary but coerced; it is forced labor [sic]. It is therefore not the 
satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it.395
Robert Blauner further developed this analysis by linking the technological and social
organisation of work to the attitudes of workers and their alienation. He argues that the
extreme division of labour within car manufacturing and in particular, for assembly-line
workers, the lack of control over the pace at which they work results in resentment
amongst the workforce. In response to this attitude workers then look to achieve autonomy
by establishing, ‘illegitimate, subterran-ean [sic] arrangements in order to maintain some
control over their work pace’.396
The workers interviewed for this thesis were far from ‘ruining their minds’. On one
level, work was indeed satisfying an external need. Many claimed they were attracted to
the high wages at Linwood, and the oral testimonies reveal that many found their work
boring. But the creative and imaginative ways workers behaved whilst at work reflect a
myriad of influences; ultimately their ‘mischief’ was defined by the specific context as
well as reflecting social, cultural, political and economic motivations. 397 This chapter aims
to move the debate on from the classic alienation thesis, as summarised above, offering a
more nuanced approach – examining different types of mischief and how these were
affected by working at Linwood. Behaviour at work not only reflects the engagement of
workers with their work but the engagement of workers with their workplace and
colleagues. This is engendered in the distinction between ‘bored at work’ and ‘bored in
work’,398 with distinct and contrasting layers in the individual experience that become
evident in oral recollections.399 The track workers interviewed for this thesis constructed
narratives in which boredom at work was disconnected from boredom in work. This is not
completely dismissive of the notion that conflict occurs within the workplace as groups or
individuals desire control within the labour process. Yet it is difficult to perceive all
mischief, either conscious or subconscious, as employees exerting control. Rather, the
actions discussed in this chapter take place within an all-encompassing dynamic of the
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quest for control in its multitude of forms. The discussion will consider the existence of a
‘factory culture’ which permitted particular types of mischief in certain situations.
3.3 Workplace Mischief
Despite the resilience of the craft tradition in the west of Scotland, the prominence of
highly standardised jobs, in particular assembly-line technology and MDW, removed much
of the responsibility and control over work. The previous chapter indicated that the skill
profile of Linwood interviewees was mixed, but prior to taking up employment in the plant
few of the shop floor semi and unskilled workers had worked in an environment in which
the nature of production or organisation of work had granted so little job control. As
management sought greater control over the work process by for example, increasing the
speed of the assembly line, the sense of insufficient time to complete the task properly
created the potential for poor workmanship and employees ‘letting things go’ when they
knew that something was wrong with the job.400 Audio recordings of workers at the Ford
Halewood plant in 1974 substantiate this argument. A press-shop worker describing
potential reasons for sabotage stated:
You weren’t interested in the job you were actually performing. You were never
made to feel responsible in any manner – so consequently, I think that some people
tended to think that if we’re all going to be treated like children we’ll fucking act
like children.401
Linked to the effort-bargain and keeping workers motivated, when disinterested in their
work employees sought opportunities to engage in forms of mischief.
When he first started at Linwood, Douglas McKendrick was told to slow down his
pace of work by fellow workers:
see when ah was working in the chimney sweeping, and the windae cleaning, the
more ah ran, the more ah earned, ye know. Well ah assumed it was just the same in
the car plant. Oh ahI went in, “Hey you, he just, you slow doon there’s other people
here you know.” An ah’m [puts head down and imitates working / hammering]. Ah
wis getting money for nothing. Ye know? Ah mean, as ah said tae ye, after a while
ye looked at the screws and they jumped in, ye know. [laughs] Ye know. The
money was so easily made … for someone who had been self-employed run, run,
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run ye know. But eh, in there everybody accepted this … Walkin about, yer
slouchin about ye know.402
Therefore, while the men at Linwood were not working in what could be called solidary
work groups such as in the docks or shipbuilding industries, there was a degree of self-
regulation of the workforce by the workforce. Industrial sociologists have drawn attention
to the existence of unofficial forms of collective organisation and small groups of workers,
as a means of organisation for employees not involved in official forms of trade union
action. The informal self-organisation of the work group has important implications for the
study of mischief.403 Mischief that constitutes resistance often requires some informal
organisation furthermore, the ability of workers to succeed in mischief without detection or
reprimanded may require the complicit support of other workers with whom they may hold
shared values. McKendrick’s narrative is complex: he portrays himself as a conscientious
employee. This is in marked contrast to the excerpts from his first interview – presented at
the beginning of this chapter – in which he recalls drinking at work and sleeping through
his shifts. This could be explained by positing that over the duration of his employment at
Linwood his behaviour changed. Initially he worked efficiently then, over time, and as his
alcoholism developed, his behaviour changed.404 His behaviour could also be linked to a
process of adapting to a factory culture in which he knew he could get away with behaving
in a certain way: he became socialised into this behaviour.
The factory culture at Linwood reflected a west of Scotland work culture
influenced by masculinity. As noted in Chapter Two, figures on the Linwood workforce
are limited, but drawing upon the oral history material, the Manpower Services
Commission survey and the general pattern in the west of Scotland, it would be fair to say
that the majority of the workforce would have been men with women employed in
secretarial, catering and cleaning roles as well as in areas of the shop floor such as the Trim
department.405 The number of women employed on the shop floor at Linwood was likely to
have reflected the changes in work in the late 1960s and 70s with, not sizeable, but a
significant increase in women employed in industry linked with the increasing
mechanisation and the development of new industries such as electronics.406 Most
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interviewees associated women employees on the shop floor as those who worked in
departments such as Trim. Some of the interviewees who worked on track production
recalled working with women, but that they were in the minority on the main lines and
which is more so the case on the North Side of the plant reflecting the traditional
engineering background of the buildings previously owned by Pressed Steel. This suggests
that within Linwood there was an embedded masculine culture permeating the workplace.
The link between masculinity and control is evident in secondary literature on the
American automobile industry, which defines one of the essential characteristics of
manliness as standing up to supervisors and management, both overtly and covertly.407
Similarly Stephen Meyer argues that:
On the shop floor, soldiering and output restriction – that is, the individual and the
collective establishment of shop activities, behaviour and rules – often rested on
masculine bonds and understandings developed in the locker room, tavern, union
hall, or shop floor.408
Historical research on masculinity in Scotland points to the prevalence of a
‘machismo’ work culture based on displays of strength and a heavy-drinking culture.409 It
was a form of work culture that appeared to be inherent in Clydeside shipyard culture,
discernible in Jimmy Reid’s appeal to the trade unionists involved in the Upper Clyde
Shipbuilders’ Work-In in 1971 that, ‘there will be no bevvying’. 410 The Linwood plant
provided a new industry and represented a culmination of change: it was a different work
environment, introduced new payment systems, and new multinational management in the
1970s. Such changes are likely to have led to changes in dominant masculinities. Meyer’s
analysis of the American automobile industry can be applied to Linwood. He argues the
motor industry witnessed a combination of both rough and respectable masculinities
reflecting skilled and unskilled workers, and that masculinity was shaped by the increasing
application of technology, undermining the control of workers, resulting in a masculinity in
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which workers sought to ‘take the piss’ or ‘get one over’ management within the
workplace.411
To return to the initial theme of conflict, studies of workplace mischief have tended
to explain this activity by making links between resistance and the structural relationship
between capital and labour, or as resistance as an expression of informal work group
cohesion. However, these approaches fail to consider non-structural factors as well as the
subjectivities of the individual workers involved in such activities. The employees are
independent actors and as such behaviour can vary greatly, as can the motivations behind
similar types of mischief. The defining of work identities is a dynamic process and it is
therefore important that within studies of mischief the subjectivity of individuals is
explored. The focus has been on the issues of conflict, control, resistance, autonomy.
Organisational mischief is multi-dimensional and as such the meanings involved in this
behaviour can vary furthermore, what is defined as mischief can vary.
Many of the types of behaviour, on the list identified by Chrysler management at
the beginning of this chapter, occur in the narratives of former Linwood employees. The
main types, within the testimony and archival material are:
 1. Drinking at work
 2. Card schools and gambling
 3. Sleeping at work
 4. Leaving work early
 5. Clock-card and over-time fiddles
 6. Theft of items
 7. Theft of wages
 8. Sabotage
For the purposes of this analysis items one to five will be classified as Theft of Time as this
behaviour results in a direct loss of labour power that has been purchased by the firm. For
example, when an employee drinks at work he/she is not working for the full period of
contracted employment, thus constituting theft of labour during ‘company time’. Items six,
seven and eight comprise theft or destruction of materials or part of the work environment.
The analysis will therefore be structured into two broad sections Theft of Time and Theft
of Items.
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3.4 Theft of Time
3.4.1 Alcohol
One of the most common acts of mischief referred to in the oral testimony and
documentary source material is of employees turning up for work under the influence of
alcohol.412 Turning up for work inebriated or drinking whilst at work can be categorised as
theft of time as employees engaging in such behaviour either do so on management time
or, as a result of drinking alcohol, are unable to work efficiently, sleep or are absent from
the shift if they leave the workplace. Within the oral testimony evidence, turning up for
work under the influence of alcohol is depicted as a common occurrence:
Oh aye common, very common, very very common. An then goin oot, like ah said,
going oot through the holes in the fence. See when their half hour’s up … it’s only
a half hour ah know but they’d be oot an in, five halves an back in again. Oh there
was an auffae lot o drink taken in there.413
This perspective is supported in the repeated noting of similar activity in the shop steward
diaries:
A bit of a disturbance up in the old toilets next to the foreman’s. A. Gillespie
(janitorial) was found to have been assaulted by someone whom he refused to
name. A. Gillespie was under the influence of alcohol and gave loads of abuse to
the nurses at the Surgery and Hosp. (He’s for the chop and a member of the
AEUW) Later on a further member of the janitorial was found under the influence
of alcohol he comes from the B+W [Body in White] area, but was found sleeping
in the storeroom next to the old toilet in the trim.414
The majority of alcohol related incidents involved men, but this behaviour was not limited
to men:
I had one of the seat sect [section] who came in late tonight and it was pointed 
out to me that she [emphasis original] was under the influence of drink. She 
was sent home and will go into the office tonight.415
                                                 
412 In the majority of the interviews alcohol was mentioned in the third person, with the exception of three
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The underlining of she in the diary suggests this was unexpected or rare behaviour for
women workers in the factory. However, there exist other examples within the diaries of
women partaking in this activity, for example:
I had Grace Stewart of the Diathermic in on Discipline for reporting for work on
Fri [sic] night under the influence of alcohol. She was sent home _ hour [sic] after
the start of the Shift on Fri-night [sic]. I explained to Thompson about Grace being
under considerable strain owing to family illness. The outcome being she got a final
warning.416
• Consequences
As in the above example, employees who were identified as being inebriated were subject
to the three stage company discipline procedure and faced a warning, suspension, or to be
fired. There are also diary entries that refer to occasions when work sections considered
whether to stop work in support of a colleague who had been disciplined. Regardless of
union affiliation the shop steward would speak to section members to establish whether
there was support for a stoppage:
… we had Bro Colin Morrison (Trucker) in the office at 1.50 P.M. Comp.
[company] are saying he was unfit for work (after reporting back late) Thro’ [sic]
Drink. They sent him home to report to personell [sic] 8 A.M. to-morrow. I met his
section at the tea-break to see if their [sic] was any support for him. I was told
politely no way.417
However, a month later in January 1979, disciplinary action resulted in an unofficial
stoppage when three members of the assembly line were disciplined and the section
discussed the possibility of striking in support of the disciplined workers:
3 ops from U/Seal [under seal] across the Road alledgedly [sic] bringing in a
“cairry-oot”!418
The Works Committee later ‘unanimously’ decided not to support the three men although
there was a section stoppage in support of one of them, which lasted for one shift.419
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Supporting a colleague generally depended on the individual and whether their behaviour
was a regular occurrence:
Later on at approx 1 A.M Bro T. Haggarty of the sequence line…was approached
by Smith and Strachan and told he was unfit to work because of the demon Booze.
They sent for the I.R.O. [Industrial Relations Officer] and a Stage 2 took
place…after Dinner the sequence line stopped saying they were stopping in support
of bro Haggarty …When I held a meeting with them, the females said they were
not supporting him and he is lucky to get away with it for so long.420
It is apparent in this record that this was not unusual behaviour for Brother Haggarty and
for this reason he was not supported by the female shop floor workers. The evidence
suggests that perhaps turning up at work on a few separate occasions was condoned by
colleagues however, when the behaviour became more recurrent it was deemed less
acceptable. It could also point to a different response towards this type of mischief by
women workers. The above examples suggest that there were instances of women being
caught under the influence of alcohol but the occurrences may not have been as common
as men.421
Throughout the discipline procedure the shop steward represented the worker,
negotiating on their behalf, and had to be present when the employee reported to the
Personnel Department. If it was decided to contest a dismissal the steward instigated the
appeal to the Industrial Relations manager.422  Within the shop steward diaries there is the
impression that in many cases the disciplinary procedure was a formality, as there was the
expectation that if employees were caught under the influence of alcohol the steward
would be able to get the decision reversed:
The fellow on the Diathermic, who, was accussed [sic] of being drunk on Thursday
night, went to a stage 3 on Friday morning.  He was represented by Bro’s Herron
and McGregor, and the upshot was that he got the bag … the man recons [sic] that
the senior stewards of his union made a mess of the matter.423
The pressure on shop stewards to ensure that employees evaded being fired was likely
related to the fact that this activity was common throughout the factory and that evidence
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indicating employees, including shop stewards and foremen, were ‘turning a blind eye’ to
such mischief, unless it directly affected production or the activity was discovered by a
more senior layer of management or an Industrial Relations Officer (hereafter IRO). The
narratives constructed within the oral testimonies indicate that attempts were made to
convince inebriated workers to go home or they were simply hidden on the factory floor,
with a ‘blind eye’ turned to such activity. The following example from a diary points to
this activity happening at night but also that it was being obscured from management by
the shop stewards:
We had a “Helluva” night in here.  First we had Chris Currie of the rear estates
reporting for work; well under the influence of drink. James and I managed to get
him to go home.424
This excerpt is consistent with the testimony of Craig Marsden who worked as an IRO
during the Chrysler phase of ownership. Marsden described the style he adopted within his
job wherein he would provide the opportunity for the worker to leave the site in order to
avoid being disciplined for turning up at work under the influence of alcohol:
The style I had was, in the end was, for example if somebody presented themselves
for work and they were drunk, or deemed to be drunk, if they walked in the factory
it was dismissal. So what I used to do was when I heard of that, I would speak,
phone up the shop steward and tell the shop steward, “Look there’s a guy down
there who, one of your member’s coming in, security think he’s eh drunk, eh, if you
get down there and persuade him, before I get there eh, to go home, he’s dealt with
under the lateness and absence procedure which is just a warning. If he comes in,
ah’m gonna have to bag him.” … An that way then [pause], the steward had
credibility, the steward’d say look, the guy told us and gave us warning but he
decided to come in he’s not, ye know … But ye know, … the guy’s been playin the
game and been stupid. And you’ve got a bit of credibility cos you gave everybody a
bit of space. So the stewards knew that you were fairly honest … and that was the
only way to do it you know.425
When Douglas McKendrick was asked about the foremen’s response to his behaviour, of
turning up to work under the influence of alcohol and then sleeping at work he stated:
No, no the, they turned a blind eye … ah can only say this as ma opinion hen, 
but they turned a blind eye eh, tae a lot o things just tae keep the peace, tae 
keep the, the line runnin. … Because, their job was on the line as well as oor
job bein on the line ye know. … Ah’m quite sure ma wee charge hand eh, knew 
that ah wis lyin sleepin on a Friday ye know.426
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Therefore, a dominant theme within the oral testimonies was that foremen and supervisors
were complicit in this form of misbehaviour by condoning workers sleeping in the factory,
as long as the activity was covert and undetected by senior management and most
importantly that production was maintained: ‘as long as the lines keeps goin, the job’s
done’.427
Another reason why workers may have expected the stewards to be able to ensure
that they evaded punishment was in the distinction between workers arriving at work
inebriated and those who identified themselves as alcoholics. Those who were taken
through the discipline procedure were mostly aware that they could claim they were an
alcoholic if there was any threat of dismissal. David Munroe worked as a union convenor
for the ASTMS union and when asked about the common issues for which he had to
represent union members through the company discipline procedure he stated:
Maybe absenteeism: that was the biggest problem. Maybe [pause] eh alcoholics,
people like that, people wi, people wi problems ye know.428
At Linwood, workers were given the opportunity to declare themselves as alcoholics to the
resident nurse Sister Jackson. The company recognised alcoholism as a medical condition
and as Munroe recalls this reflects the fairness of the managers with whom he had contact
and the discipline procedure:
if ye were an alcoholic ye had the chance tae admit ye were an alcoholic things like
that, and then, but as ah say unless ye were really, really bad, they were quite
fair.429
• Explanations
The prevalence of drink at Linwood was one of the main types of mischief referred to in
the oral testimonies and there is a variety of explanations for this type of behaviour. The
above excerpts indicate that the firms managing Linwood recognised alcoholism as a
problem. McKendrick stated that he became an alcoholic while working at Linwood but
unsure as to why it developed at that time. There was some suggestion that men who were
alcoholics at Linwood had always been heavy drinkers:
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I think they done it for, ah think, think they done it for years. Ah mean … tae me a
gambler’s always a gambler. … they betted before … they were gamblers or else
they were drinkers, but wi that kind o money they were drinkin more and gambling
more … by far.430
Implicit in this narrative is that the higher wages at Linwood in comparison to other
industrial employers in the area meant that employees at the plant had greater disposable
income to spend on alcohol:
That was common quite a bit eh. Ye’ve got ae realise these people had a lot o extra
cash in their pocket, An they were gonnae spend it, wan way or another an drink
always comes intae it. Ah meant it was, was a, most o their, most o their problems
was in there, was drink, ye know.431
As the workers received their wages on the Friday morning this is consistent with the claim
that drinking was especially common at the end of the week once the wages had been paid:
It did happen. Mare on a Friday. That guy on a Friday used tae maybe get a few
drinks an [pause] these things happen. That wis the foreman. It wisnae just the men.
The foreman did as well [laughs].432
This is further underpinned by the IRO recalling the number of wives of Linwood workers
that gathered at the factory gates every Friday lunchtime to collect money from their
husbands before they had the chance to spend it.433 These statements indicate a linkage
between the higher wages at Linwood and increased spending on alcohol. During the era of
the Linwood factory many women continued to have the responsibility of controlling the
household budget. Having given a proportion of their pay to the household budget, for men
working in the plant the higher rate of pay meant they had more disposable income, which
could have been spent on their leisure activities or alcohol. Women on the other hand did
not have access to the same levels of disposable income as their husbands.
Greater disposable income may have afforded workers more money to spend on
alcohol but it is an insufficient explanation as to why workers thought it acceptable to
drink prior to going into work, and risk losing their job if found intoxicated or in
possession of alcohol. If workers were arriving in the plant under the influence of alcohol
this could be attributed to alcohol addiction; symptomatic of a culture in which alcohol was
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prevalent and transferred into the factory, or reflecting a particular attitude towards work.
One possible explanation for workers arriving on the night shift drunk was due to the lack
of alcohol availability when they had finished their shift. It was documented in a meeting
of members of the TGWU that shift workers experienced the difficulty of when to fit in
social activities. Several senior stewards stressed the need for recreational facilities so that
nightshift workers could for example, ‘drink at cockcrow’.434 The regularity of diary
entries that report drunken workers suggests that for a number of workers it was difficult to
find a compromise between social activities and night-shift work. Interviewees told of
meeting other workers at the plant social club prior to starting on the night shift and that
workers who shared a car to travel into work would go into Linwood village for drinks
before work.435 When asked about whether drink was more of a problem during the day or
night shift George Wilson commented:
Oh aye comin on the night shift. Ah mean they’d sit in the pub fae five o’clock oh
aye. They’d come in, some o them couldn’t stand, honestly, some o them couldn’t
stand comin in.436
There were also interviewees who claimed drink was common during the day as there was
a prevalent culture where workers drank during lunch time and in particular, Friday lunch
time after being paid. In the above excerpt Wilson’s claim that workers were drinking to
the point they were unable to do their job, consuming alcohol with workmates prior to
attending work, or during the working day, can also be seen as a socially cohesive activity
amongst informal work groups.437 The above excerpts refer to shop floor employees but it
was not an activity that was specific to this layer of employees. Barry Stubbs refers to a
foreman attending work drunk, and both the drawing office clerk, Bill Stewart, and the
wages clerk, Colin Jackson told of drinking socially with work colleagues. For Stewart this
comprised a lunch time drink on a Friday but Jackson constructed a narrative in which
socialising with colleagues at the Rootes Club was common after work and during the day,
which suggests there was a work culture based on drinking with colleagues, ‘Drink was
always involved with everyone involved in Chrysler payroll. No gambling but everybody
liked a drink’.438 Yet, this does not explain why workers regarded this as acceptable
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behaviour, or why so many shop floor workers were either directly involved through
attending work under the influence of alcohol or by concealing the activity of fellow
workmates.
In part this can be explained by recognising that alcohol was a fairly imbedded
element of working-class culture in Scotland and the pub was an arena, not only for
socialising, but where the relationships of the workplace were reinforced. For instance, in
industries such as shipbuilding where gangs organised work, men could secure entry to the
gang through negotiations in the pub and further still enticements of the liquid variety
could be offered to foreman in exchange for sought-after work.439 Furthermore, time spent
drinking with work mates was an important element in the formation of group cohesion
and group identity. While many of the interviewees claimed not to ‘socialise’ with work
mates they did describe a culture in which many workers drank at lunch time and
confessed to on occasion drinking prior to coming into work. It should be highlighted that
most of the interviewees did not live in Linwood but it is probable that factory workers that
did live locally were more likely to drink with people they worked with.440
The importance of drinking, and spending time in the pub, was also of key
significance for notions of masculinity. Historically masculinity has assumed many
‘changing’ and ‘divergent’ forms but as a discourse has been extremely influential in
determining the behaviour of men.441 In the west of Scotland a heavy dinking culture
permeated notions of being a man. The workplace ‘provided an important site for the
incubation of macho values and attitudes…encapsulated in the “hard” Glaswegian working
man’.442  Hence, the level of consumption and the ability to hold one’s drink indicative of
masculinity and a crucial part of male self-respect.443 Subsequently, masculine culture
transferred into the factory. In addition, from the early 1960s a crisis of masculinity may
have exacerbated the ‘hard’ image, as male machismo was undermined by an increasing
number of women workers in highly automated work, as in the North Side of the Linwood
plant – relatively clean production. In this sense, a worker going on shift under the
influence of alcohol reflects cultural as well as attitudinal forces.
The attitude of workers towards their work was certainly a factor in determining
whether they would turn up to work under the influence of alcohol and can be understood
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when linked with the difficulty level and responsibility associated with the job. The
testimony examined in Chapter Two points to the ease with which some of the employees
claimed they worked. If the jobs were considered easy as there was little physical or mental
challenge or concentration required, then the attitude may have been it was acceptable to
attend work under the influence of alcohol. Similarly, the removal of responsibility for
work - through MDW, scientific management, and a high day rate of pay - could have had
a similar effect. Yet what is suggested within Anna Anderson’s testimony is that women
may have had a different attitude towards turning up for work inebriated. For instance, in
one of the above diary entries the steward identifies the ‘women’ of a section as refusing to
support a worker. In the period during which the Linwood factory was open there were
many pubs in the area but they tended to be the preserve of male clientele. Women tended
to play a peripheral role in the traditional drinking culture based in pubs.444 In Anderson’s
testimony she suggested that as her husband and his male friends were able to declare
themselves as alcoholics they were able to get away with drinking alcohol and sneaking
out of work during the day to go for a drink, without fear of being sacked. She identifies
her husband as an alcoholic but she claimed that the company policy did not help matters
as it ensured an income while sustaining his addiction.445
Drinking in the plant when on shift, rather than before work or during lunch time, is
more likely to reflect an addiction to alcohol or boredom at work. As Meyer writes,
‘alcohol numbed the body’s senses and reduced the tedium, fatigue, and monotony’ for
those working in mass production jobs in the American automobile industry.446 To some
extent this could be attributed to the absence of responsibility as well as autonomy in mass-
assembly work. Blauner argues that due to the extreme sub-division of labour in assembly
work there was little variety in the immediate work process.447 This is evident in Barry
Stubbs’ narrative:
Aye maybe just the, the, the, the pressure oh the jobs. It wis a horrible job. See
workin on a track daen sixty cars an hour. … Imagine what, ye didnae have a
minute tae yerself. Ye went in wan car, oot a the car, in the car, oot the car and in
the car.448
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The pacing of work by conveyor technology and work output determined by scientific
management meant a severe restriction on the autonomy of the worker and related
pressures of lacking control over the pace of work. Anderson attributes alcoholism at the
plant to monotony experienced by assembly-line workers:
Ah remember Andrew [Anderson’s husband] saying a friend of his, ah’m trying not
to say anybody’s name, it was boredom. Boredom and, not boredom, monotonous.
Some of the jobs they had on these lines were monotonous, and ah think that had a
lot to do wi it.449
The testimony is consistent with Meyer’s analysis of the American car industry which
links drinking in the workplace to attempts to counteract monotony:
For mass production workers in the automobile plants, alcohol numbed the body’s
senses and reduced the tedium, fatigue, and monotony of their work.450
The testimony of Barry King, a skilled coach trimmer who worked in the
rectification area, and then as an inspector foreman, reveals a contrary attitude to drinking
in the workplace:
An they would go out on strike for somebody that was out, caught out drinkin.
Maybe a guy was suspended and they would all want tae hit the street because he
was suspended for drinkin. Now, no way, eh, ah could not condone that at all ye
know, ah’m dead against that sort o thing.451
King was a skilled worker and therefore the link could be made between a rough unskilled
or semi skilled working class and a respectable skilled working class, the latter
traditionally characterised by temperance. On the one hand, when interpreting this
testimony there was an awareness of the concept of ‘composure’; in that individuals will
construct a persona of themselves in narratives that they wish to project. King may have
been projecting an image of himself as a skilled worker that always completed his job on
time and did not condone alcohol in the workplace, thereby adhering to a respectable
working-class masculinity.452 Yet in his testimony he recalls reluctantly having to strike in
support of an employee who was sacked due to being under the influence of alcohol.
Confirming that at times there was support for workers in such situations and collective
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pressure for action. David Bright, a wages clerk who worked alongside interviewee Colin
Jackson, although he did not include himself he acknowledged that some of his workmates
were heavy drinkers.453
The reasons employees at Linwood would engage in this form of misbehaviour are
due to a combination of factors including a synthesis of their attitude towards their job as
well as the influence of a factory culture that was shaped by predominant masculinities. It
is conceivable that one of the reasons the firms at Linwood provided the opportunity for
workers to declare themselves as alcoholics was in part, recognition that a hard-drinking
culture was so prevalent at that time and also that drinking alcohol is behaviour that is not
as tangible as say theft. As workers were able to declare themselves as alcoholics they
could avoid being fired. Or if inebriated workers were encouraged to go home they would
receive a suspension or lose out on a day’s pay rather than lose their job. That the stewards
and foremen ‘turned a blind eye’ further points to this behaviour as being perceived as
somewhat acceptable and understandable.  Only three of the sample admitted to attending
work under the influence of alcohol but the distinction can be made between rough and
respectable behaviour. Whilst drinking was rough behaviour, it was accepted as inherent
component of factory culture.
3.4.2 Sleeping at Work
Another form of behaviour described in the interviews is of employees sleeping during
working hours:
an there was many a story’s came out of it that there would be guys found sleepin
up on top of pallets instead of bein on the job.454
A common link was made between intoxication and sleeping at work. For example:
somethings that happened werenae true, used tae bring in bottles o wine at dinner
time. … They used tae, sea sick. [imitates someone rocking from side to side] It’s
that way they were, that drunk they used tae lie aboot the place. It’s unbelievable so
it wis.455
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As noted in Chapter Two, Barry Stubbs felt under constant pressure at work and did not
have time to take a break. He found it incomprehensible, not only that people had the time
to sleep and expect to get away with that behaviour, but would be able to participate in
such mischief without being reprimanded. In the previous example, the connection is made
between inebriated workers and sleeping yet, the oral testimony evidence analysed in
Chapter Two of this thesis drew attention to the testimony of line workers who worked
back on the line in order to create time away from the line. One way of passing the time
away from the line was to sleep. Thus in effect, sleeping constituted a method by which
workers exerted control over themselves within the workplace. Within the oral testimony
and documentary sources there is evidence of varying responses to employees who slept
during a shift. The skilled workers in the sample were critical of such behaviour as it was
seen to reflect laziness and failure to work efficiently. These workers distinguished this
behaviour as different from their own and reflecting a different attitude towards work.456
• Consequences
Evidence of sleeping and the response of management also exist in the shop steward
diaries. As with being caught under the influence of alcohol, workers that were caught
sleeping at work could be taken through the discipline procedure and faced losing their job:
There were two cases in CAB [Car Assembly Building] where the people were
caught sleeping. Company wanted to dismiss these people. The Works Committee
agreed to bring in T. Robertson [TGWU Senior Steward] on this one.457
A diary entry on the 7 May 1979, noted that:
Bro Williams (man in toilet sleeping thurs [sic] night) was given a 2 week
suspension for sleeping. Bro Gillespie failed to turn up for stage 3.458
Similarly, there is evidence of workers being disciplined for sleeping at work. For instance,
paint sprayer Mark Ellison described a scenario in which a shop steward was caught
sleeping and fired the next evening.459 What is apparent from the documentary and oral
history evidence is the inconsistency in response to employees caught sleeping. In the
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above diary excerpts, in one instance employees were threatened with dismissal whereas in
the second excerpt the employee was given a suspension. Both diary entries refer to the
same department, but with a two-year time difference between the events. This latter
example occurred during Peugeot’s phase of ownership of, ‘Any strikes and we’ll move
out.’ 460 On assuming ownership the company had made it clear in the PSA Declaration of
Intent that commitment to providing employment was conditional on, ‘prevailing
economic conditions’. 461 Although the late 1970s was a period of adverse market
conditions Peugeot had achieved productivity improvements, therefore dismissal of
Brother Watson may have elicited a solidaristic response from his section that could have
disrupted production.
Comparisons can be made between the response of fellow employees and managers
to inebriated workers and sleeping workers. When a worker was caught sleeping in work
and disciplined, this could result in industrial action, a strike of solidarity. There is an
example of this in October 1976 when 130 electricians and plumbers walked off the job in
support of a plumber who was sacked after ‘allegedly’ being found asleep on the night
shift.462 But also it appears that sleeping was another activity to which a ‘blind eye’ could
be turned and sleeping colleagues would be obscured from management by fellow
workers. Yet again, there is evidence to suggest that foremen were complicit in this
process:
Hide them! Gaffers [foremen] as well. That ah’ve seen gaffers doin it as well. 
See, see like ah’m sayin ah had that box wi the, underneath, an a lot of people 
tae sleep in, they put them in there out the road. An peopl’d do their job fur 
them. They’d soon cover it up. … An gaffers didn’t want nothing to do wi it 
cos they’d, they’d be a, they’d have again, they’d have a strike on their haund 
if they’d put somebody home that wis drunk.463
Here the complicity can be explained with reference to a discourse that can be labelled
‘pressures of production’.464 As discussed in the previous chapter, this discourse is based
upon the notion that due to production demands foremen and managers, during periods of
high demand, were unlikely to undertake action that may disrupt production. Foremen
would ‘turn a blind eye’ to certain behaviour as long as production was not interrupted.
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This resulted in an inconsistent management approach, as at other times management
would discipline workers for the same actions.
Sleeping at work is depicted within the oral history material as an activity that is
linked to workers turning up to work drunk, and that some of the workers who worked
back up the line in order to achieve time away from the line, used it as an opportunity to
sleep. This was an activity in which the informal workgroup could be compliant. When
working in pairs, working back on the line required coordination between both workers
and a convergence of interests between workers in the section as workers further back on
the track would allow workers from further down the track to work back, which resulted in
more than one employee working on the vehicle at one time. Furthermore, when
individuals were asleep the work group would collude in this activity in order to prevent
detection by supervisors or IROs. The oral testimony highlights this was another activity
that was met with an inconsistent response from management. It is evidence in the diaries
that there was an official discipline procedure but the existence of a competing discourse
emerged during the interviews: as long as production was not interrupted there were
foremen who ignored certain types of mischief.
• Explanations
The behaviour described points to an indifferent attitude towards work. The above
testimony lends itself to an instrumental interpretation of attitudes to work and there is
evidence in the interview material to support the view that workers at Linwood were
disengaged and sought extrinsic rather than intrinsic satisfaction. For workers who stated
their work tasks were boring and monotonous, sleeping offering a form of escapism or
simply rest from work. As many of the assembly jobs consisted of repetitive processes
requiring limited responsibility and control over the planning and pace of work, this would
have nurtured an attitude in which employees absolved themselves of responsibility over
what would happen if they walked off their job. The majority of the sample who took on
track work experienced a distinct change in their experience of work and for some this was
met with a degree of resistance in the form of employee mischief. This is not to suggest an
overly determinist analysis based on the technological system or the social organisation of
work, rather that there can be differing factors influential in a worker’s decision to sleep at
work. Workers at Linwood may well have sought intrinsic rewards through mischief.
Sleeping is evidence not only of escapism but also as an attempt by an employee to regain
autonomy over their time and effort within the work place. The above example of Brother
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Williams disciplined for sleeping in the toilet and Brother Gillespie failing to turn up for
the disciplinary procedure may well be explained by cultural factors. The diary entry was
for two shifts on May 7 1979. Not only was it the May Day Holiday it was also the day on
which four prominent league teams in the west of Scotland were playing football: Celtic,
Greenock Morton, Partick Thistle and Rangers.465 It is feasible that Gillespie did no turn up
to work as he wanted take a holiday on the May Day and furthermore, watch the football
which in turn may have potentially offered him a degree of intrinsic gratification at having
achieved this day off work.
For George Wilson, workers who slept during the working day displayed a lack of
responsibility towards not only their job but absolved themselves of responsibility for their
work:
it wis … mostly the same wans awe the time that wis doin it. Cos they know they
were gettin away wi it. Ye know what ah mean, they knew it. They’d come in awe
the time and they’d go fur a sleep, “Auch somebody else’ll dae it”. The, these kind
o wans.466
At first it seems like there is an inherent contradiction within Wilson’s testimony as despite
the sentiment in his quotation, he admitted the job at Linwood meant he did not feel the
same responsibility towards his work as when he had worked as a roofer. He too admitted
to sleeping at work underneath a table. However, for him there was a distinction between
workers like himself, who were able to sleep at work because either they had co-ordinated
with other workers to ensure their job was completed and took it in turns to have time
away from the line, and workers that worked back on the line enabling time away from the
line. At times this was because workers had completed their ‘designated’ work. Although
these activities could be viewed as mischief, both perceptions on sleeping on shift reveal a
desire for autonomy over oneself.
Evidence suggests that although mischief such as moving away from the line,
playing cards, or sleeping, did occur, employees still completed their jobs:
And I know that a couple of my husband’s friends, well it was about four or five of
em, they were younger then remember, they all went about together, they used to
climb over the fence at dinner time, and you’d be lucky if they came back cos
they’d made their tally or something. You know that, I saw a lot. Not just my
husband and his friends, a lot of it.467
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These workers had asserted control over the labour process and manifested an attitude that,
as the work had been completed they could do what they wished with their time. The
employees as individuals and informal work groups found ways of exerting control over
the effort-bargain during the hours they were at work, which in effect comprised theft of
company time. The line workers that partook in this activity did not conceptualise the
exchange of labour as the purchase of their time, and the overtime scam is an ideal way of
exploring this attitude towards their work.
3.4.3 Clocking In / Overtime Rota
Research on theft in the workplace indicates that the most common form of  what the
authors call ‘production-deviance’ amongst employees, was taking more time than
allocated during lunch or tea breaks. The same study found that in the manufacturing
sector specifically ‘coming late or leaving early was the second most prevalent item.’468 At
Linwood the theft of company time occurred on an individual level by employees that were
not directly involved in production. Due to living in such close proximity to the plant the
IRO, Craig Marsden, recalled the convenience of being able to use his factory walkie-
talkie from his kitchen window, thus suggesting that he was not always on-site during his
hours of work.469 Similarly, David Crawford who worked up to Inspection Supervisor in
the paint plant spoke of being able to take extra time at the end of his lunch break when he
was aware there was ‘a gap in the line’.470 These acts comprising theft of time were
individualised however, in the interviews the shop floor production workers described the
ability to collectively organise in order to cover lateness or leaving work early.
At the Linwood car plant a clock card machine established the presence of workers
onsite. Each had a personalised card and stamp number that had to be inserted into the
machine on arrival and when they departed at the end of a shift. The system enabled
management to monitor time-keeping and importantly, highlighted whether there were
enough workers present to commence production on the integrated assembly lines. When
George Wilson was asked what the consequences were for lateness he immediately stated,
‘You’re clocked in’.471 In his working area employees would clock in for one another.
Despite attempts by management to control this system, Stubbs of the CAB told of it being
                                                 
468 Richard Hollinger and John Clark, Theft by Employees (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 44.
469 Oral Testimony, Craig Marsden, Interview 1.
470 Oral Testimony, David Crawford, Interview 1.
471 Oral Testimony, George Wilson, Interview 1.
134
common for everybody in a section to be stamped in by the first person to arrive at the start
of the shift:
So, in a lot o cases folk would say, “Auch just stamp the card ... You stamp 
awe the cards.” An the first wan in would stamp awe the cards. … That was 
alright, but when the somebody let you doon like that, you say well, “Ah’m no 
stampin his card cos he’s very unreliable”. That’s where yer teamwork came 
in, an the gaffer’s just turned a blind eye. Ok you would get people comin in 
eh an sayin right, eh [pause] we’re no gonnae let them, let them do that. So 
they pulled them up.472
This process meant employees were able to evade management control as they could turn
up late knowing that their cards had been stamped and they would not be penalised. It was
another activity in which there were times when foremen were complicit as long as they
had enough men for the line to start. However, this did cause problems if individuals failed
to turn up for work:
An, ah always remember eh wan gaffer an, he thought he was Mr. Nice Guy and,
auch, “Ah’ll just stamp their card an, ah’ll let, let them know they’ll be in.” An it
just so happens this day two o them never came in so he hadnae enough, and he’d
already pressed the button for the track to start. “Awe they’ll be in”, but they never
appeared. So they let the, let him down. So he got reprimanded fur it.473
There is evidence to suggest that utilising the stamping system to exert control over
work time was undertaken in a systematic fashion, with greater opportunity when the
workers undertook overtime during which time the foremen were not always present.
Rodger McGuinness explained that when workers were given an overtime allocation they
were frequently able to finish the work well within the shift, ‘There might have been five
or six of us asked to come in, but only one would … need tae stay back to clock the
cards’.474 Such testimony depicts it as being common for workers within a section to take it
in turns to stay behind until the end of the shift. George Wilson was in charge of the
overtime rota for his section and he constructed a similar narrative to McGuinness in that
there was a rota for the overtime. While the rest of the overtime workers would leave the
car plant via holes in the fence, one worker remained and was responsible for ensuring that
the cards were stamped at the end of the shift, ‘Your turn ae stamp out, you’d wait tae four
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o’clock but he’d be away at wan’.475 Line workers told of an acknowledged agreement
between the two shifts, in jobs where it was possible, workers would work back on the
line, meaning that at the start of each shift, there would always be a break in the line for
some workers. This informal work-group organisation meant that the workers were able to
manipulate management time as well as completing their allocated work. Thereby during
such periods, informal work groups or sections could use the system of ‘clocking-in’ to
obtain some control over their time at work.
• Consequences
During periods of high demand, of key concern for management was productivity and
intrinsic in meeting production targets was the efficient deployment of workers. Equally,
time management was a fundamental element in improving production rates and in 1979
the PSA management decided to undertake head counts at the start and end of shifts:
All shop stewards informed their [sic] will be a Head Count in every section 5 mins
[sic] before lunch + 5 mins [sic] before stopping time. Anyone not at their place of
work during count will be taken thro’ [sic] procedure. This will take effect from
Mon 19 Feb. “79 [sic].476
Unauthorised movement of workers around the factory was regarded by management as
detrimental to efficiency rates. Within the diaries there is evidence of management
crackdown on this activity in the late 1970s. However, this evidence is in marked contrast
to the testimony of the line workers who portrayed a working environment where they
achieved some autonomy over the pace at which they worked and, when there was less
supervision during weekend and night shift overtime, could collectively organise
themselves to ensure that they would maximise their earnings and complete their allocated
work, despite not working for the full shift.   
Time management was a measure taken by management to tackle the practice of
workers clocking on for each other:
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I had 3 people in the office tonight 2 u/seal [under seal] and 1 trucker all for the
same thing it was that they were reported not in but all there [sic] time cards were
stamped before starting time and when they came in they failed to report to their
foreman that their cards were stamped … the company was saying that they were
trying to defraud them.  2 of them got final warnings the 3rd man who was already
on a final warning for the same thing they were suspending him for 3 days so
failure to agree was lodged and I will be going to a stage 3.477
By lodging a failure to agree, the shop steward had decided to support the member of his
section to prevent him from being suspended. Shop stewards did not necessarily support
every case that arose in the factory, and at times there was no sectional support from the
workforce for individuals who had displayed poor behaviour and were subsequently
disciplined by the company. For example, ‘Works Com [Committee] meeting today
decided not to support member from paint who was bagged for bad timekeeping’.478
However, McGuinness implicates management in this process when he recalled that when
discussing the overtime rota the foreman told the men in the section:
“Ah don’t mind, as long as the place is kept clean.” He says, “the jobs are done 
that ye’s are told tae do. Ah don’t mind ye’s going away”.479
This is another instance when foreman condoned the behaviour of workers even when it
was against the rules of the company. It was an act meaningful to the employees involved
as it was another process by which they could gain a degree of autonomy over their actions
while at work.
• Explanations
Clocking in for people that are late falls into the category of looking out for other workers
in the same way as hiding drunken workers and covering for those who were sleeping on
shift. The action of clocking in all of the cards for a work group was a way in which
management control over the start time of work could, to some extent, be ‘renegotiated’. In
this sense these attempts to manipulate time and prevent management control can be
compared to the practice of ‘the welt’ in areas such as Liverpool. The ‘moral economy’ of
casualism that was pervasive in Liverpool port work was transferred into the new
industries in the post-war period. Ayers argues that, ‘the practice of the welt was
transported into some of the shops at Ford’s with men on night shift covering for each
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other while they took time out to sleep, play cards’.480  In the west of Scotland, the skilled
working-class identity was staunchly defended by workers in the traditional industries. At
Linwood the workforce adopted some of the elements in this tradition in their resistance to
new methods of managerial control. Clocking in other workers’ cards indicated the
existence of collective identity that protected workers from penalties for lateness as well as
aiding workers in their creation of time away from the line.
Nonetheless, there is an indication that there were divisions within the workforce,
and whether a worker’s card was stamped was depended on geographical loyalties and
circle of friends. An employee who commuted to Linwood from Glasgow claimed that:
Certain people would do it for their pals. … It was people who lived locally who
were more likely to do it because they were more in cahoots with each other. We
were living further away and in less contact with local people.481
Furthermore, the process of stamping in the cards commanded a commonality of respect
among the group of workers. Having been clocked in, if an individual did not turn up for
work or was excessively late and attracted the attention of the foreman or a more senior
management figure, this would lead to animosity amongst the group workers who would
refuse to stamp the individual’s card in future.482 The overtime system functioned in the
same way. If an employee failed to stamp the cards or take his turn to stay on shift and
allow the others to leave early, he was perceived as having let the group down and was
excluded from the system. The overtime rota involved greater co-ordination: McGuinness
explained that there was a rota system to decide the workmate who had to stay back to
stamp the cards and was a means by which the employees could maximise their economic
return.
Part of the reason that such clock ‘fiddles’ developed was linked with the attitude
workers held towards the effort bargain. To refer back to George Wilson’s explanation for
the behaviour of the workforce in terms of pride, previously mentioned in Chapter Two, he
reconstructs a viewpoint that reflects the classic alienation thesis:
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But no, ah, ah go back again tae pride. There wis nothin, there wis nae prise wi it,
just a, a menial job tae, ah don’t know about the pride on the other side o the line.
When it came tae the finished article ye know. Puttin in awe the, it was only shells
we were working wi, it wis only a shell, ye know. Ah don’t know wi across the
other side o the Car Con [Car Conditioning]. A mean when it came tae the polishin
putting awe the final touches tae it. Wit kind o pride they had in the car goin oot.
But in oor side there wis definitely, there wis nothing.483
The lack of pride in the job can also be linked to the argument made at the beginning of
this chapter that due to the division of labour, for workers that had tasks that were highly
specialised, repetitive and subject to measured day work – with their pace of work
determined externally by technology and organisation – this resulted in an absence of
responsibility towards their work. When such behaviour is considered within perceptions
of time in capitalism the workers did not view the time away from their work to be the
theft of time as they believed that if they were meeting the production targets as
established by MDW, the means by which they achieved the targets was insignificant.
That the management deployed a team of men to undertake a job quota that could be
completed in two hours as opposed to seven was not a concern of the workers. These
activities were fuelled by a factory culture in which ‘getting one over’ on management was
important and the overtime rota was a method that allowed significant job control for
workers that were able to partake in this form of mischief. In Nichols and Beynon’s study
of a chemical processing plant following the introduction of a New Working Arrangement,
interviews with employees reveal that many shop floor workers resisted the re-grading of
job categories and subsequent changes in work organisation by continuing to work as they
had done. One worker told the authors that, “[we] let them think we’re doing it their
way”.484 Thus the workers in the plant found methods of resisting managerial control in a
covert manner.
The Linwood interviewees depict the overtime system in the plant as overt and
condoned by the foremen or gaffers as long as the work was completed. This complicity
may reflect the promotion of foremen from the ranks of the shop floor as it was difficult
for them to challenge activities they were once involved in. Failure to challenge this form
of mischief concurs with the narrative of avoiding industrial action. However, the oral
testimony can also be interpreted as being constructed to glorify risk at work. Johnston and
McIvor have argued that within the testimonies of former workers of heavy industries such
as shipbuilding, interviewees, usually males, have constructed an ‘heroic’ discourse related
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to the physically hard nature of work in these industries.485 At the Linwood plant the work
was not as physical. It may have required dexterity and continual effort but the majority of
jobs involved machinery and did not require the application of demanding physical
strength. The discourse of risk that emerged in the interviews was an important element of
the factory culture and in particular, masculine identities at the plant. Few of the workers
exhibited concern about being caught for instance, sleeping at work. This can be
understood as the heroic discourse being transferred into the new working environment at
the plant, and then adapted from glorified risk associated with the challenge to masculine
strength and health, to the risk involved in mischief.
3.4.4 Card schools, gambling and games
On the shop floor workers were able to counteract the monotony and boredom experienced
at work by playing games in groups. These ranged from activities that could be done whilst
working – crosswords and ‘liney’486 to games that were played away from work such as
dominoes and cards. As explored in the previous chapter, interviewees told of experiencing
satisfaction in being able to work back on the line in order to achieve time away from the
line and regarded it as their own time in which they could play cards. Playing cards during
the hours of work was more achievable by workers that were able to move away from their
workstation. It was one of the most common games mentioned in the interviews and within
the plant card schools were formed, which normally involved gambling:
Auch aye! [laughs] Guys used to loose awe their wages [laughs] Fur goodness 
sake aye! Aw that happened aw the time. Ah wis never involved in that.487
Albeit, George Wilson recalled that two of the women assembly operators in his sections
also participated in card games, the majority of the references to gambling in the
testimonies are related to men.488 This is reinforced in references to card schools taking
place in the factory, sometimes in hidden locations described as ‘wee dens’,489 or in
Watson’s testimony where he claimed the ‘gambling dens’ were ‘nearly always [in] the
toilets’.490  The occurrence of gambling throughout automobile plants, in particular the
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toilets has been noted as a social space where men would engage in the ‘collective
expression of relief’ from the pressure of work on the shop floor.491 This was substantiated
by an interviewee who joined Linwood as a Technician Apprentice, in that not only did he
recall being aware of gambling in the toilet but that access to the card game was controlled:
An ah went to walk into the toilet, and there’s two guys standin outside … “Go
somewhere else.” So ah kin o looked at them an as ah wis lookin at them the, a
double swing door opened and ah saw into the toilet and there’s guys playin cards
and there’s guys sittin on seats and ah’m goin eh, obviously whatever’s goin on in
there ah’ve no tae see.492
As Bill Reid was an apprentice and the card games occurrence were during management
time, the group of workers involved were seeking to regulate access to the group activity as
well as prevent being exposed to management. Reid was not only a physical outsider from
the group, but as an apprentice was not conceived as being a man therefore could not join
in these activities.493 Therefore, the toilets were used for such group activities that
solidified the group identities within the plant. It is unclear as to whether these groups were
identified along sectional lines or prowess at playing cards, but the above excerpt indicates
the parameters of the group were policed.
Employee control of the toilets, as projected in Reid’s testimony, is noteworthy in
terms of significance in industrial politics. Employees working on track work had to seek a
relief man to do their job in order to get a break to go to the toilet. Management have
traditionally attempted to control visits and time spent in the toilet so as to minimise
disruption to work output.494 The congregation of workers in the toilets to partake in a
leisure activity and control of access, presumably to warn on the approach of managers
suggests effective worker control of an area that management had sought to police access.
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• Consequences
Resistance to management was often a collective effort within work sections in the plant.
During 1977 there is a record of an ongoing issue between workers and management over
the playing of cards during company time. The company issued a statement to a Works
Committee, which was commented on in the shop stewards’ diaries:
3. The playing of games.  The company are saying that their [sic] will be no games
played between the hours of 7.45A.M. until 12 noon and from 12.40P.M. until 4.30
P.M. As you knowe [sic] their will be a difference of opinion on that.495
The next day six workers in K Building were issued with final warnings for playing cards
during work time.496 Further discussion occurred between management and the unions
regarding the playing of cards as the night shift steward noted in the diary:
The Company have made a new statement regarding playing of games. They are as
follows: 1. We can play games on our tea break and mass relief. 2. We cannot play
games on personnal [sic] relief, All operators are to get up when breaks are
finished.497
However, the management response to this activity was varied. IRO, Craig Marsden,
recalled that due to the large amounts of money that were staked on a card game, there
were times when the stewards would inform the IROs of this activity. Implicit in his
narrative is that rather than the activity being unifying amongst work groups, there were
times when the activity worked against the interests of the cohesive group:
periodically you used to get ehm [pause] eh card games stating and they would
fleece some of the gullible of their entire … week’s wages. And those, so long as
you, you know. You were often warned of the occasions when you were warned by
the stewards that there was a card game going and, and who to hit.498
Therefore, there is the sense that management was actively targeting the playing of card
games at work not simply to enforce control over the workforce during the hours of work
but also to protect workers who were subject to groups of workers coalescing to ensure that
one worker lost the card game. Andrew McIntyre, who worked as a skilled electrician in
the paint shop, commented that workers were not allowed to play games in this area and if
                                                 
495 ML, Linwood Box 10, Item 8927252/1, TGWU Shop Stewards’ Diary, B Shift, 11 October 1977.
496 ML, Linwood Box 10, Item 8927252/1, TGWU Shop Stewards’ Diary, B Shift, 12 October 1977.
497 ML, Linwood Box 10, Item 8927252/1, TGWU Shop Stewards’ Diary, B Shift, 13 October 1977.
498 The verb ‘to fleece’ someone is used to describe stripping someone of their money. Oral Testimony, Craig
Marsden, Interview 1.
142
discovered, ‘you’d get your books’.499 In many of the line workers interviews, as with
other behaviour noted above, there is the discourse of ‘turning a blind eye’:
They shut their eyes tae everythin. Naw. The guys were too hard fur that. They
used tae play at dinner time an awe that.500
Although it is with reference to an earlier time period, when gambling was illegal, Ross
McKibbin’s article on gambling draws attention to the arrangement of bookies and their
agents in factories, and that while management were often aware of this activity, ‘most
turned a blind eye’.501 The link can be made here with the discourse of avoiding industrial
action. In his oral history interview, Marsden joked that there were certain aspects of
factory life that you had to be aware of such as, ‘never sack the bookie’s runner. Yeah. Not
unless you wanted a strike’.502 This is supported in the narrative of McGuinness:
You got other ones that … in Linwood itself they were actually bookmakers. You
could put your horse racing on and your football on in Linwood. And they, they
didnae bother anybody because there were two bookies that actually, that
everybody knew ehm that were bookies.503
It was easier to allow the gambling to take place as long as work was being completed.
• Explanations
From the above oral testimony excerpts despite management attempts to prevent the
playing of cards during working hours, the shop floor appears a social space where the
distinction between work and leisure was never fully broken down. The defence of playing
cards or reading the newspaper at work was derived from a rough masculine culture that
developed in the new mass-assembly environment, and remained as ‘illicit activities’
representing masculine play.504 The playing of games at work, in particular cards, was an
activity that had also occurred in other industries and whilst this activity can be reasoned as
a methods of counteracting monotony or boredom at work, it has functions other than
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simply as a form of escapism from work or as a means of earning some extra cash (through
gambling).505 Andrew McIntyre described playing the game liney:
So ye had a thing like a, a round tin lid lyin on the floor, and ye kicked that with yer
foot an if you made it lie against a line near near where your opponent was you got
a point, and he would get the bin lid back to you, near the line where you were. 506
This game was played not only to pass the time but also functioned as an informal method
of determining which workers would take on tasks such as making the next batch of tea.
The card schools and gambling performed other functions within the car plant other than
providing a form of relief or ‘skiving’ from the job. Historically, betting and gambling
were important elements in working-class communities; balancing the focus on the
physical demands in the workplace with mental and intellectual stimulation in leisure time.
McKibbin’s study deconstructs the involvement in gambling to argue that rather than being
inherently about chance, the strategies devised and knowledge of stakes and form
functioned to contribute to a form of cultural capital.507 Therefore highlighting that such
activities can offer both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards for those participating.
When applied to the car plant, gambling was significant in shop floor culture in
terms of working class informal hierarchy. The organisers and key players in large card
schools commanded the respect of fellow employees and challenges to the hierarchy could
be made by winning or controlling the card table, rather than through violence.
Furthermore, the collusion amongst workers in order to ‘fleece’ someone of their wages
may also have been a reflection of workplace hierarchies. Whilst McKibbin’s article points
to the long history of such activities, in Linwood their function in determining
responsibilities or cultivating hierarchies, meant they had additional purposes that to some
extent mirrored that of work groups or gangs in traditional heavy industries. In Linwood,
the autonomy of the gang in the labour process may have been absent, but activities such
as games provided ordering functions amongst work groups or those working in close
proximity to each other.
The ability to play cards at work thus created time away from the line, either
through ‘skiving’ or working back on the line and represented the ability of the workers to
demonstrate their autonomy at work. As Mars argues:
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When the pie salesman understocks a supermarket, he is not, in his eyes,
performing a criminal act; rather, he is demonstrating that he is on top of the job
and that the job is not on top of him.508
Involvement in such activities was an important representation of the autonomy of the
workers over themselves within the workplace. However, the illicit participation in these
games also had important cultural and social functions for the workers involved which call
into question distinct categories of intrinsic and extrinsic reward.
3.5 Theft of Items and Industrial Sabotage
The distinction can be made between the theft of time, which can be perceived as
intangible and open to interpretation, and the theft or destruction of the firm’s property or
the production process, which is more easily identifiable.509 This section focuses on
examination of the primary evidence relating to such activity as well as a discussion on the
meanings of such behaviour. In the shop steward diaries, relative to issues associated with
the theft of time, there is little mention of theft of items or acts of sabotage. By
comparison, within the narratives constructed in the oral history interviews, there are
references to this behaviour in its many different forms.
3.5.1 Theft of Items
In the free narrative section of his interview Andrew McIntyre, a skilled electrician who
worked predominantly in the North Side paint plant, commented on theft within the plant:
The thievery went on all the time. Ye’d be workin at yer bench, people would roll
car tyres by ye time after time after time, going out towards the back fence.
Presumably the car tyres went over the fence. Ah don’t know but just, they were
comin from one side an goin out the other.510
The anecdote about tyres being stolen from the car factory by being bounced over the
fence was reiterated in four of the interviews:
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They used tae bounce, they used tae bounce tyres over the thing … they were
stealin them, bouncin right over the fence an the other guy at the other side  …
away wi it. Some o the things. Oh dear me. Batteries. Hang the batteries roond the
big coat. Walkin oot wi batteries.511
Bouncing tyres over the fence may have been an activity that was obscured from
management detection due to the absence of modern close circuit television at the plant.
Furthermore, that this narrative is constructed in more than one interview arguably gives
credence to this event occurring with the regularity that is claimed in the interviews. On the
other hand, theft of tyres by bouncing them over the factory fence may have been an event
that happened on a few instances and has taken on a legendary quality in the memories of
the interviewees. The anecdote – stealing in such a blatant manner – optimises the ability
of the workers to ‘get one over’ management, resistance to management control, and as
such it is understandable that some workers would reconstruct this in their narrative. This
is particularly true for an employee like McIntyre who, as was explored in the previous
chapter, experienced a heightened awareness of management attempts to undermine his
skill. In his interviews he exhibited a degree of pride in the ability of workers to get away
with autonomous activities such as stealing.512 He recalled the theft of other comparatively
valuable items such as cable for its copper content. He witnessed an employee wrapping
cable round a workmate, ‘There’d be people who’ll come in skinny an go out fat’.513 The
concealment of stolen goods around the body was similarly uncovered amongst car
workers in Coventry by Paul Thompson.514 There are accounts throughout the testimonies
of theft that was achieved by concealing company property under heavy jumpers, parka
jackets, down trouser legs or as Douglas McKendrick recounted, he was popular amongst
fellow employees who used his empty whiskey bottles to steal car windscreen fluid.515
Staff narratives also contained reference to this type of mischief:
It is apparent that different types of theft took place aside from the theft of small car
parts for personal use by workers who owned cars. Parts were also stolen to order:
There is an auffae lot o things went on … It was unbelievable. It really was ye
know. You could put your order in fur a certain thing fur a car.516
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Foreman Dan Nelson identifies batteries, tyres and wheels as the types of things that would
be stolen.517 These are items that for people who owned a car would be items that could
need replaced. Therefore, individual workers had a potential self-interest in stealing car
parts for their own cars. Yet this kind of activity did not only involved material that would
be used for cars, but could include material that could be sold on for other purposes:
Ah know that [theft] definitely went on … I know for a fact it did cos I remember
getting paint [laughs] from a certain person on the shop floor.518
Larger scale organised theft was also mentioned in the oral testimonies and this involved
collusion with individuals that did not work within the plant:
Big lorries would come in, filled with spare parts an cushions or other bits an pieces
that there would be fur the, the factory, and some of them would go out with
complete cars inside them.519
Similarly Barry Stubbs recalled an incident where an employee conspired with a lorry
driver and they worked together to remove items from the plant:
Then gettin them takin, up tae his garage. Apparently, they they caught him, an he
finished up with three or four hundred pound o stuff in his garage. Batteries an eh,
you name it. 520
This is similar to Dan Nelson’s account of the raid of a local petrol garage:
ah don’t know how word got around but there must have been some sort of
investigation and eh the police went in an raided the garage and of course, there
was a pit, a service pit … full of wheels, tyres, wheels with tyres on them, tyres on
their own, batteries, all sorts of stuff. An ah remember, ah never saw anything
about it but it was, everybody talked about it in the factory. So there was lots of
theft went on.521
Either individuals or groups may have stolen and sold on goods to the garage, thus
highlighting the economic motivations for such theft. A further example of materials from
the plant being utilised for external commercial purposes is raised in McIntyre’s testimony
when he explains hearing a rumour concerning the use of plant material:
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heard that the stores personnel at one point had been [pause] interviewed by the
police an a lot o them got sacked, the high heidyins o that. Because they’d buildin
houses elsewhere usin the, the company stores as the source o the materials.
Whether they just signed off bits o paper or materials actually came in an back out
ah don’t know. 522
Whilst Anna Anderson reasoned misbehaviour as a response to boredom and monotony
within her testimony she also states:
A lot of em would go into the pubs, men pinching, pinching paint. Do you need any
paint, do you need this, and do you need that? That went on, putting them under
their coats and trying to get parts out that somebody wanted, and they would sell
them.523
Therefore highlighting the potential extrinsic motivations for engaging in this type of
activity.
Clerical staff may have appeared to have limited opportunity to steal materials from
the plant however, Colin Jackson, who worked as a wages clerk, told of a scandal
involving the wages department at Linwood and claimed that a wages clerk was taken to
Paisley Sheriff Court responsible for the theft of unclaimed wages. This situation of
unclaimed wages arose when employees had been off work, long term sick and were
provided with an income tax rebate that would be made up in the wages department:
But an awful lot of people didn’t realise they had money. So we’d go fur say three
or four weeks, five weeks and this one hasnae turned up for this an he’s got five
envelopes lying here wi five pounds in each envelope an things like that ye know.
An it was tempting for us in the wages department tae sae, “This, they haven’t a
clue”. … That was tempting for a few people.524
This was also recalled by Jackson’s colleague, David Bright and referred to by McIntyre
who claimed:
Wages Department they got raided by the police, they got carted off in Black
Marias at one point for some fiddle goin on wi the wages, the [sic] disappeared.525
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Therefore, whilst the references to theft occur predominantly in the interviews with
semi- and unskilled workers and in the main refer to shop floor activity, this is not to say
that members of staff were not involved in activities that constituted the theft of items from
the company. Two of the interviewees that worked in the paint plant told of one of the
management perks that consisted of having their cars re-sprayed. Paint sprayer Mark
Ellison recalled working on his own on some night shifts as he was selected to spray cars
owned by managers.526 McIntyre provides a consistent account of managers’ cars being
painted on the night shift and goes so far as to accuse management of taking further
advantage of this situation:
There was, some o the gaffers were presumably doin, eh all their friends’ cars as
well cos their, gaffers cars would come in regularly.527
Although this activity was seen as a ‘perk’ of the job afforded to managers, in essence it
was theft of company property – paint. Ensuring a single paint sprayer completed this work
during the night shift concealed the theft of the paint but was also theft of company time.
Dan Nelson describes another example of an incidence of theft by a foreman in which he
was implicated. Whilst working as a foreman, one night whilst leaving the staff car park
another foreman drove into the back of his car:
He said, “I’ll get ye a new engine lid.” … An ah mean, eventually he, he got me a
new engine lid, an he took it out the factory his-self, ye know, in his own car an
brought it to me an gave me it. A never ever fitted it to the car.528
Nelson identified the engine lid as stolen therefore he gave it away. He described how he
did not want to refuse accepting the part from the other foreman:
Ah didn’t want it. Ah didn’t want to be connected with that. Eh, an ah couldn’t
refuse to take it cos he was such a nice chap ye know, an ah didn’t want to offend
him by sayin’, “Oh no ah can’t take that it’s stolen property.”  … An ah woudn’t go
an report him or anything, ah wouldn’t get up to these sorts o things. … it came out,
it was all painted the right colour for the car an everything … an a never fitted it.
When ah sold the car ah still had the dent in it.529
This situation highlights that whilst there were some workers who perceived it to be
acceptable to take items from the factory. Others perceived it as stealing. The foreman
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stole the part as it prevented him having to pay to repair the car or Nelson having to
complete an insurance claim. What is interesting in Nelson’s narrative is that when asked
about searches he states that items stolen from the factory would have been, ‘taken out in
the back o cars’ and then goes on to reason that:
it could only a been staff members’ cars ah, ah would think, cos the workmen, the
workers weren’t allowed their cars into the factory…or maybe they were takin’
them out in the back of trucks that were taken out the factory ye know.530
Even at the top-level staff there is suggestion of misbehaviour. In 1976 a case was
brought to Glasgow Sheriff court in which a buyer at the Linwood plant was implicated.
The Managing Director and Sales Director of Rotary Tools were charged with fraud and
corruption including a charge concerning, ‘alleged payments to officials of Chrysler
Linwood.’531 During the trial it was alleged that ‘Mr McKay (buyer at the Chrysler
Linwood plant) had demanded 5 per cent of the value of orders’.532 These allegations were
denied during the trial however, point to the potential for corruption amongst senior
members of staff and management.
• Consequences
Within the Linwood plant there were security men that at times would undertake searches
as employees vacated the building at the end of a shift. McIntyre also stated that security
men patrolled the plant and the employee car park:
if anybody had a new or up to date radio or something the car should ah had, their
number plate was taken an they were identified an, had tae explain, show receipts
they’d actually bought these things somewhere otherwise it was their books.533
This indicates managerial attempts to prevent employee theft.  These strategies were
depicted as ineffective as the searches only occurred at particular times rather than
frequently:
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Ah think when they knew something was missing, that’s when the searches would
happen. … nine times out of ten time, they wouldn’t have known because the
wheels and tyres that get thrown over the fences are unbelievable.534
Or workers would avoid being caught by getting rid of the items when they became aware
that a search was on:
There would be a search on, and everybody would know there would be a search
on, there would be guys there with stuff tied to their body, goin out and they’d pull
the string and it would drop down and they would all walk by and all the stuff
would be lyin all over the ground.535
The threat of being caught stealing by a security guard was described as minimal in the
testimonies of those who discussed theft. Searches did not occur frequently, employees
stealing items could hide within the crowd passing through the factory gates and if people
became aware that a search was happening would dump the stolen material.
There is a distinction between theft of items from the plant and other types of
activity in that it could not be defended, unlike drinking at work and playing cards. It was a
form of mischief that was tangible and would not be supported if taken to disciplinary
procedure and according to the narratives usually resulted in instant dismissal. McGuinness
claimed that theft occurred on a daily basis and when asked what would happen if someone
was caught stealing:
Oh aye, aye, that would be the sack right away, sack right away, well, eh, because
it’s theft isn’t it?536
David Munroe, who was an Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs’
representative, was asked to represent a security man who had been stealing material from
the plant and reported by his wife. His testimony highlights the limits of negotiation when
theft was referred to the formal disciplinary process:
a security man who’d been, who’d been twenty-five year in the place … “ye know
ah cannae, ah can just go in there and plead yer case but, the first thing they’ll say,
‘you’re here, your job is eh secure, security. You’re here to make sure it’s
secure’.”.537
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Despite theft being described by many of the interviewees as an activity that could not be
defended, George Wilson adheres to the discourse of management’s ineffectiveness due to
the threat of industrial action. He claims that even when searches did occur the security
guards deliberately avoided searching certain individuals:
They wid go fur the wan that looked awe right. Ah mean if they seen, somebody
comin wi. Wi bulges oot here. They would let them go. That kind o, that kind o
thing. Ye know. They didn’t want involved wi it either.538
He extends this viewpoint to include foremen who ‘turned a blind eye’:
Aye, ah’d just shut the blind eye. Ah’m doin ma car, what can ye do? Tell the
foreman? The foreman’s no, he didnae want ae know.  … Ah’m no joking, there
must have been three or four cars going oot, goin oot o there everyday in lieu
[laughs].539
This complicit collective acceptance of theft as a common occurrence was defended by
Douglas McKendrick. When asked what his relationship was like with the other workers in
his sections he replied:
Quite good, quite good because they helped me tae steal, an’ ah helped them tae
steal ye know. Ye were, ye were all thieves, thieves under the skin so tae speak ye
know.540
Here he defined his relationship with the workers in terms of helping each other out in
stealing from the plant therefore, he remembers workers to be more active in aiding each
other to steal. By implication his narrative is based on the notion of a shared collective
value. Perhaps, if the security guards were employed from within the local community they
deliberately sought to avoid uncovering theft as there may have been repercussions out
side the car plant. So there appears to be a mixed picture on attitudes towards and reactions
to theft. Some workers worked together to steal from the plant as an organised group
activity, whereas other theft occurrences were on an individual level of which there was
awareness, but the workplace solidarity did not necessarily extend towards defending a
worker caught stealing.
Theft appears in the interviews to be an activity that could not be defended if taken
through the disciplinary procedure and whilst some shop floor workers, security men and
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management may have ‘turned a blind eye’ for a variety of reasons, when dealt with at a
disciplinary level this activity could not be defended and the support of the work group
would not generally be expected.  Douglas McGuinness told of not only having his tools
stolen on numerous occasions, but also that he had had wages stolen from the pocket of his
jacket at his workstation:
… it must have been somebody that has been working with me for a long time
because it could only have been up to twenty people because they were the only
ones that could work down to my line, you know, so it only could have been one of
twenty people. I just couldn’t believe it.541
The solidarity of the immediate work group did not mean that workers were immune from
being the victim of theft.
• Explanations
Mars’ work focuses on what he calls, ‘institutionalized pilferage’ and in particular the role
of work groups and power relations in the workforce in this activity. He identifies the term
‘the fiddle’ as the name for activities through which the waiting staff in the hotel business
can obtain monetary gain, which is perceived as a legitimate aspect to their wages. Thus,
due to the low wages in the industry the act of pilferage is justified.542 Likewise, Bellamy
argues that theft from the Scottish shipyards was deemed acceptable due to the harsh
conditions, long hours and low wages for shipyard workers. For the Linwood employees
this is not a dominant factor in the justification of such activity. As McGuinness noted:
So the thing is you say it yourself why do they need to do it? The money that
they’re getting, you say to yourself, why take the risk for four or five quid.543
By comparison the Linwood workers appeared to have had high wages544 and it questions
the need to steal for economic gain. Yet, the testimonies point to a range of theft extending
to large-scale and organised theft, which suggests that there were workers involved in
order to make extra money in addition to their wages. For workers who owned vehicles
that had been produced at the plant, stealing parts was a method by which they could
update the car model, repair or replace damaged or broken parts without the financial
                                                 
541 Oral Testimony, Rodger McGuinness, Interview 1.
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543 Oral Testimony, Rodger McGuinness, Interview 1.
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outlay. This type of theft reflects an economic need as well as opportunistic attitude.
Where considered within the context of the economic downturn in the 1970s and
subsequent periods of short-time working and the three-day week, theft was a means of
combating the instability of employment at Linwood.545
Theft is a topic mentioned in all but two interviews, ranging from people saying
they knew of it but neither observed or were directly involved in it as an individual or
collectively. To those who acknowledge theft as a common daily activity, it ranged from
pilfering and ‘perks’ to entrepreneurial activity. None of the interviewees conceptualise
these activities as financially detrimental to the company ergo the workforce and lends
support to Mars’ argument that within larger organisations the incidence of theft is
increased due to ‘the impersonality of large organisations’.546 Within Linwood the scale of
the plant in part meant that the availability and access to goods that could be utilised in the
workers own vehicles or sold on, and could be small enough to remove from the site,
contributed to the occurrence of theft at the plant. The testimonies of the Linwood workers
reveal that amongst the semi-skilled process workers, attitudes held towards work, in terms
of the priority of extrinsic rewards are mirrored in their attitude towards theft:
Aye, so? Repeats, there was nothin that way – Aye So? Take it what’s it got ae do
wi me I’m no losing anything. It’s back to what I’m sayin as long as Ive got ma pay
in ma hand on the Friday.547
What is obscured from the workers is the implications of their actions for the efficiency
and profitability of the plant:
There was an awfae lot o thieving goin on. … Its like, you’re lookin fur Mark,
Marks and Spencers or Woolworths, some oh the guys came in there an thought it
wis a shop. Just came in there tae steal awe the stuff oot an go away wi it. Oh it
happened awe the time.548
                                                 
545 The workers at the plant experience periods of short-time working and three-day week due to a period of
economic recession, the Oil Crisis in 1973, falling domestic car sales and increased foreign competition.
The economic impact on the interactions between workforce and management will be discussed in
Chapter Five.
546 Mars, Cheats at Work, p. 157.
547 Oral Testimony, George Wilson, Interview 1.
548 Oral Testimony, Barry Stubbs, Interview 2.
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3.5.2 Sabotage
There is limited evidence of forms of sabotage directly linked to the destruction of property
or products in the plant. However, it seems likely there were less occurrences of this type
of mischief, given the fewer references to this activity within the interview material and
denial of such behaviour when interviewees were asked whether they had any memories of
sabotage. One of the most recurrent examples of resistant behaviour was that of damage to
cars in production:
We had a problem at the rear seats last night.  Someone is Sabotaging [sic] the
cushions by putting scissors or a knife through them. (We all have our suspicions as
to who this is).549
This is in addition to attempts to stop mechanised track work:
The people on the conveyor lines; some o them were sensible, some of them were
almost criminally lunatic. Ye got sometimes got somebody put an iron bar through
the chain that was draggin the cars round, just tae stop the, the conveyor… to give
themselves a break presumably cos of this mind numbing conveyor job. But the
iron bar coulda jumped out an killed somebody, the cars would jump off the line
somewhere else goin round a bend.550
• Consequences
If a worker was caught participating in this type of activity it is certain they would have
been disciplined and likely they would have been fired however, due to a lack of
documentary evidence on this form of mischief it is problematic to provide an analysis of
the consequences of such action.
• Explanations
Paul Thompson stated that even for skilled workers who adapt to the working in the car
industry, there is an atmosphere where:
Occassionally you’d get people that was absolutely browned off and they’d let fly
at something so they chuck a spanner in the works, stop the track going and all
have an hour off whiles they sorted it out.551
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550 Oral Testimony, Andrew McIntyre, Interview 1.
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155
Thus suggesting that sabotage was an expression of dissatisfaction with work or that it was
perceived as a measure by which workers could gain autonomy over the track and pace of
work allowing them to have a break.
One of the few workers to recall sabotage was Archie Watson whose conception of
sabotage mirrors the explanations offered by Blauner and Chinoy; that workers sought a
break in their highly automated work:
A lot o things was eh, some people would stick spanners in the works, an stop it cos
they wanted a break […] oh aye that happened on more than one occasion. But oh
nobody knew who it wis.552
This perspective is reiterated later in the same interview. When discussing the restriction
on movement for men in the UMB and that permission had to be sought from the foreman
before going to the toilet in order for relief cover to be provided he claims:
… but other people oot o badness, auch, stuck spanners in tracks tae, an the 
whole thing would awe clog up and the whole things wis stop. Now that 
happened eh, an awful lot eh I don’t know how many times but eh, quite a lot.553
This narrative remains consistent in a second interview with Archie Watson where he
claims that vandalism aimed at stopping the track was committed by ‘Lots of people like
that who just didn’t want to work’. He also referred to sabotage such as the breaking of
tools or missing things out as deliberate by ‘people who wanted a break.’554 Watson
constructs a narrative in which the act of sabotage is depicted as a highly individual act that
occurred regularly. Furthermore, while he highlights that such activity was motivated by a
desire to achieve a break, therefore as an example of a worker seeking autonomy on the
shop floor, he further links the activity with the character or personality of workers that
were doing things out of ‘badness’. This is similar to the testimony of Mike Berry in the
CAB who claimed to observe workers:
mixin up a left and the right hand hinges and things like that. They would do it
deliberately to stop the track at the finish up. This is where ye got the bad ones.
Uhuh because they wanted a break, tae away an play cards or somethin like that. It
happened in every factory. A, a longer break so that, ye, that ye, you had tae, it was
your job tae make sure they didn’t do tha.555
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While the source material suggests such examples were rare, when they did occur they
seem to be an extreme response to systems of work in the plant where workers felt
dislocated from and subordinate in the production of the end product. Stopping the line
provided, ‘a resistance to the managerially desired rationalisation of a worker’s time.’556
Indeed Blauner goes so far as to say there was something of a “Sabotage Attitude”
amongst car workers; a view supported in the work of Ely Chinoy who found in his study
of car workers that the workers were wishing for the track to break down, “break down,
baby”, which he relates to the loss of control.557 Similarly, Brown uses historical examples
of workers that have employed more subtle tactics by which technology can be temporarily
interrupted or by which workers will mediate the speed or consistency which they work
at.558
However, the incidence of mischief, or more specifically sabotage, can be linked
with change within the workplace. Specifically changes to systems of payment, or the
organisation of work, can been met with labour force resistance in multiple forms rather
than simply to take official organised action for instance in striking. There are examples of
sabotage as a response to the application of scientific management in American car plants:
Workers recalled sabotage in the “friendly factory”, with cushions ripped out of car
seats at final assembly, water put in gas tanks, and soda bottled placed in door
pockets. Such practices disturbed some workers and further fractured the world of
workers.559
Furthermore, Mike Berry’s quotation highlights that there may also be a personal dynamic
underpinning the reasons for sabotage. Sabotage could be directed at particular foremen,
inspectors or other workers and the consequence of a personal issue or something external
to work.
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3.6 Conclusion and Implications for Industrial Relations
Three crucial points arise from above the above exploration of theft within the car plant:
that of resistance to management control of labour on the shop floor; a deep-rooted apathy
among the workforce indicative of a passive resistance to the work, and the complicity of
the shop stewards and foremen often ‘turning a blind eye’ or obscuring such occurrences
from senior management in order to avoid the official discipline procedure. At the start of
this chapter there is reference to an account of the types of individuals at Linwood:
Only last week I overheard a young apprentice boasting he’d succeeded in getting
through a shift in which he’d done only one hour’s work.560
While this is the observation by one individual it points to an attitude to work in which
there is a conflict between the interests of the employee with management production
strategies.
The discussion was situated in the context of theoretical models and debates on the
effort-bargain, resistance and autonomy in the workplace. Workplace mischief is multi-
layered however, the above cases highlight alternative ways in which workers extended
autonomy during the hours that they were at work. The company had established time in
the factory into distinct time periods as a means of structuring the working day and
introduced systems to ensure employees turned up to work at allocated times. Yet, whilst
the company may have purchased the labour power of employees, which was put to use
within this structure, this did not ensure that the workers’ perception of their time and its
use in the workplace concurred with that of management and that of the company.  Hence
it was subject to personal renegotiation and manipulation both on an individual level and at
times collectively. At times, some of the managers would allow this to occur in order to
avoid production stoppages.
The distinction is made here between the entire workforce and the company as the
locus of control, because ‘perks’ such as re-sprays and repair of personal cars by
management were as much organisational mischief as ‘bouncing tyres over the fence’,
taking screw drivers and hammers from the shop floor. Despite the application of a variety
of organisational and surveillance techniques the above accounts reveal a work culture in
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which perks and pilfering were commonplace and highlight that misbehaviour is multi-
faceted as well as an intrinsic dimension of the dynamic of control in the workplace.561
On the other hand, the chapter has also drawn attention to the variety of potential
motivations for mischief. In exploring mischief in the Linwood car plant, the classic
alientation thesis can be challenged, as can the notion of distinct intrinsic and extrinsic
rewards. The later are more fluid tendencies that at times can co-exist, overlap and be re-
negotiated depending on the individual, group, or historical contingency. Types of
mischief reflect the variety of ways in which autonomy can be sought. Furthermore, that
when intrinsic rewards may be absent from work, workers can find other ways of
exhibiting their autonomy or skill, exemplified in McIntyre’s testimony:
There’s one instance the, [pause] one o the small tools people eh, an his pal, had
rigged up a calendar. It was a girlie calendar. An all the young lads were always
quite pleased tae see girlie calendars above the work bench, ehm. … But he’d
rigged this calendar up if ye lifted a page it triggered a little switch and it squirted
water at ye. So him an his, his mate always kept this reservoir filled up an any time
ye got new people, there was regularly new people, comed along, lookin at the
calendar, they would get soaked by this, windscreen washin thing that had been
rigged up under the bench. It was always a laugh.562
Therefore, for workers coming from skilled background into Linwood, they adapted to this
new working environment. The autonomy that was perhaps absent in work process, could
still emerge in the work place. As Edward gross comments, workplace mischief highlights
the:
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innovativeness and originality of the human spirit. In site of automation and
computerization, containerization, and other technical changes, the worker is alive,
and expressive.563
                                                 
563 Edward Gross, ‘Fiddles and Crime: The Work That Deviants Do’, Review Essay of Cheats at Work in
Contemporary Sociology, 12 (1983), 610-11 (p. 611).
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Chapter Four
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Chapter Four
Managing Linwood: Company, Plant and Shop Floor
4.1 Linwood Lives: Adam Fleming
Chrysler just lost the ability to manage its company right at the top and it filtered
down. Good management trickles down, I’m sure they’ve taught you that. I was
taught that sixty years ago. Eh, good management trickles down so Chrysler were a,
never, they were always the third in the, in America. Eh and, when they moved
over here, as I said, they hadn’t learned the lesson of when in Rome do as the
Romans do. Their products were, always sort of one behind, you know the, the
market leader. Their eh [pause] their position in the market place therefore was
affected so their, their revenue was affected so their investment was affected and it
was a spiral. Eh, so I think it was a spiral of, of bad decisions and eh, and business
acumen. Eh, it’s interesting that eh, you know a few years ago, in fact I thought it
was a disaster when the, Daimler bought Chrysler, and they merged and now
they’re de-merged because Chrysler’s losing them a bomb. So Chrysler has never
changed you know we’re going back by forty odd years or thirty odd years ago.
The [pause] whatever it is in the, in the eh, in the business acumen they just, they
just won’t make it. … It nearly brought down Daimler-Benz. Eh so it wasn’t
Linwood and the bad practices industrial relations wise or other wise that closed
Linwood, it was, it was the business [Chrysler] closed Linwood.564
This extract is from the testimony of Adam Fleming who was first employed in Linwood
as an Industrial Engineer in the 1960s. He was promoted to management at Linwood,
initially as Industrial Engineering Manager, then Production Superintendent in the Trim
Shop before becoming Production Manager responsible for Body in White, Paint, Trim and
Assembly. Finally he exchanged positions with American manager Art Hawkins to become
Production Manager of the Power Train, otherwise known as the Unit Machine Block.
Having previously worked in the American subsidiary Massey Ferguson, Fleming claimed
he was surprised by the variety of work undertaken at the Linwood plant by Pressed Steel
Company Limited, on the North Side of the plant, subsequently acquired by Rootes in
1966 and renamed Rootes (Pressings) Scotland. Under Pressed Steel ownership, the North
side of the plant, as well as providing car bodies for Rootes production on the South side,
was a significant producer of railway wagons, cabs for BMC commercial vehicles and car
bodies for other car companies such as Volvo.565 Fleming noted the manufacture of
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refrigerated lorries for a Danish contract as particularly innovative as he understood the
Linwood plant to be amongst the first to produce refrigerated lorries in Britain.566
The diverse product lines at Pressed Steel in the 1960s reflect a manufacturing
sector where there was a high degree of traditional engineering skills. The Rootes Group
factory was originally built on the North Side to produce the new Hillman Imp in order to
compete in the growing small-car market. Following the Chrysler takeover there were
many changes to production at Linwood including a shift to solely vehicle manufacture,
the cessation of the production of body panels for rival vehicle companies, as well as
product rationalisation. Consequently, when Fleming left the Linwood plant in 1974 he had
experienced working for three different firms at the site (Pressed Steel Company, Rootes
(Pressings) Scotland Ltd, and Chrysler UK), as well as significant experience of different
managerial positions. It is clear from Fleming’s consistent narrative on his day-to-day
experience of work at the car plant, both shop floor and managerial, developments at
Linwood reflected major trends in industrial relations experienced in post-war Britain:
initially industry-wide agreements initiated by employers’ associations; followed by
formalised plant-based collective bargaining, productivity and procedural agreements; and
in the 1970s a shift towards greater centralisation and support for worker participation.567
Such strategies and schemes introduced by successive management at the plant did little to
defuse industrial tension on the shop floor. Therefore an exploration of developments at
Linwood offers an opportunity to analyse the policies of firms that were attempting to
negotiate a specific period in British industrial relations following the move away from
formalised industry-wide agreements in the 1960s and prior to the development of human
resource management in the 1980s and 1990s.
Managerial policies at Linwood were designed to improve industrial relations and
lead to more effective management of the workforce, which involved responding to a
variety of factors impacting on shop floor performance identified in Part One of this thesis.
The emphasis in Part Two, is on management’s exploration of mechanisms to improve
shop floor relations. These foundered ultimately on key structural features of motor
assembly in the 1960s and 1970s especially - competition, cost controls, market pressures
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– and the workforce desire for autonomy / control which is explored in the next chapter.
Situated within the political-economic context of the post-war period with the focus on
schemes introduced to increase productivity and improve industrial relations through
consultation, co-operation and collaboration between management and workforce at
Linwood, the aim of this chapter is to investigate the character of management at the plant
and the apparent inconsistency between management rhetoric and reality in practice.
Within the chronology of the plant ownership, initially there will be a theoretical
analysis of industrial relations, which will underpin examination of two significant
strategies of labour management at the plant: the introduction of formal plant productivity
bargaining in the 1960s, with the Brabloch Agreement, and moves in the 1970s to
encourage worker participation and greater communication at the time of the Planning
Agreement initiated in 1976. Consideration will be given to the distinction between joint
consultation and joint decision-making, explored in the Employee Participation
Programme and the Planning Agreement Working Party. Within the context of the Rescue
Plan for Chrysler UK in 1975, a condition of the Labour government entering into a
Planning Agreement with Chrysler, was for participation to be instigated in the form of a
Planning Agreement Working Party. Using the rhetoric of consultation and working
together with the workforce, employee participation in management decision-making and
long-term planning suggests Chrysler seemed to have embraced notions of industrial
democracy embodied in the Labour government’s Social Contract – implying employee
influence in the area of ‘managerial relations’.568 This projected a different style of
management from that of the previous firms at the Linwood plant and saw the
establishment of four management / union representative committees with the task of
devising a short-term operational strategy to tackle Chrysler UK’s financial problems. Yet
changes in styles of management and attempts at industrial democracy through
participation schemes did little to counter communication, consultation and decision-
making asymmetries at the plant, as managerial policy was additionally shaped by
historical contingencies meaning decisions made in response to wider market forces at
times served to undermine a more consultative style of management.    
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4.2 Structures and Styles of Management at Linwood
4.2.1 Theoretical Framework of the Discussion
Successive managements at the Linwood plant utilised the rhetoric of co-operation and
attributed industrial relations issues to small pockets of deviant workers. In his research
paper for the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Organisations chaired
by Lord Donovan, Alan Fox identified this interaction as a unitary frame of reference
within an industrial organisation whereby management is regarded as the only valid source
of authority controlling the activities of a workforce with whom there shared commonality
of interest in achieving the aims of the company. Diametrically opposed to this perception
is the pluralist frame of reference, which Fox argued accommodated the existence of
divergent and oppositional ‘orientations’ of workers and management – acknowledged by
the management. The pluralist frame of reference accommodates conflict as an inevitable
part of the interaction between different interest groups whereas in the unitary frame of
reference, conflict is the result of confusion over the common aims or due to ‘agitators’.569
At Linwood the interaction between management and workforce was complex and concurs
with John Eldridge’s claim that there is a ‘false consciousness’ within British
Management.570 Although management at the plant appeared to support organisational
pluralism and facilitate employee participation it retained unitary values. Indeed Jim
Phillips has highlighted that unitary values and pluralist policies can co-exist within a
single business institution.571 The divergent conception of industrial relations was
compounded by management’s acceptance of union contribution to wage rate negotiations
and bargaining – identified by Fox as market relations – but resistance to worker
involvement in the area of managerial relations such as decisions on strategy and
deployment of labour perceived as encroachment on the authority of management.572
Within Linwood the style of management is characterised by a distinction between the
rhetoric associated with intent to resolve industrial relations issues versus the reality of
responding to wider economic and market forces.
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The gap between the rhetoric and reality of industrial relations was shaped within
the context of political economy and specific historical contingencies. The shift towards
more interventionist economic management from the late 1940s meant greater interaction
between government and industry as successive governments sought to address balance of
payment deficits and control inflation.573 Consequently, interactions between management
and workforce at Linwood, underpinned by the humanisation of capitalism, articulate with
Ramsay’s cycles of control.574 Hence, cycles are linked to the conditions which make
challenges to management authority periodic. For example, Rootes management adopted
pluralist measures during boom periods when wage concessions could be used to ensure
productivity increases, thereby allowing management to evade Incomes Policies through
productivity bargaining. In the 1970s Chrysler management pursued participation in an
attempt to re-orientate the attitudes of employees during a period of economic recession,
the Oil Crisis in 1973, falling domestic car sales, increased foreign competition and
continued trade union strength. For Jim Phillips the effects of sustained unitary values
within management ‘compromised’ pluralist industrial relations in practice and their
impact on industrial organisation.575 However, due to the apparent disconnect between
rhetoric and reality it is more beneficial to conceive of the nature of management policy at
Linwood as ‘pragmatic pluralism’. This is evident in management attempts to facilitate
improvements using emergent and indeed fashionable industrial relations policies, such as
worker participation in the 1970s and, productivity bargaining in the 1960s, and seeking
these through agreements with workforce representatives. Yet whilst these pluralist
elements are apparent in such procedures, the evidence explored in this chapter points to
the pragmatic force within management style when agreements were abandoned because
significant – from the perspective of management – concerns intervened related to
changing market conditions. Productivity driven by the cyclical nature of capitalism
maintains asymmetrical power relations between management and workforce.
Fleming used the notion of culture to conceptualise the styles of management at
Linwood in which asymmetrical industrial organisation is evident. He described Rootes
and Pressed Steel Fisher as the ‘British culture’; elaborating that it was, ‘a sort of
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gentlemen’s culture’.576 A hierarchical dichotomous structure based on traditional top
down channels of communication and enforced managerial authority with at times
dramatic negative recourse, such as dismissal of Rootes entire assembly line in May 1964
in response to industrial action over a bonus scheme.577 It was a style of management that
prompted Baddon to note that the ‘abrasive side of management in the north side of the
factory impressed Chrysler’.578 Both Pressed Steel and Rootes adopted the multidivisional
form (M-Form) of company organisation, which reflected broad developments in modern
business enterprise and management in the UK that emulated US businesses. The M-Form,
intrinsic in American big business from the beginning of the twentieth century, consisted
of decentralised vertical organisation along the lines of separate divisions co-ordinated by a
Head Office. From the inter-war period there are examples of some larger British firms
such as ICI that adopted such structures, but it was not until the 1970s there was a shift
towards the ‘visible hand’579 style of management commonplace in modern enterprise in
the US as a growing number of British firms replicated and adapted the M-Form.580 For
Fleming the shift to Chrysler management created a clash of cultures:
I mean eh, it’s a culture American way of life, is a culture different from the
Scottish way of life, eh we, we have. I, you know what, when I was with the, the
Rover company I mean BMW took over running of you know the, well they bought
the Rover out. Eh, what in 1992. And you know gave it up x number of years’ later.
That was a clash of cultures as well.581
It was an unfamiliar style of management implemented by American personnel, and he
attributed subsequent problems that arose in the plant to cultural differences that
exacerbated prevailing tensions between management and workforce. How labour relations
were conducted at Linwood was determined by management’s perceptions of its formal
relationship with the workforce.
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4.2.2 Pressed Steel - ‘Autocratic and Authoritarian’
Prior to Rootes building the South Side of the plant in 1960, Pressed Steel Company
Limited had purchased the Beardmores factory at the Linwood site in 1947. The effects of
post-war consumerism had created a demand for luxury items including cars and as
Pressed Steel was a company associated with the development of growth industries such as
car manufacturing, strong political pressure from Sir Stafford Cripps prevented the factory
remaining under Beardmores. 582 With Board of Trade Finance Pressed Steel built a car
body stamping facility at Linwood in 1959.583 For a company with a style of management
described by Bain and Lockyer as ‘autocratic and authoritarian’ – exemplified by the
dismissal of the ‘entire labour force’ in 1948 in response to claims for pay parity with
Cowley rates584 – the task of dealing with expansion of the labour force, a skills
shortage,585 and industrial organisation based on de-centralised collective bargaining,
embodied in a system of ‘informal’ industrial relations, was problematic as trade unions
were in a strong bargaining position due to full employment. Upon assuming ownership of
the plant Pressed Steel, federated to the Scottish Engineering Employers’ Association
(hereafter SEEA), sought information on industrial relations and local wage rates, and
subsequently began consultation with the Amalgamated Engineering Union. Nevertheless,
negotiations over piece rates continued to take place in an informal fashion on the shop
floor; a process which Rootes later described in evidence to the Robertson Court of Inquiry
reporting in 1968, as ‘crude’ and ‘under constant threat of withdrawal of labour.586 The
strong bargaining position of trade unions meant management was more likely to concede
wage claims and trade union demands to avoid industrial action and prevent skilled
workers seeking higher wages elsewhere. This contributed to over-manning, the
continuation of restrictive practices and weak management.587 This implies a pluralist
pattern of labour management in existence at Pressed Steel. One former-employee
commented on the competitive nature of sectional wage claims:
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And when it came to negotiating salaries every year the, the production workers
would go for an increase and they would get it, or they would negotiate for it, and
eventually get it but then you had, the the skilled workers sitting there not had an
increase, not getting an increase and em, so again then they would maybe go on
strike … And tae me, they, the managers should have been working together with
the unions at the same time, and make sure they were both treated the same and
then if the engineers went they got a wee extra, something extra, the unskilled guys
‘wait a wee minute we want this’ and this, this back to and fro all the time.588
Bill Stewart’s testimony indicates an inconsistent system of pay negotiations that arose
because Pressed Steel had to adapt to changes in production and the labour force that had
grown from 250 workers in 1947 to over 3000 by 1968, as well as a requirement for skilled
workers.589 These changes were linked to the transition from the production of railway
rolling stock to car body production in 1959, followed by further building expansion in
1962 to provide the manufacturing capacity for BMC lorry cabs and car bodies for the
Hillman Imp in the Rootes factory on the South Side. Thus while Pressed Steel adhered to
SEEA agreements, there was a parallel system of industrial relations whereby sectional
wage-claims led to customary and informal shop floor bargaining.
With such changes management sought to address industrial relations issues and its
growing concern over rising piece rates throughout its branch plants. The company was
aware of the inadequacies in the existing management structure to effectively cope with
influences on the payment system and wage negotiations. In a letter to the Board of Trade
R.T. Chapman, the Personnel Director of Pressed Steel, commented that the company
sought to improve the system of payment: ‘We felt that the situation demanded fresh
examination by minds untrammelled by years of custom and practice’.590 Consequently,
the company approached Emerson Consultants who had been responsible for the
implementation of the Productivity Agreements in 1960 at the Esso Fawley Refinery.591
The inclusion of the Emerson’s report on Linwood is useful because it spreads further light
on structures of management at the plant as well as the effectiveness of new pay schemes
and impact on productivity.
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4.2.3 Emerson Management Consultants
Commencing in October 1962 the comprehensive six-month study of Pressed Steel
recorded accusations of an inconsistent, inept and authoritarian style of management at
Pressed Steel’s Linwood plant, levied at plant management from shop floor and
supervisory staff.592 Despite the high labour turnover rate of sixty-two per cent in 1961, the
personnel structure and staffing was inadequate for the size of plant and the Personnel
Department played no role in creating an induction procedure or follow-up assessments of
labour deployment. The absence of a manager with the specific remit of industrial relations
and ‘training of supervision and line management in the handling of men and the
organisation of work’ meant that the Personnel Manager was responsible for industrial
relations issues.593 The problems detailed in the Emerson study reflect the dominant
narrative in management literature, as well as substantiating observations in the Donovan
Commission; that despite increasing specialisation, and a growth in the area of personnel
management, many such managers lacked formal training and specialised job functions.594
The absence of managerial role and ad hoc style are indicative of the lack of importance
assigned to labour management by Pressed Steel in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Emerson sought to bring about a shift from the existing defensive and authoritarian
style of management through structures that would facilitate co-operation and consultation:
Perhaps the most pressing need is to instil an acceptance that conferring does not
imply subordination or incompetency; that communicating does not imply the
incapacity to make decisions, does not weaken a manager’s position.595
This necessitated systems of dialogue between line management and senior management,
as well as within line management and supervision. While there is little evidence in the
source material of the development of personnel policies at Pressed Steel, it appears that
attempts were made to improve communication with different layers of management
including department heads, superintendents and foremen, and in the provision of
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information regarding managing workers which, along with implementation of a new
payment scheme, formed key elements in the Linwood Plan.596
4.2.4 The Linwood Plan (1963)
The Emerson report had drawn attention to a potential source of tension for labour
management at the plant as being the relatively low wage rates at Pressed Steel in
comparison to the high day rate received by Rootes workers in the adjacent factory:
A way must be found to reconcile the differences in rates and systems between
Rootes and Pressed Steel and, more importantly, to create some means whereby the
devastatingly bad management, that allowed the seeds of such a situation even to
germinate, will be avoided in the future.597
The system of Payment by Results (hereafter PBR) was no longer deemed to be an
efficient method of payment, largely due to inflationary wage claims resulting in
competitive claims between sections and loss of managerial control in the context of
increased bargaining power.  Consequently, the Linwood Plan was implemented on 28
September 1963 as a year-long trial to be followed by the introduction of the scheme in
other Pressed Steel plants. The main points of the plan were the reorganisation of the
grading structure which saw piecework replaced by high day rates accompanied by a plant-
wide bonus scheme based on the differential between labour costs per car to sales ratio.
Collective bargaining continued as unions were involved in negotiating the basic rates of
pay and then a factory bonus rate was applied to these rates.598
Prior to the Linwood Plan, consultation with trade unionists occurred through a
Works Council which was described in the 1968 Court of Inquiry as  ‘purely a consultative
body and did not discuss wages and conditions’.599 The style of management at that time
meant that in practice, the Work Council was a vehicle for management to dictate on
general issues rather than a forum for negotiation and worker input. The Linwood Plan
aimed to redress this and facilitate better consultation with the introduction of a stratified
managerial structure including thirty-four departmental Productivity Committees that
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consisted of one supervisor and two employees, which reported to a Steering Committee
responsible for discussing employee suggestions for improving efficiency. 600 Furthermore,
a bonus scheme linked to productivity was envisaged as an inducement to encourage
employees to suggest ways of improving productivity.601 There was a strong unitary
sentiment to this new incentive scheme as it promoted the need for the ‘co-operative
efforts’ of the workforce in order for everyone to gain from the bonus scheme. It
represented a shift from existing individualistic approaches to maximising earnings under
PBR, and reported as bringing about changes in attitudes at the plant, engendering co-
operation between workers and management. 602 This policy move by Pressed Steel was
depicted in the contemporary press as a pioneering scheme in employer-management
relations: ‘the management, shop stewards and men seem to be working towards a degree
of “fellowship” and joint enterprise which would surprise many men in industry’. 603
Initially the scheme appeared to be successful with improvements in productivity,
substantial reduction in labour turnover, fewer strikes and despite full employment in the
region, the company gained control over wages. The crucial weakness in the Linwood Plan
was it was a reactive approach by the company to under-productivity as bonus increases
were wholly dependent on sustained demand for cars. As highlighted by Jim Phillips,
‘uneven growth’ was central to the nature of industrial relations at Linwood,604 which is
substantiated by experiences at Pressed Steel. During cycles of low demand for car bodies,
such as during Spring 1964 and Winter 1965, bonus payments were limited and the plan
became unpopular with the workforce. Under these conditions managerial authority was
challenged as trade unions responded with demands for wage increases.605 Furthermore,
the reality of consultation saw workers input remain at shop floor level as Productivity
Committees did not provide for employee involvement in decision-making or the
implementation of suggestions. Indeed, Peter Griffiths, MD of the Rootes Linwood plant in
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1964, commented that many employee suggestions were ‘left pending and unresolved far
too long’.606 Thus, with fluctuating demand for cars, the Linwood Plan could only ever
function as a temporary measure to secure workforce compliance in an attempt to increase
productivity and did little to improve labour management.  
The managerial policy of encouraging worker-management committees and
processes of consultation in effect comprised a coercive strategy to increase productivity
because managerial rhetoric did not synchronise with the reality of the ‘joint enterprise’.
Management at Pressed Steel utilised the rhetoric of consultation to facilitate dialogue on
workers’ knowledge and skills that could then be used to inform work studies in an effort
to improve operational effectiveness, and workforce compliance gained by the use of
monetary incentives to assuage industrial conflict. Underpinning much of the conflict was
the company’s unwillingness to resolve the issue of pay parity with the workers’
counterparts in England, which negated monetary incentives devised by management. Pay
parity was also a significant factor for the management of Rootes when the company
commenced operations in 1960 and formally opened in 1963 in what became known as the
South Side of the Linwood Car Plant – across a dual carriageway from the Pressed Steel
Company on the North Side. Like Pressed Steel, Rootes had access to a workforce with a
similar skill background. In many respects the style of labour management at Pressed Steel
was in accord with that of Rootes in its plants in England. A strong unitary sentiment was
indicated in comments by Geoffrey Rootes when he attributed strikes to the ‘subversive
action and the increasing influence of extremists’.607 This analysis will now examine
initiatives at Rootes’ Linwood plant to indicate that these also were shaped by pragmatic
pluralism and that there is further evidence of disparity between the rhetoric and reality of
Rootes’ industrial relations policy.
4.3 Rootes – ‘handicaps of geography’
At the official opening ceremony of Rootes Motors Scotland Ltd there was
acknowledgement of the need for cultural sensitivity to management of the Scottish
workforce. Geoffrey Rootes spoke of the importance of ensuring senior managers at
Linwood were either Scottish or well informed on ‘Scottish conditions’ and that the
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majority of supervisory staff and junior management should be Scottish.608 The absence of
documentary evidence makes it difficult to assess Rootes’ adherence to this commitment in
the earlier days of the factory. However, unlike Pressed Steel, Rootes adopted the broader
pattern of specialisation within British management with the appointment of an Industrial
Relations Manager and provided courses for junior management and supervisors on
‘modern techniques of communication’.609 The company responded to indiscipline
amongst the workforce and restrictions on output by facilitating greater training for
operators and supervisory staff, which imply support for a pluralist framework in Rootes
Linwood factory. 610 But company rhetoric was divergent from reality, apparent in the
company’s managerial strategy on establishment of the plant at Linwood.
4.3.1 The Brabloch Agreement (February 1960)
Within the Transport Museum collection there is an unsigned ‘Memorandum of Agreement
between: ‘Messrs Rootes Motors Ltd; the Engineering and Allied Employers’ National
Federation; the Amalgamated Engineering Union; the Electrical Trades Union and the
Transport and General Workers’ Union’. The document was drawn up at the time of the
signing of the Brabloch Agreement on establishment of Rootes at Linwood and it gives an
idea of the company’s intentions towards labour management during the settling in
period.611 Rootes indicated that it sought to improve industrial relations perceived as being
achievable by the implementation of strategies outlined in the agreement. Three of the
clauses detailed in this memorandum are outlined below:
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2. WAGE RATES AND EARNINGS [sic] will be in line with those already
established in the district.
4. … The Company regards as a managerial right the use of the techniques of work
study and work measurement and the use of the shop in the normal way in
operating such techniques.
6…. The Company has the right to preserve the mobility of its labour force ithin the
factory. 612
From these three points the company’s intention to exert its influence over labour
management, cutting across central tenets of trade unionism in the West of Scotland, is
evident. Like Pressed Steel the company sought to control wage rates and as early as
November 1960, prior to establishing the factory at Linwood, approached the SEEA to
ascertain ‘wage rates in the area’.613 Crucially, for Rootes the workforce at Linwood was a
source of cheap labour so it implemented a system of payment at Linwood that differed
from that in its other factories. In addition, Rootes initially paid semi-skilled operators at
the Linwood plant low rates in comparison to industry pay levels, which it justified as
being due to the fact, ‘most of the labour would initially be inexperienced in car assembly
and unaccustomed to the pace of work’.614 Management assumed that workers’ acceptance
of the new pay system was dependent upon the training of operators to communicate more
effectively with the workforce. Although trade unions were involved in the negotiations on
terms of employment, Rootes was able to take advantage of local rates that were lower
than those of the company’s Coventry workforce as the trade unions involved in
negotiations were ‘eager to secure exclusive recognition and recruitment rights’.615
Consequently under the Brabloch Agreement Scottish unions allowed Rootes to implement
a regional rate structure that meant, although wages at the plant were higher than existing
regional rates, until July 1976 workers at Linwood were paid less than their counterpart
Rootes workers in the Midlands. It was a contentious issue at parent company level with
forty-nine wage claims based on parity with Coventry rates cited in the report to the
Donovan Commission in 1966, and continued to impinge on wage negotiations after the
company took over the Pressed Steel factory to form Rootes Motors Ltd.616 Management
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justified the disparity as necessary due to the higher costs associated with manufacturing in
Scotland.
As noted in Chapter Two, Rootes had been directed to Linwood by the Government
as part of a major regional policy tool to tackle unemployment associated with the decline
of heavy industries in the west of Scotland; thus the company expected a compliant
workforce that would accept conditions of employment, including wage levels that were
lower than in Rootes’ English factories and not open to negotiation due to the Brabloch
Agreement.617 There was the assumption that as Rootes – beset by the ‘handicaps of
geography’ and the ‘increased distribution costs’ related to opening a plant north of the
border618 – was providing regional employment, the move should be appreciated regardless
of the rates of pay that were offered.619 This was problematic from the beginning on two
accounts: first, the terms of wage structures at the new plant were set at local levels as part
of the Brabloch Agreement signed by the unions, which had not been in a position of
power to negotiate these terms. As every employee had to be a member of a union as a
condition of employment,620 wages rates were a fait accompli, determined by management,
and like the experience of workers at Pressed Steel, were linked to prevailing economic
conditions and demand for cars. As noted above the early 1960s experienced a rise in post-
war consumerism with increasing demand for Hillman Imps and the need to bring
Linwood up to full capacity production of 2500 cars a week, which forced the company to
concede wage claims.621 Plant management agreed to wage claims on condition that
planned productivity levels were met, yet despite the incentive of a pay rise these levels
were not always met.622 Secondly, the dominance of management in setting pay structures
cut across key elements of working culture that had dominated the heavy industries in the
west of Scotland – crucially collective bargaining and negotiation over piece rates, which
negated Geoffrey Rootes’ claims of sensitivity to ‘Scottish conditions’ that would shape
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management of the Scottish workforce. This dictatorial style of management is similarly
evident in management responses, such as the laying-off of the entire assembly line in May
1964 due to industrial action over the bonus scheme.623 This reaction is likely to have been
shaped by high demand and a pressure to maximise production at this time however, such
evidence does not suggest a managerial policy that was sensitive to Scottish work culture
and practice in industrial relations.
In the period between the Brabloch Agreement in 1960 and when the company
gave evidence to the Donovan Commission in June 1966, the system of payment and
accompanying wage structure formed the basis of ninety per cent of negotiations with
management.624 The interaction between management’s resistance to pay parity demands
and the erratic compliance of the workforce meant it was period characterised by a series
of attempts to introduce bonus / incentive schemes linked to productivity, and the
application of scientific management techniques in order to establish rated norms. The
latter was a significant area of conflict for a workforce used to the PBR or piece-rate
system as it became further removed from control of pay structures.
4.3.2 Scientific Management: Work Study
It is clear from clauses Four and Six in the memorandum that Rootes wanted to rationalise
the pay structure at the plant, achieved by the application of scientific management
principles to determine rates of pay. The new system of labour management included a
fixed day-rate system incorporating work-study techniques based on Taylorist
principles.625 Jobs were observed, broken down into simple processes and timed by work
study officers or engineers. Work study circumvents problems associated with PBR,
advocated by Taylor, such as piecework bargaining that gave rise to wage inflation. For
plant management the system meant exact production levels could be specified that
enabled control over the workforce and subsequent consistent levels of pay. For the
workforce it represented further control of the shop floor that restricted worker bargaining
in the process. PBR had given workers some control over their work while at the same
time sustaining productivity levels. Paradoxically, work evaluation and work study
removed the worker from that role, which required more supervisory staff. Significantly, it
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required a major re-orientation in the attitudes and training of shop stewards in bargaining,
which was problematic in the early days of adjusting to the application of work study and
high day rate.
The nature of this style of labour management created a ‘clash of cultures’ because,
as noted by Knox, ‘craft attitudes were, at least for a time, kept alive in a totally different
working environment’.626  To a large extent, workers in both plants displayed elements of
craft attitudes in terms of ‘intrinsic rewards’ concurrent with those noted by Goldthorpe et
al.627 So unsurprisingly, the application of work-study and high day rate was met with
resistance on both sides of the plant because many of the manual workers were used to
PBR and wanted to retain personal control over their pace of work and therefore the wages
they could earn. As the pace of work began to increase, especially following
commencement of production on moving tracks in January 1963, sectional wage claims
began to emerge resulting in a system of industrial relations dominated by plant
negotiations between management and shop stewards. Resistant to piecework the company
hired consultants in 1963 to devise a plant-wide incentive scheme linked to conditions of
productivity, but skilled workers opposed the associated job evaluation so it was not
implemented. Along with the establishment of a Productivity Committee in spring 1964
comprising both management and shop floor representatives, these policy initiatives were
perceived by management at the plant as, ‘essential to obtain the interest of all employees
in the profitability of project [sic] as a whole’.628  However, that there were times when
shop floor workers were able to oppose the implementation of industrial relations policy,
suggests that the dictatorial style of management at the time of signing the Brabloch
Agreement, could and was, challenged with success by the workforce. This inconsistency
points to the need to situate the discussion within a broader context, in order to explore the
influence of external factors and specific historical contingency on industrial relations
policy.
4.3.3 Incentive Schemes and Productivity Bargaining
In light of the prevailing macro-economic conditions in the UK Harold Wilson’s Labour
government’s strategy to restrain rising inflation by controlling potential pay and price
rises with the introduction of Incomes Policies in 1965-1969, the productivity agreement
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was a method by which firms in the private sector could circumvent governmental control
of pay awards.629 Thus during a period of high demand, as in March 1964, management
implemented a bonus scheme, which sought to prevent sectional wage claims, as a short-
term measure to ensure continuity of production.630 Such strategies further intensified the
‘clash of cultures’ on the shop floor. Many of the sectional wage claims were ‘protective
measures’; one wage claim would result in a series of claims from other sections, but
management responded with a process of re-grading at the plant. The key point here is
wage claims were linked to the status of groups of workers. For example, on the South
Side in March 1966 a group of workers went on strike upon the implementation of a new
grading structure as it narrowed the wage differentials between craftsmen and semi-skilled
operatives.631 With strict demarcation central to the craft culture of the west of Scotland,
for groups of skilled workers it was a fundamental condition of employment that the pay
differential between grades of workers was upheld.
In evidence submitted in 1966 to the Royal Commission, Rootes pointed out that
the process of gaining agreement on wage differentials ‘took far longer than was really
necessary’.632 This statement suggests frustration and that management was insensitive to
the importance of skill status among the workforce and resistant to conceding ground to
demands for associated pay differentials. In February 1966 management responded to a
series of wage claims by undertaking job evaluation and subsequently introduced a new
grading system that cut the existing eighteen grades in the plant to seven.633 In addition,
although it had been established in 1964, such streamlining of the pay structure suggests
the role of shop floor representatives on the Productivity Committee was nominal because
they did not have the authority to discuss wages or conditions.634 As such it was ineffectual
at facilitating greater management-workforce bargaining, but was instead a channel of
communication utilised by management, which, when it became a Works Committee to
discuss matters affecting the entire plant, Rootes claimed ‘operated successfully’:
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In discussion with this Committee on bonus schemes and in domestic discussions
in accordance with the … Domestic Procedure, the Personnel Department played a
major role, and in fact represented the official view of the Company at all of the
meetings which took place.635
Underpinning this assumption was the unitary sentiment that industrial tension caused by
streamlining the grades, stoppages and disciplinary issues was linked to the workforce
failing to recognise the aims of the company. Equally, for the workforce, the process of re-
defining categories of jobs required management acknowledgement of custom and
practice, as well as adherence to a pay hierarchy within the workplace based on traditional
notions of craft skill and associated pay differentials. Hence the polarity between
management’s stance and the ‘clash of cultures’ meant pay negotiations and productivity
agreements were bereft of sustainable commitment.
As with Pressed Steel’s Linwood Plan, the slump-boom cycle of fluctuating sales in
the car industry, coupled with inflationary-deflationary economic measures, meant there
was no guaranteed longevity to such schemes which were only viable as a short term
attempt by plant management to meet peaks in demand.  For the workforce scepticism of
the management’s motives was justified.  Following the introduction of the August 1964
bonus scheme, the company announced short-time working and redundancy proposals for
up to 400 employees of the 2400 strong workforce.636 Not only did this give rise to
industrial tension at the plant, it undermined future bonus schemes and wage negotiations.
Plant management found itself in a continual cycle of short term fixes to ensure continuity
of production while at the same time conceding to sectional wage claims despite the
workforce failing to meet agreed productivity levels. These examples are indicative of the
pragmatic pluralism shaping labour management at Rootes’ Linwood plant. The
complexities of labour management were exacerbated, not only by the takeover of Pressed
Steel in 1966 when initially the North Side and South Side of the plant remained under
their respective management, but also the necessity for investment to address the
company’s burgeoning debt.
When Rootes took over the North Side factory, the Linwood Plan was terminated.
Bonuses under the plan had fallen due to a fall in Hillman Imp sales therefore the
management replaced it with the Rootes Pressings Productivity Plan.637 Like the South
                                                 
635 FAI, Papers of Cliff Lockyer, Box 7, Evidence for Government Court of Enquiry [sic], Rootes Motors
Scotland Ltd., 31 May 1968.
636 FAI, Papers of Cliff Lockyer, Box 7, Rootes Motors Ltd, Report for Royal Commission, Development of
Scottish Project, Rootes (Scotland) Limited, Linwood, June, 1966.
637 TNA: PRO LAB 10/2834, The Sunday Times, 25 May 1969.
180
Side plant this was based on work study, organised by an Industrial Engineering
Department and introduced on 30 April 1966.638 The new management sought a method of
rationalising the existing pay structures in the two factories and undertook bargaining with
shop stewards rather than union officials and in doing so, to some extent undermined their
authority on the shop floor. The company regarded shop stewards as having greater
understanding of the specific branch plant situation than union officials. Paradoxically
these were the shop stewards that the company claimed needed further training in order to
negotiate more effectively over pay and productivity, rather than bargaining with the local
union officials.639 This perceived commonality of interest was flawed because the Pressed
Steel workforce was aware that its wage rates were lower than comparable rates in the
Rootes South Side factory, which in turn were lower than their English counterparts and it
impinged on wage negotiations at the plant. Despite the unions, representing employees on
the South Side, having signed the 1960 Brabloch Agreement, in the 1966/67 negotiations
that led to the Court of Inquiry, the Chairman of the Works Committee on the North Side
commented that he would not enter into negotiations with management on increased
productivity and flexibility until Rootes Pressings workers received wages in parity with
Coventry hourly rate.640 It is therefore understandable fluctuations in demand for the
Hillman Imp not only intensified workforce resistance to management’s increasing control
of the shop floor, but made the workforce more determined to achieve the highest wage
increases possible to counter these effects and subsequent periods of bonus and higher
wages followed by short-time working and lay-offs.
Both Pressed Steel and Rootes managements attempted to both exploit and coerce
the Scottish workforce by paying low wage rates as well as at other times incentivising it
with generous bonus schemes. However, what neither firm recognised was that financial
incentives were only part of the motivations for the workforce; evident in the fact that
despite successive wage agreements industrial action occurred over issues that cut across
traditional work patterns and workers’ independence. This ‘clash of cultures’ was
exacerbated by managerial adherence to the existing disparity in wages between the
Linwood and the Coventry plants.
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In 1966, Rootes had informed the UK government that due to debts of £10.8
million the company urgently required capital. Chrysler offered financial investment but
this was subject to an increase in its voting shares to effectively allow a takeover.  The
proposal was met with concern amongst the Labour Cabinet over the influence of three
American car firms in the UK and the subsequent impact on the domestic car market.
Therefore, Anthony Wedgwood Benn (Tony Benn, then Minister of Technology) gave
consideration to the possibility of a merger between Rootes and BMC or Leyland, but
neither firm was interested in a merger.641 Rootes had experienced loses of £2.1 million in
1965 and £3.6 in 1966: the escalating debts meant the situation was untenable.642 The
company’s financial problems were so significant that for the UK government to offer a
resolution would have meant a long-term financial commitment; as Benn highlighted, for
the government this would have meant investment in ‘an insolvent enterprise company
without any guarantee that in this way it would remain viable’.643 Cautious about state
intervention because of the use of public money in such investments, Benn sought
assurances from Chrysler that the company would maintain a majority of British directors
and also that it would expand its British operations.644 The interaction between politics and
economics was significant because despite low unemployment and relative economic
prosperity, the Labour government, under Harold Wilson, recognised the political
importance of maintaining high employment levels that could potentially be secured with
increased investment from Chrysler. As Young and Hood concluded:
It was here, yet again, that the government was caught in what was later to prove
the crucial pincer movement in 1975, between open-ended financial commitment
and employment.645
The unemployment ramifications in the west of Scotland meant the future of the plant was
a key issue in discussions with Chrysler. Thus, in January 1967, the government conceded
to a Chrysler takeover as being the most viable option available and provided government
funding through the Industrial Reorganisation Committee, which obtained fifteen per cent
of the total Preferred Ordinary Shares.646
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4.4 Chrysler: ‘Yank Among the Thistles’
Upon assuming control of Rootes in 1967 Chrysler restructured management, evident at
company level with the appointment of five new directors on the Rootes’ board including
American representatives. At Linwood, Peter Griffiths, Managing Director of Rootes was
replaced by American manager, Robert Irwin. Furthermore, as mentioned in Adam
Fleming’s testimony, American production managers were transferred to the plant.
Fleming was replaced by Art Hawkins as Production Manager of the assembly line.647
Hood and Young attributed some of the industrial relations problems within Chrysler
plants to ‘the employment of middle and some senior managers more in tune with practice
in the United States than in Europe’.648 There was discussion within the press on how
Chrysler would handle industrial relations at the plant as the American personnel were
faced with a radically different factory environment. For instance, the Scottish Daily
Express pointed to the potential difficulties facing Irwin because his managerial experience
in America and Australia meant working with one union in each plant, whereas there were
nine unions at the Linwood plant. 649 As noted above, for Adam Fleming the takeover by
Chrysler created a ‘clash of cultures’, which he attributed to the unfamiliar style of
management implemented by American personnel at the plant. He expanded upon his
original point:
And I had deduced, the problem Chrysler had in managing in the UK so it was
Scotland as well as Ryton, but predominantly because a Scot’s a Scot, is they’d
never heard the saying, “When in Rome, do as the Romans do”.  So they were
trying to manage the Scottish plant the way they managed their Detroit plants. The,
the senior eh Director in Managers that came over, eh, especially the Plant
Managers level, thought that the Scots would react in the same way that the
American shop floor workers would react.  And of course the Scots don’t do that.  I
mean we’re a much more independent group eh, and we don’t eh, the Scots you
know, couldn’t be bought off.650
The proposition that multinational management should manage in the style to which the
indigenous workforce was accustomed is underpinned by the notion that the American
managers were insensitive to the embedded culture of organised labour in the west of
Scotland. It disregards the perceived advantages to international firms of establishing
branch plants in the UK as well as potential economic benefits that could help to re-dress
the Balance of Payment deficit. Although the UK had been the main exporter of cars in the
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world in the immediate post-war period, during the 1960s it was superseded by European,
American and Japanese car industries that had grown exponentially. Unlike the UK, both
France and Germany had invested Marshall-Aid money in industry so were better placed to
respond to demands both at home and globally. As noted, in the domestic market demand
had been restrained by government regulations on hire purchase. Albeit the inclusion of the
Pressed Steel factory meant that from this point on the site at Linwood became responsible
for producing car bodies for all of Chrysler UK facilities, the company lost £4.5 million at
Linwood alone in 1967.651 The new management’s response to re-dress this deficit was a
strategy of rationalisation of the existing pay structures in the two factories and approached
the unions to enter into plant-based productivity bargaining.
4.4.1 Shop Stewards: New Roles – Old Problems
Prior to the introduction of the Linwood Wage Grading and Productivity Agreement in
1968 there was no negotiation structure that incorporated both North and South Sides of
the plant. In addition, on the North Side there was no representative body as management
would not acknowledge the Works Committee following the withdrawal of the National
Union of Vehicle Builders (hereafter NUVB) representatives in November 1967.652 The
intention of Chrysler was to introduce a uniform method of negotiating that included both
North and South Sides, that would facilitate bargaining with the unions – through shop
steward representatives – to reach common agreements. Two key points arise here: first of
all, inclusion of the shop stewards in formalised negotiations pointed to support of power-
sharing and decision-making between management and shop floor, which was a shift from
the approach under previous ownerships. Secondly, Chrysler management’s style
transferred greater responsibility onto the shop stewards by drawing them into a key role in
the allocation of wages in the plant. Like Rootes, production in Scotland offered
companies such as Chrysler a reservoir of low-cost high-skilled labour that enabled
expansion of production without increasing unit labour costs. Therefore, this move created
a conflict of interest for the unions.
The Agreement meant that payment by results and piecework was replaced by a
system that linked pay grades to levels of operator performance. It replaced the high day
rate on the South Side and the day rate based on work standards accompanied by the bonus
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scheme on the North Side. Crucially for the workforce it was a payment system that
included changes to work practices. Two main areas of contention were the withdrawal of
the Bonus Scheme and mutuality relating to MDW.653 The Amalgamated Engineering
Federation (hereafter AEF) and several craft unions on the North Side were resistant to the
agreement because the bonus scheme, albeit related to increased track pace determined by
management, provided some degree of incentive on levels of production and worker
autonomy. This autonomy was diminished within the terms of the Agreement because:
provision was made for improvements in labour utilisation by double day-shift and
three-shift working; for the use of work study techniques to establish work
standards and man assignments for all operations; for the abolition of non-essential
jobs such as craftsmen’s mates; and for greater mobility and flexibility in the use of
available manpower.654
Mutuality was equally important to the unions opposed to the new productivity plan and
argued for the standards to be brought under collective bargaining. Like Rootes’
productivity determinism, wage grading took place during a period of Incomes Polices
(1965 to 1969) and for companies like Chrysler was the main method used to evade
governmental control of wage awards. Chrysler management would not allow work
standards to be subject to collective bargaining and under the Pay Agreement the labour
force had to work to these standards while taking any disagreements through procedure.
This allowed management to shift from conceding inflating wage claims to the
introduction of changes in the workplace.
When considered within the context of the slump-boom cycles experienced at the
plant, for management of a company competing in a global market it was a strategy that
transferred risks onto the workforce.655 The changing nature of work propagated a new
insecurity among large segments of the workforce.  It is therefore understandable that
discussions between unions and management lasted for over a year. Negotiations were
ongoing from February 1968 but despite only having the agreement of the Transport and
General Workers’ Union (hereafter TGWU) and the NUVB, Chrysler implemented the
Agreement on 6 May 1968. Together these unions represented sixty per cent of the hourly-
paid employees at Linwood, however six other unions, mainly representing craft workers,
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did not participate in negotiations yet had the payment agreement forced upon them.656 The
implementation of work standards and increased flexibility as (detailed in the initial
Agreement) resulted in industrial stoppages in the Press Shop and amongst maintenance
staff that led to the shut down of the plant until 7 June 1968. The key point here is,
consultation with the unions and shop stewards was framed in unitarist rhetoric of
company and workforce commonality of interest articulated by the managing director,
Robert Irwin in a Paisley Daily Express article entitled ‘Yank among the thistles, How
Robert Irwin MD plans to weed out the prickly workers of Rootes’:
Much of the trouble here… is inspired by small groups who are impatient,
unwilling to listen to the other side, completely resistant to change. And [sic]
looking for any excuse to have a day off.657
Paradoxically, the Court of Inquiry concluded that the locus of blame for the
industrial conflict lay with Chrysler management: inadequate communication during
negotiations and acting ‘with rapidity in a situation requiring patience’, the Agreement,
regardless of how acceptable it seemed, should not have been implemented with the
agreement of only two unions in a multi-union plant.658 Inducements of co-operation and
de facto acknowledgment of all unions in negotiations were underpinned by conflicting
aspirations for the Agreement. For management it was a means of overcoming resistance to
change and improving labour organisation. For the workforce the disparity between joint
consultation and joint decision-making was sustained by placing the onus on shop
stewards, not necessarily determined by union demarcation, which weakened the channels
of collective bargaining. As such, reflected the inadequacy of ‘common interest’ in the
acknowledgement of issues of importance to workers. This was a contention that informed
subsequent attempts at industrial democracy during Chrysler’s period of ownership. The
Court of Inquiry acknowledged severe financial loss and the absence of a plant wide
negotiating framework as extenuating circumstances in which the company had introduced
such changes before reaching agreement at Linwood. Consequently, aware of the potential
repercussions of commercial failure on unemployment in the west of Scotland, the Court of
Inquiry advised all unions accept the Agreement, which enabled Chrysler to introduce
work-study techniques and MDW throughout its UK operations in 1968.
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4.4.2 Changes to payment systems: Measured Day Work
When describing the work-study techniques Fleming indicated an orientation with the
management’s desire for efficient organisation and timing production processes. He
commented that:
The skills of a work study engineer were all to do with evaluating the process and
also to put a time on that process and the time of course was, as a result of man
doing work.659
Under the terms of the Agreement Industrial Engineers were engaged by management to
undertake job evaluation in order to identify and organise the most effective use of labour
and manning levels. Fleming noted that such studies took into account the dexterity of
workers and suitability for their allocated job, as well as rating each work study in terms of
pace, for instance fast or slow. Work-study techniques and MDW were extremely
contentious because they necessitated the implementation of  ‘accurate time standards’ for
each job in the factory and these formed the basis of ratings and the designation of a ‘100
performance’ as a standard performance rating throughout the factory.660 For Chrysler
MDW was a method of accurate work allocation and enabled management to control the
corollary between pay and productivity. The unions denounced the system as non-
scientific:
Whilst time study is presented by management as scientific, nothing could be
further from the truth…It must be recognised that in the main time studies are
simply judgements, they are not scientific or accurate.661
The craft unions disagreed with work-study and MDW because as noted in Chapter Two,
how quickly a job could be performed and the way it was undertaken was central to the
craft tradition that had dominated work culture in the heavy industries in the west of
Scotland. Working to different standards, labour would effectively be conceding to
management that the new pace was achievable and make future changes to manning level
and job allocation difficult to challenge. Fleming commented on the workers’ responses to
the timing allocated to jobs:
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Oh they hated it [with reference to workers subject to work study] … There were
all … the guys were eh, were always eh tryin to get [pause] get the fiddle going.
Eh, so that they got more time on the job than what they really need.662
The opposition to MDW reoccurred in the oral testimonies of production workers that
worked under Chrysler management. When asked about MDW Archie Watson, operator in
the UMB, responded:
according tae them ye sh, ye had tae be workin every minute o the day right, but
ye’re were allowed a certain a, amount o time but they were the ones that was
telling ye what that amount o time was, that you could go ae the toilet right, or ye
can huv a break. Ye know, there wisnae something that you decided on, it was what
they decided on, an that was the measured day work.663
He also recalled the response of the workforce to Industrial Engineers or ‘Time and Motion
Men’:
if anybody knew that the time study was in the, the vicinity they [pause] they would
actually eh, slow the thing doon, take a wee bitty longer daen it, a wee bit longer.664
This is similar to the experience of line operator, Douglas McKendrick who stated that
when his section was informed it would be subject to time study, the slowest man in the
squad undertook the task so that ‘the times were better’.665 In this instance by ‘better’
means slower so as to ensure a greater time allocated to the task – enabling the workforce
to ‘steal a few seconds’.666
For skilled workers in particular, this presented a potential source of conflict. One
interviewee who worked as an electrician at the plant recalled the strict demarcation of
skilled work at Linwood, and more importantly that workers would attempt to protect their
skilled status by guarding their knowledge and preventing other sections and skilled groups
from gaining information on how to undertake particular jobs and that retaining this skilled
knowledge from management meant it had less power to control the workforce: 
The less skills ye have the worse conditions the more ye have to do wit yer told. …
The real asset of being skilled was that you had choice, more choice about what
you did.667
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The rating technique brought management and the shop floor into conflict because, as
Adam Fleming highlighted, although it was difficult to contest the actual timing of each
task, there were frequent objections to the rating assigned by the industrial engineer.668 It
was the element of MDW that the unions claimed could not be accurately measured. As
Braverman pointed out, workers would never fully divulge information that could reveal
‘trade secrets’ that would result in greater loss of control to management and the potential
lose of their jobs, so from the perspective of management cannot have an input into the
process of work study.669
The response of management to worker resistance to work evaluation and MDW is
exemplified in a company statement in The Times in August 1968:
This is a case of shop stewards countermanding management instructions … indeed
it is tantamount to a suggestion that they can veto management directions. This, of
course, is a situation which the company is not prepared to accept.670
In this statement the company’s unitary values are evident – the shop stewards were an
inherent source of the problems. Two key points emerge from this statement; first it
highlights the centralised locus of control within Chrysler UK, exhibited by North
American firms in the UK.671 Management controlled the assembly-line track therefore
could increase work rates to achieve higher productivity by increasing the speed of the
track. Hence, managerial decisions on work evaluation and MDW were able to by-pass the
unions and shop stewards. Secondly, it indicates a low level of branch plant autonomy that
meant the polarity between managerial rhetoric and reality in practice was sustained, in
that union and shop steward input progressed little further than consultation in the process
of decision-making if it did not concur with company strategy. Lockyer and Baddon argue
that Chrysler UK’s determination to maintain continuous production in the early 1970s
resulted in the company neglecting quality and industrial relations in the branch plants.672
With Chrysler UK’s withdrawal from the Engineering Employers’ Federation and Scottish
Engineering Employers’ Association effective from 1970, it presented greater scope for
negotiation with the unions. In reality it circumvented the constraints of the employers’
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associations and ‘official’ trade unionism as the intention was in-house negotiations
between productivity driven management and shop stewards rather than union officials.
Chrysler UK’s departure from the employers’ associations mirrors wider UK
developments, where there was a shift from industry-level to firm-level bargaining. This
was part of the general trend to decentralisation within industrial relations. However,
within Chrysler UK this actually formed part of a move towards greater centralisation, as
policy was developed at UK level to be implemented throughout the various branch plants.
It does however appear Linwood management sought to improve industrial
relations, not simply by expanding industrial relations personnel but by encouraging shop
stewards to become IROs.673 This was a strategy of incorporating militant and vocal
stewards into the management structure; bridging the communication gap between
management and workforce as industrial relations problems could be handled in-house. It
suggests that the company recognised the specific nature of industrial relations and the
potential benefits of hiring individuals more accustomed to the system of industrial
relations in Scotland, and the custom and practice to which the workforce was familiar. A
former IRO, Craig Marsden, who had not been a steward but had joined the company as a
graduate, noted the ease with which former stewards would walk around the shop floor
‘networking’ and finding out ‘what was brewing’.674 When questioned about the status of
the IROs within Linwood, Marsden stated:
You were the meat in the sandwich. You had to try and educate management: they
couldn’t treat people in certain ways. Now you wouldn’t have an IR Department –
it would be driven by HR and you would have advisors dealing with policies … In
those days, driven by IR matters … it was essentially a strategy to resolve disputes
as quickly as possible to try and ensure continuity of production because that was
the … that was the real employment problem.675
His testimony indicates that avoiding stoppages affected the approach of the IROs. For
instance, as revealed in Chapter Three, he learned very quickly never to sack the ‘bookies
runner’ and at times ‘turning a blind eye’ to events on the shop floor that if led to a
disciplinary procedure, could result in a stoppage.676 Therefore, despite the existence of a
more highly organised and centralised industrial relations staff structure, at plant level
certain traditions and practice continued.
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Amongst the documentary material from the car plant, there is evidence to suggest
that there were shop stewards who were seeking greater influence not only in the area of
industrial relations but also in addressing some of the production and quality issues at the
plant, therefore in the area of managerial relations. In a document entitled ‘Chrysler-
Linwood Plant, Statement Re. Proposed Enquiry [sic]’, the shop steward position is quoted
at length:
Many other examples could be mentioned which required co-operation and co-
ordination of Management and Trade Unions to resolve, and despite offers and
suggestions from the Stewards to jointly study and work at resolving any existing
problems which would prevent moving into a quality and acceptable production
figure, Management insisted that there were no problems … It is difficult to
understand Company’s rejection of advice and co-operation offered by the
Stewards. We do not believe Local Management make [sic] these arbitrary
decisions, it is our opinion that these are taken by National Representatives of the
Company.677
The low level of branch plant autonomy during Chrysler’s period of ownership was
recognised by the Linwood plant shop stewards. As the above document suggests, little if
any progress was made to include shop stewards in effect discussion on production and
industrial relations. Instead it points to a style of management emanating from the parent
company in which it was the responsibility of stewards to enforce any agreements on the
workforce. This style of management undermined the authority of the unions and put a
strain on industrial relations at the plant, and may well have contributed to the trend in
reactionary ‘wild-cat’ strikes prevalent during Chrysler’s ownership. It facilitated the
plant’s move into a phase of industrial relations where issues were dealt with at a local
level but the overall strategy and co-ordination were provided by an Industrial Relations
Section at Whitley, which will now be examined within the context of branch plant
autonomy. 678 There will be further discussion on the shop stewards’ position in the plant in
Chapter Five.
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4.4.3 Productivity and Branch Plant Autonomy
In his oral testimony Adam Fleming recalled that at the end of each day plant management
at Linwood participated in a conference call with the Detroit management of Chrysler
Corporation. The parent company set production targets for its UK plants and productivity
was closely monitored in each plant.679 There is consensus within the literature that
operational management decisions such as wage rates and work conditions tended to be
less centralised, so provided local management with an area over which it had most
autonomy.680 Hood, Young and Dunlop also note that as well as the strategy of greater
European integration, a loss of competitiveness by the European companies was met with
greater rationalisation and reorganisation.681 A more difficult economic environment,
unemployment and a weakened labour movement gave rise to increasing centralisation in
MNCs in the 1970s. Therefore, while branch plants had a degree of autonomy over certain
areas, it was determined by the global strategy of the parent company. The parent company
set production targets but it was down to plant management to ensure these were met,
which in turn influenced the style of management in the branch plant.
In the late 1960s high demand for cars and subsequent pressure for continuous
production saw management respond with increases in the speed of the line. This resulted
in the attitude among some workers that, ‘Doing the job properly was not the priority.’682 It
created friction between the Production Supervisors and the Quality Supervisors because
when the latter requested rectification work on cars this affected productivity targets for
the plant.683 Oral testimony evidence indicating that workers were aware of the pressure of
maintaining production and high levels of productivity, Chrysler continued to under-utilise
the site at Linwood, which it justified as being related to the low productivity of the British
labour force compared to its French operations.684 In a note prepared for the Prime
Minister, Edward Heath, the company was described as having ‘to concede relatively high
pay increases’ so as to avoid production stoppages.685 Similar to Rootes’ strategy during its
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period of ownership, Chrysler resorted to offering pay rises in order to achieve increases in
productivity.
In the negotiations for the 1970 Wage and Productivity Agreement, the company
acknowledged that parity remained a highly contentious issue for the Linwood workforce
but would not yield on worker demands. The workforce made a claim for an increase of
£10 a week but the company was only willing to offer wage increases that would amount
to £4.10/-. The unions implemented an overtime ban in December 1970 with the threat of
further industrial action but ended the ban before Christmas. Despite the threat of industrial
action the company responded by drawing the lack of finance available in Chrysler UK to
the attention of the workforce. In the factory newspaper Gilbert Hunt, Managing Director
claimed, ‘there is not much money left in the till’. He implored the workforce to consider
its actions in any industrial dispute as they could be extremely detrimental for the UK
operations, ‘Any employees inclined to test the Company’s strength might find themselves
creating a situation which takes us beyond the limit of our resources.’686 Such rhetoric
linked the wage claim to failure of the Linwood plant. Management used the rhetoric of
responsibility again in 1978 during the company proposals for the Chrysler Incentive Plan.
This time Managing Director Chrysler UK, Peter Griffiths implored the workforce to
consider the wider implications of the way in which it worked:
We want everyone to realise that the speed with which they react and respond to
possible delays in production can have a real effect upon their Plant’s and the
Company’s performance.687
Negotiations over the 1970 Pay agreement continued into January 1971 before the unions
accepted the pay increase of £4.10/- with incentives of improvements in the company
pension, raising the rates of female employees and increased personal relief time in return
for increased productivity. Robert Irwin, Linwood Managing Director in 1970, commented
in a letter to employees that ‘this is a good offer – the highest increase the Company has
ever made to hourly paid employees at any of its plants’.688 While it fell short of the initial
union wage claim, it exceeded the norm in terms of previous wage rises; implying that the
workforce should be grateful. From the perspective of the workforce, this statement was
insensitive to the fact that despite this wage increase it maintained pay disparity between
the Linwood workforce and counterparts in other Chrysler UK operations. For the
                                                 
686 TNA: PRO, LAB 43/595, Industrial Relations Section, Scotland, First Report Engineering (Vehicles),
IRO, AG Mackenzie, 30 November 1970.
687 FAI, Papers of Cliff Lockyer, Box 7, The Chrysler Incentive Plan, 1978.
688 TNA: PRO, LAB 43/595, Letter to Chrysler Scotland Ltd. Employees from R. H. Irwin, Linwood
Manufacturing Director, 2  December 1970.
193
company it was a wage increase it was prepared to pay in order to maintain continuous
production at Linwood.
The wage rise granted at the plant was indicative of the parent company’s intention
to set its own agenda in disregard of the economic conditions and concerns regarding the
disparity between wage increases in the public and private sectors in the United Kingdom
during this period. This was evident in the company’s interactions with the government.
Towards the end of 1970 the Managing Director of Chrysler UK, Gilbert Hunt, attended a
meeting of motor industry representatives that met with the Secretary of State for
Employment to discuss the issue of wage restraint.689 Yet despite company loses of £10.9
million in 1970, the Chrysler UK group conceded a wage claim of almost eighteen per
cent, while at the same time the government was attempting to keep a claim by mail
workers down at eight per cent.690 An editorial in The Guardian exemplifies reaction to the
company’s decision, ‘it drives a coach and horses through the Government’s attempts to
carry out a policy for incomes and Whitehall can rightly feel betrayed.691 Chrysler
conceded to the wage rise because the company was launching the Hillman Avenger in
America on the 20 January 1971 and was dependent on car body shells and component
parts from its branch plant in Linwood.692 It was clear Chrysler’s interests ran parallel to
the national interests.
The demand for continuous production and increased productivity meant
management at Linwood responded by increasing the speed of the assembly line. This
occurred even though management knew that the assembly technology was not built with
the technical capacity to increase the number of vehicles in a given time above the original
maximum set-up level. As Fleming commented:
And it was when I was the eh the Plant Manager of the Assembly plant that we
were able to raise the production level from what the design level was, was 48, I
think it was about 48 units an hour. … we really had a production requirement for
one a minute so we raised the production from 48 an hour up to the 60 an hour.
And that was an absolute disaster. As a young manager it was my first introduction
to overstretching mechanical facilities. 693
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He went on to detail that when the machine speed was increased beyond the set-up level
the rate of assembly line breakdowns increased, rendering this managerial strategy to meet
production targets not only ineffectual but detrimental to production. However, increasing
the speed of the line at Linwood car plant was a key condition in productivity bargaining
and effected changes in the workplace such as flexibility in the deployment of labour in
return for improved rates of pay. Such bargaining meant management could attempt to
make gains in cutting across intrinsic craft demarcation lines at Linwood car plant.694 Yet
productivity in the branch plant remained below that of international competitors and was
attributed to strikes and disputes.
In 1975 the Central Policy Review Staff (hereafter CPRS) outlined poor
communication between management and the workforce as a significant factor in industrial
tension within the British car industry.695 Similarly Hood and Young have argued that
within its UK subsidiaries Chrysler management should have dedicated greater attention to
developing effective communication procedures.696 Conversely, documentary evidence
suggests that Chrysler UK centralised management directed a great deal of attention to
improving communications with its workforce, incorporated into a larger participation
agenda. Indeed, Elliot commends Chrysler as ‘one of the more progressive new entrants to
the participation arena’.697 The attempts at worker participation within Chrysler were
centrally co-ordinated by the Central Industrial Relations Department and the Employee
Participation and Communication Department based in Whitley, Coventry. The aim was to
solve the problems of ‘monotony, frustration and overall working environment’ by
providing the workers the opportunity of contributing to management decisions and
planning.698
4.4.4 Employee Participation: ‘A new basis for Managerial Authority’
Although Fleming had left employment at Chrysler prior to the introduction of the
Planning Agreement, his testimony provides a salient commentary on the burgeoning
number of participation schemes and attempts at industrial democracy throughout the car
industry in the 1970s:
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one of the ‘in’ words in the seventies was participation.  Where, and it was after
you know the sort of Ryder Report and the bringing together of eh, of the eh, the
and the creation of BL. Eh, and the recognition within the government that not only
was productivity a problem but industrial relations were a problem.699
This trend was noted by Clegg who suggested that during the 1970s: ‘the word
“participation” came into vogue’ with the increased popularity of joint consultation.700 The
emphasis on participation is significant when placed within the context of the Linwood
plant’s history of poor industrial relations and suggests that consultations between
management and representatives of the shop floor were problematic. Fleming’s narrative
offers some acknowledgement of the problems likely to have impinged on consultations
between management and shop floor:
the management and trade unions would agree to set up working groups so that the
working group would hear what the management plans were and eh, they would
agree the need for those plans and would support them. But of course, it really
didn’t, didn’t work because that meant that the trade union representatives even the
more, I mean we’re talking about bringing in shop stewards sittin down with senior
managers and directors eh, sittin down with their eh, with their eh local reps and
their national you know reps so, it was, it was a whole mix of people.701
Implicit in this narrative is recognition of difficulties attributed to fundamental differences
between the trade union representatives and management. An argument for worker
participation is it improved the position of trade unions in collective bargaining; this was
not the case at Linwood as the company was attempting to move towards company-wide
wage negotiations. Placating the leadership meant there was less likelihood of strong shop
stewards taking the ‘Linwood Lemmings’ out on strike.702
Developments in employer-union bargaining at Linwood reflect major patterns in
industrial relations of the post-war period in Britain: initially industry-wide agreements
initiated by employers’ associations; followed by formalised plant-based collective
bargaining, productivity and procedural agreements; and finally a shift towards greater
centralisation and support for worker participation.703 Blyton and Turnbull have argued
that examination of the purpose, scope and outcomes of participation schemes give an
indication of the extent of employee involvement and influence in decision-making.704
The chapter will now move on to a consideration of the motivations and interactions
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between company, management and workforce during two key participation strategies in
the 1970s, namely the Employee Participation Programme (hereafter EPP) and the
Planning Agreement Working Party.
4.4.5 Industrial Democracy: Motivations, Interactions and Transactions
Prior to returning to government in 1974, the Labour Party had worked to rebuild its
relationship with the trade union movement and the Trades Union Congress (hereafter
TUC) as part of the Social Contract. Central to this concept was a Labour government
commitment to industrial democracy. At this time Jack Jones, General Secretary of the
Transport and General Workers Union, was influential in persuading the TUC and the
Labour government to recognise industrial democracy as a central issue on the political
agenda. To some extent the government was influenced by membership of the European
Economic Community (hereafter EEC) from January 1973, which led to debate on the
adoption of common labour laws throughout the EEC. The Labour government provided a
commitment to industrial relations legislation in favour of labour, in return for voluntary
wage restraint. As part of the Social Contract, Jack Jones had argued for worker
participation in the form of worker directors. This model of industrial democracy was met
with a divided response within the TUC. On the one hand worker participation was
perceived to be incorporating employee representatives into management which could
nullify their ability to represent their members. On the other hand, access to managerial
information was potentially beneficial to representatives in the collective bargaining
process. This was important for those who sought to increase collective bargaining within
increasingly complex organisations, including MNCs, where at times it was difficult for
stewards to gain access to information.705 The EPP was perceived as providing workers an
opportunity to contribute to management decisions and planning.706
From the spring of 1975, having abandoned the idea of worker directors due to
workforce opposition,707 the Industrial Relations Department of Chrysler UK began
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developing an EPP, which included two employees at Board level and union representation
on committees at central company level. In addition to a national negotiating committee,
the programme was to introduce Plant Employee Representative Councils and sub-
committees within each plant. Each would be composed of manual and staff union
members to ‘discuss and review the operation of the plant on a weekly basis’, as well as
maintain communication between management and the unions.708 Such proposals suggest a
Chrysler UK central management that had embraced organisational pluralism and
acceptance of employee influence in what Fox defined as ‘managerial relations’.
Acceptance and implementation of the EPP was a condition of the 1975 wage
agreements. The company offered to pay £50 to each employee on condition of acceptance
of the EPP in principle by all negotiating groups by the summer, followed by an additional
£50 providing the EPP was fully accepted by the end of the year. The wage claim was
submitted in May 1975 and the Linwood workforce was told it had to accept the EPP in
principle by 12 July and implementation by 24 December.709 Attached to the wage
agreement proposed for the Stoke Engine Plant, which encompassed the proposals to set up
the EPP, was a Chrysler UK statement claiming that the company was offering an ‘across
the board’ wage increase and ‘not willing to engage in collective bargaining with different
work groups’.710 Although this statement was issued with reference to the engine plant at
Stoke it gives some indication of the company’s attitude to joint negotiation and employee
participation in the setting of wage rates. In effect a unilateral company decision that
obviated employee representatives in wage rate negotiations. The EPP was not accepted at
Linwood, or indeed in any of the Chrysler UK subsidiaries.711 The implementation of these
wage agreements led to strike activity in both the English plants and Linwood before wage
rates were negotiated and increases accepted.
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A former shop steward at the Linwood car plant, Peter Bain points to
management’s motives:
By August, the EPP still had not been accepted, but after assuring the Linwood
stewards that all they had to do was to allow the company to state publicly that the
unions were prepared to discuss the proposals, the JRC [Joint Representative
Council] got the go-ahead to sign. The £50 was then paid, but the eventual combine
statement went a good deal further than the Linwood stewards had agreed. It was
claimed that Chrysler were desperate to convince the government that labour
relations were good so as to help them obtain the loan they had requested.712
In light of Chrysler UK losses of £17.8 million in 1974, the offer of £100 per employee to
ensure the acceptance and implementation of the EPP and resistance to engage in plant-
based collective bargaining could be seen as a strategy to avoid inflationary wage claims.
Like previous incentive schemes, cash inducement showed little genuine commitment to
the principles of industrial democracy. It was a coercive transaction between management
and workforce to encourage workers’ acceptance of the EPP that circumvented employee
participation in the setting of wage rates and consultation.
During this phase of ownership the buoyant market of the 1960s had given way to a
down-turn in economic growth, falling domestic car sales, in particular between 1970 and
1974, exacerbated by quadrupling of the price of oil between 1973 and 1974 due to the
OPEC oil embargo713 With a diminishing global market due in particular to increased
competition from Japan, it became apparent that the Chrysler Corporation did not have the
finances to invest in the development of new models in Chrysler UK and maintain its
threatened market share. With Chrysler UK sustaining losses of nearly £80 million
between 1967 and 1975 the long-term viability looked pessimistic.714 The urgency to
implement the EPP was political strategic management to assure the Labour government of
the company’s commitment to proactive employee participation in consultations and
decision-making in the branch plants in order to secure financial aid.
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4.4.6 The Rescue Plan: Reactive Political Intervention
Doubts over the sustainability of Chrysler UK were not unexpected. In December 1974
Harold Wilson had ordered an inquiry into British Leyland under Sir Don Ryder, as well as
the government think-tank, the CPRS under Sir Kenneth Berrill to investigate problems
facing the entire UK car industry.715 The latter study reported that the car industry in
Britain was overcapacity and characterised by low productivity in comparison to European
car plants. The conclusion of the report predicted that divestment was inevitable with
Chrysler UK as one of the firms most likely to downsize its operations.716 In November
1975 Chrysler stated its intention to close its UK subsidiary within four weeks unless the
Government intervened with financial assistance.717 The urgency to implement the EPP
was political strategic management to assure the Labour government of the company’s
commitment to proactive employee participation in consultations and decision-making in
the branch plants in order to secure financial aid. Notably, publication of the CPRS Report
in early December 1975 was deliberately postponed while discussions took place between
the Chrysler Corporation and the government.718
Chrysler’s threat to withdraw its UK operations presented the government with a
dilemma – secure equity stock in the UK subsidiary; pursue a rescue strategy similar that
of British Leyland and nationalise the company; do nothing and let the Chrysler
Corporation shut down the branch plants or offer financial assistance to the company.
Equity participation meant the government’s involvement in the company would be driven
by the market interests of the parent company in Detroit which may not have been in the
interest of the UK economy. Acquisition of the UK subsidiary may have resolved this
problem with comparatively little cost to the Government, but this had to be offset against
substantial liabilities and long-term viability of a company too small to compete and
succeed without access to wider market developments that could be provided by the
Chrysler Corporation. Alternatively, the government could simply have let the Chrysler
Corporation close down its UK subsidiary but this could have had economic and political
ramifications. Although the UK subsidiary’s share of the domestic car market was 6.6 per
cent in 1975, the contract with Iran – 60,000 Avengers in ‘kit’ form – accounted for 71 per
                                                 
715 Sir Kenneth Berrill, Obituary, The Daily Telegraph 18 May 2009.
716 Central Policy Review Staff, The Future of the British Car Industry, (London: HMSO, 1975).
717 MRC, MSS.315/C/4/1, Chrysler UK, Building the New Chrysler: The facts about the agreement with the
Government, the reasons why it was necessary and what we are going to do next, February 1976 and
PCL, Folder 692.2222, REN 27, PC 669, OS, Linwood Car Plant, Vol. 1, Scottish Daily Express,
November 19/ 1975.
718 Tessa Blackstone & William Plowden, Inside the Think Tank: Advising the Cabinet, 1971-1983, (London:
Mandarin, 1990), p. 137.
200
cent of its production in 1975.719 If Chrysler withdrew, the potential losses of £150 million
from the Iran contract and increased foreign imports of cars from Japan would have had an
impact on the already high deficit on the balance of payments.720 As the Iran contract was
with the Chrysler Corporation, the parent company was in a position to exert a certain
degree of leverage on the government.721 Closure would also have had a noticeable effect
on rising unemployment with the addition of the 25,000 Chrysler workforce made
redundant and subsequent redundancies in the supply and distribution industries amounting
to an estimated total of 55,000 unemployed.722
Closure meant 7000 of those redundancies would have been at the Linwood plant
and coincided, with not only a surge in support for the Scottish National Party, but the
formation of the Scottish Labour Party by two Labour MPs, Sillars and Robertson, in
opposition to the Government’s White Paper, Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to
Scotland and Wales, published on the 27 November 1975.723 The Scottish Daily Express
reported on rumours of resignation of Scottish Secretary of State, Willie Ross and
Secretary of State for Industry, Eric Varley, over the Chrysler talks. Allowing for a certain
degree of bias as well as journalistic licence, the newspaper warned of the potential
ramifications of Linwood closure drawn to the government’s attention by Willie Ross:
unless it started a rescue operation which would preserve at least part of the
Linwood workforce, Scotland would be handed on a platter to the Nationalists.724
Crucially, formal production of North Sea Oil had started on the 3rd November 1975. As
noted at the time by the economist Gavin McCrone, the income from North Sea Oil could
sustain an independent Scotland with a balance of payments that would enable its economy
to, ‘break out of the “stop-go” cycle and plan a sustained rate of growth’.725 Written in
1974 and submitted to the Cabinet on 23 April 1975, for the Department of Trade and
Industry it confirmed the revenue expectations from North Sea Oil.  Such was the fear of
rising Scottish nationalism that the document remained secret (until February 2006)
because the political security of the Labour Party in the central belt of Scotland was
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already destabilised by the threat of constitutional change from rising nationalism
following the ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil’ campaign by the SNP prior to the general election in
October 1974.  The threat to Labour’s political security in Scotland could have intensified
with the closure of the Linwood plant in an area heavily affected by industrial decline.
At the time of the negotiations between the Government and Chrysler, a joint union
delegation of shop stewards and staff representatives produced a document, Chrysler’s
Crisis: The Worker’s Answer [sic] that was submitted to the Government, in which they
detailed the problems with Chrysler UK and outlined a three-stage rescue operation. The
document accepted that there was over-capacity in the UK car industry and related it to
over-production of cars in the same range. The shop stewards offered a solution to this
over-capacity and suggested it could be used to build commercial and specialised vehicles
such as buses, off-road vehicles, tractors, heavy vehicles that would be of benefit
especially in the ‘Third World’. Suggestions were made, for example, to transfer some of
the production at British Leyland, of Land Rover type vehicles for which there was a long
export waiting list, to the Ryton paint shop, although this would require adapting the paint
shop from the electrostatic technique to paint on aluminium. With foresight, the shop
stewards noted the importance of ecological and environmental considerations and urged
the company to concentrate on the development of new vehicles.  However, the following
introduction in the document gives an idea of the workers’ perception of their role in
planning for the future of the company:
Discussions and decisions about the future of Chrysler (UK) have been taking place
behind closed doors. Those most directly affected (the workers, their families and
their shop stewards) have been shut out from even meeting Riccardo ------ in spite
of the company’s blaze of publicity about more “worker participation” as recently
as May of this year. 726
This was a document based on feasibility using information gathered from the various
branch plants and showed commitment to the long-term future of the company.  Yet as
noted, during the process of negotiations in the winter of 1975 union officials were not
invited to participate in talks or offer solutions until a rescue package had been agreed
between Chrysler and Government.727 The unions were simply asked to agree to the
principles of the Rescue Plan so were essentially issued with an ultimatum rather than
afforded involvement in any form of negotiation. The main worry for the Government was
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the reaction of the workforce to the agreed redundancies identified in the plan. Employees
were left to speculate on the future of their jobs. In December 1975, Linwood was on a
three-day week, with no start date following the Christmas holidays and rumours of a
pullout circulated bolstered by Riccardo’s reported statements in the press. Despite the
agreement in principle of the EPP, there was no employee participation at such a crucial
stage for Chrysler UK either at national or plant level.
On 17 December a Rescue Plan was agreed of £162.5 million in grants, loans and
guarantees as well as a strategy for Chrysler UK viability into the 1980s. It included a
commitment to meet half the potential losses of £40 million in 1976, £40 million in 1977,
£30 million in 1978 and £20 million in 1979, as well as a loan of £55 million to finance
capital expenditure on plant and model development. The necessary rationalisation of the
car plants was to be at the expense of 9000 jobs of which 3000 were to be at Linwood.728
The Rescue Plan was contentious because investment in a company of tenuous long-term
viability could not be reconciled with the criteria for assistance in the Government’s new
White Paper, Approach to Industrial Strategy, published on 5 November 1975. With the
onset of Planning Agreement negotiations between the Government and Chrysler, Michael
Heseltine, at that time MP for Henley, drew attention to the contradiction between rhetoric
and reality in the Government’s industrial strategy in the following quotation from the
White Paper:
By and large, profitability and return on capital, measured in financial terms,
remain the best prima facie indicator of an industry’s or company’s efficiency in
using resources.729
 He further noted that under the heading, ‘Assessment of Viability’:
An assessment of viability is a matter of facts, figures and commercial judgement
in which wider economic and social factors have no part to play. 730
Using these criteria Chrysler UK was a weak company and its viability untenable. It is
feasible to suggest that the Government anticipated a growth in Chrysler’s profitability
indicated by the reduction in estimated losses over the four-year period of the Rescue Plan.
However, the company’s rationalisation plan involved greater focus on assembly rather
than the more profitable manufacturing side of the industry in plants such as Ryton where
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the Alpine was assembled using component parts manufactured by Simca in France and
only a third of its capacity. At the time the UK was in the depth of a recession and had
experienced an unprecedented rise in inflation to 29.6 per cent in August 1975731 falling to
25.2 per cent in the December.732 The Government was relying heavily on North Sea Oil to
redress the deficit in its Balance of Payments but the full effect of that revenue would not
have been felt until the early 1980s, thus it is conceivable that financial assistance of
Chrysler UK was political expediency. The motivations for the transactions between the
Government and the Chrysler Corporation that produced the Rescue Plan for Chrysler UK
may well have been reactive intervention to the convergence of these economic and
political events.
4.4.7 Planning Agreement Working Party: New Chrysler – ‘new attitudes’
A central component of the Rescue Plan was the development of a Planning Agreement
with the Government, the formulation of which commenced on 5 January 1976.733 Its
scope covered company strategy between 1976 and 1979. The broad objectives were to
rationalise production in the UK, improve the market share of the company as well as
attitudes among the workforce, perceived as crucial to improving industrial relations and
dealing with productivity and quality. It also included a commitment to consultation with
employee representatives on employment levels and productivity. No finance would be
provided until the rescue plan was ‘agreed in principle’ by the trade unions.734 The
Government loan of £55 million to finance capital expenditure on plant and model
development as well as a £35 million guaranteed bank loan was on condition of a
‘Certificate of Progress’ that verified the company’s collaboration with the workforce in
future planning and strategy discussions.735 Government documentation identified the
potential benefits of the Planning Agreement in dealing with symptoms labelled as the
‘British disease’: attitudes, productivity, quality and industrial relations. It outlined the
requirements for ‘meaningful consultation’ that required of management ‘a readiness to
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disclose to union representation a substantial amount of information of a planning
nature’.736
The formulation of the Planning Agreement Working Party (hereafter PAWP),
suggests that Chrysler management had adopted a pluralistic approach to its interactions
with the shop floor. The PAWP comprised four sub-committees that negotiated on a
national level: Sales and Product, Sourcing and Manufacturing Facilities, Finance,
Employment and Productivity. On each sub-committee there were three senior
management figures representing centralised management at Whitley and four employee
representatives, albeit union representatives from the branches. Following consultations at
sub-committee level a report was produced for the PAWP as a whole to discuss the
recommendations or resolve arising dilemmas. The four sub-committees focused on a
different set of issues and in the constitution of the PAWP the company stipulated a
specific objective for each committee as detailed below:
1. Sales and Product – To devise a product timing chart and sales and export
forecasts.
2. Sourcing and manufacturing – To produce capital plans, relative to sources,
facilities and transport, for each plant.
3. Employment and Productivity – To issue plans for manning levels, training
programmes and a ‘code of practice’.
4. Finance – To develop a programme of capital investment including projected
sales revenue, overheads and tax.737
Whereas previous plant-based joint consultation had tended to focus on operational
management issues, this brief outline on the scope of each committee suggests that the
areas for discussion between employee representatives and management were
comprehensive and include managerial relations as defined by Fox. For the workers access
to planning information and influence on the decision-making commercial strategies of
Chrysler UK marked a significant development in the company’s industrial relations
strategy. Prior to the PAWP the great uncertainty about the future of Chrysler operations in
the UK was exacerbated by limited communication between management and shop floor
on strategy and long-term planning. The inclusion of employee representatives on the
working party suggests a major shift in the interactions between management and
workforce at the Linwood plant.
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The nature of participation was discussed on establishment of the PAWP.  An
information booklet distributed to employees use terms such as ‘New Chrysler’ and ‘new
attitudes’ and emphasised a change in the industrial relations strategy of the company.
Involving employee representatives in planning decisions necessitated ‘taking into account
not only the interests of all sides but using the information and ideas of all of them too’.738
Yet, at the third meeting of the PAWP in June 1976 the employee representatives criticised
the format of sub-committee meetings which they described as question and answer
sessions. Within the terms of the PAWP constitution the company did provide information
however; the representatives stated this was essentially little more than ‘reiteration of the
Government plan with which they are already familiar’.739 The contention arose because
although Chrysler management adhered to the aim of the PAWP, to facilitate ‘a real
exchange of ideas and proposals’ to ensure government endorsement of the Planning
Agreement740, the role of the employee representatives in the decision process was to
sanction ‘plans presented by Chrysler as a fait accompli’.741 Chrysler management
attributed the problem in its interaction with the employee representatives as being unused
to this new concept in industrial relations and the inadequate briefing of management
representatives involved.
At the time of the planning agreement the Linwood Toolroom capacity was a key
‘interest’ among the workforce and a recurrent issue in PAWP meetings from September
1976. A brief examination of management’s response to meaningful discussion on this
issue reveals much about Chrysler’s motivations. At Linwood, by the early 1970s the
Linwood Toolroom had been phased-out resulting in 200 redundancies.742 The
Manufacturing and Sourcing Sub-Committee raised the issue of the Toolroom at the
September PAWP meeting and a failure to agree was recorded.  Management disagreed
with the full-capacity use of the Toolroom due to quality issues at Linwood, cyclical labour
requirements, and that it was more cost effective to sub-contract tooling work than to re-
establish the Toolroom.743 This issue was raised again at a meeting in December 1976 and
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became a recurrent issue on the agenda of meetings in early 1977 if only due to employee
representatives raising the matter, rather than any decisions achieved.744 The
Manufacturing and Sourcing Sub-Committee commented that an investigation would need
to take place, into the capability of the Linwood Toolroom. The company could not afford
delays in tooling and management representatives commented that, ‘Chrysler Europe lack
confidence in Linwood Toolroom’s ability to reliably meet dates’, thus the decisions on
Linwood was postponed.745 The Toolroom was due to be reviewed at the end of 1977
however, the company announced in the July PAWP meeting, that the company was
undertaking a report on European standards and requirements, and only when this report
was finalised would the PAWP have the opportunity to consult this report and then come
to a decision on Linwood.746 Company reservations about quality and productivity at
Linwood were raised in other PAWP meetings. On the one hand it is understandable that
the Chrysler was hesitant about investment in re-establishment of the Toolroom, equally so
that it would wish to investigate European standards given increasing rationalisation. On
the other hand the refusal to make a decision on Linwood could also be viewed as a
delaying tactic until after the signing of the first planning Agreement in March 1976.
There was undoubtedly some overlap on the issues discussed at sub-committee
meetings and plant committees. Potential tension was recorded in one of the early meetings
of the Employment and Productivity Sub-Committee. The focus of this committee was to
identify causes of poor labour utilisation and provide suggestions for improvement.747 An
employee representative, Phillip James from the Linwood plant, would not participate fully
in the discussion on labour utilisation or procedure recommendations to enable
improvement. As noted in the minutes of the meeting:
it became clear that the Linwood Representative, Mr. James was under instruction
not to participate in any form of “E.P.P.” … His particular concern, which was
shared by the Stoke Representative, was that of infringing on the rights of the Plant
Union Committees.748
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James draws attention to the motivations for inclusion of senior shop stewards at this level
in the management structure of the company. It suggests the potential for a clash of interest
for the employee representatives with their role on plant union committees. In the first
meeting of the PAWP the company gave assurances that the remit of the working party
was in planning decisions and was not in a position to countermand the authority of plant
union committees.749
Notably, a caveat in the PAWP constitution on sub-committee procedures
prohibited the employee representatives involved in the working party from discussion on
the content of the meetings with the workforce. Instead the agreed procedure was to
produce a bulletin after each meeting containing information cleared for release to the
workforce.750 In addition there was no provision for formal arrangements on the PAWP for
employee representatives to discuss shop floor input to the Planning Agreement.751 As
minutes of meetings could not be circulated on the shop floor, nor the proceedings
discussed, this not only compromised the position of the employee representatives as shop
stewards, but the selective areas of consultation on the sub-committees presented the
potential for a conflict of interest for the employee representatives.
For the Linwood branch-plant, the provision of an in-house facility to refurbish
tools or re-tool for new products meant the re-establishment of the Toolroom to full
capacity was important.  In Chryslers Crisis: The Workers [sic] Answer, produced in
December 1975, the re-establishment of the Linwood Toolroom was outlined in the
suggested rescue operation.752 Thus, it is likely that the company was aware that this was
an issue that would require attention in any planning agreement.  As noted earlier, the
government only agreed to provide investment on the condition that the management and
workers worked together to devise the planning agreement. Chrysler UK could not risk the
planning agreement failing on the basis of the Linwood Toolroom and so it appears
delayed any decision on this area until after the first agreement was signed. In fact, no
agreement was ever reached on the Toolroom. This example highlights an agenda driven
by centralised management that rendered the shop stewards and unions impotent in the
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mechanisms of participation, thereby marginalising the status of the factory workers
process.
After eleven months of consultation the first Planning Agreement was signed on the
8th March 1977 between Managing Director, George Lacy and Secretary of State for
Industry, Eric Varley. Upon signing, George Lacy championed the improved
communication through the PAWP and of the ‘opportunity for the employees’
representatives to become fully involved in the planning process’.753 After the first
planning agreement the company moved Arrow production to Dublin without consulting
the UK workforce.754 Following the signing the company moved its Arrow car production
to its subsidiary in Dublin without consultation with the UK workforce. The employee
representatives were only able to comment on this strategy after the company had made the
decision. Similarly, the company announced that, following the launch of the Avenger in
mid-1976, the introduction of another new model scheduled for production at Linwood
would potentially have a ‘disruptive effect’ on continuity of production and so decided that
it should be manufactured at Ryton. The U-turn on this planning issue meant that the
reduction in models produced at Linwood, in preparation for the new model, continued as
planned but without any contingence to maintain the level of work at the Linwood plant.
The company advised that a second new car would be introduced in the 1980s but did not
provide the employee representatives on the PAWP with any information on the timing of
the introduction or type of car.755 It is clear from the minutes of the January meeting in
1978 that the employee representatives on the PAWP were not included in any
consultation procedure regarding this planning arrangement but were instead informed of
the changes once the decisions had been made.
The response of the union Chairman, John Carty, was disappointment in the
communication of this issue and accused the company of ‘deviating’ from the Planning
Agreement. Management’s response was that the shift was ‘merely a change to the basic
manufacturing source’.756 However, this decision impacted on the overall number of
models being produced at Linwood as detailed in the Planning Agreement, therefore the U-
turn had implications for the long-term viability of the plant. These actions highlight that
the rhetoric of consultation could not counter the prevalence of unitary attitudes amidst
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Chrysler management. Decisions made by Chrysler UK management were introduced with
disregard for the conditions of the Planning Agreement. It is feasible that Chrysler avoided
consultation with the employee representatives in the knowledge that the response of the
workers they represented on circulation of the decision would ensure this was pre-empted
and met with firm resistance. The failure to discuss and negotiate joint decisions obviated
the role of employee representatives in decision-making at the plant.
By 1978 both management and workforce attributed improvements in industrial
relations, including an 80 per cent reduction in lost hours, to the planning agreements that
the company had approved in consultation with the unions and government:
The planning agreements have contributed to the incredible drop in stoppages…this
type of dialogue has in my view engendered a better relationship.757 (Peter
Griffiths, Deputy Managing Director Chrysler UK)
Similarly the AEUW Convenor at Linwood, stated:
I certainly think the planning agreements are contributing … giving trade union
people a better understanding about what Chrysler is trying to do.758
Given the apparent lack of communication in the branch plant in the early 1970s, the
PAWP may appear as having been a radical change in company communications with the
workforce and by association industrial relations. Aside from the publicity and the many
bulletins informing the workforce on aspects of the planning agreement, the minutes of the
meetings reveal a different picture of the Planning Agreement in practice. The company
was seen to be promoting structures of consultation and improved communication between
the workforce and management but this was selective.
Although many aspects of the EPP outlined above were never implemented, the
aim had been to introduce participation throughout all levels of the workforce, which
included plans for conferences and briefing meetings at the plants carried out by the
Managing Director, as well as quarterly company bulletins and improving
communications. But Management documentation relating to its strategy of ‘Participative
Management’ points to the inability of management to fully endorse organisational
pluralism in the plant and contributes to an understanding of the inadequacies in the
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Planning Agreement.759 In a company document containing speeches from a Linwood
Branch-Plant Communication Meeting held at Linwood, on 27 February 1976, the Chrysler
UK Industrial Relations Manager Peter Griffiths acknowledged that the new style of
management may be difficult:
Some of you, perhaps, will find participative management difficult to understand
and harder still in practice to accommodate.760
By implication this acknowledges that the new style of management required a distinct
change in attitudes and practice. However, closer inspection of the company
documentation from the Communication Meeting points to the apparent contradiction and
difficulties in the company’s participation strategy.
Management perceived communication and consultation to be at the centre of this
new style of ‘Participative Management’, in particular direct communication with all levels
of the workforce. The slides used in the communication meeting compare the old and new
styles of management at the plant. For instance:
Before:
Management decision understood – Questioned – perhaps disobeyed.
Employee uninformed or wrongly informed of management objectives.
Conflict follows.
After:
Decision discussed – questions answered – Joint agreement sought.
Employees informed of facts and objectives.
Less chance of conflict.761
These slides highlight the persistence of unitary values present within pluralist forms of
industrial relations as conflict is attributed to misunderstandings of the company aim and
poor communication. The aim of communication strategies was not therefore, to facilitate
greater employee involvement in decision-making but rather, if channels of
communication were improved this would ensure a compliant workforce. There is little
recognition of the divergent interests of labour and capital within this viewpoint; little
accommodation for challenges to the decisions of management. Chrysler’s aims in
‘Participative Management’ are evidenced in one of the earliest slides entitled
                                                 
759 FAI, Papers of Cliff Lockyer, Box 7, 1976: Communication Meeting, Linwood 27 February 1976.
760 FAI, Papers of Cliff Lockyer, Box 7, 1976: Communication Meeting, Linwood 27 February 1976.
761 FAI, Papers of Cliff Lockyer, Box 7, 1976: Communication Meeting, Linwood 27 February 1976.
211
‘Participation, A New Basis for Managerial Authority’. This slide is further useful when
considering the motivations of Chrysler UK management in exploring various participation
strategies. In particular three statements stand out:
The balance of power has changed away from established authority to organised
labour.
A company consists of groups with conflicting aims, common objectives difficult,
sometimes impossible, to establish.
But a congruence of purpose must be established - if continuing conflict is to
cease.762
From this slide a complex yet somewhat contradictory picture emerges. First of all, the
motivations of management are clearly identifiable as relating to a loss of managerial
authority. On one level this saw management turn to a pluralist participation agenda in
order to ensure continuity of production and to meet productivity targets. Management
appeared to acknowledge the differing interest groups within the firm. However, on
another level, implicit in this slide is the notion that the different interests groups can have
a common goal. The evidence from this slide points to a participation strategy whereby
management could work to reassert control in the plant and in no way balance the authority
of labour and capital in decision-making.
In June 1978, two years after the introduction of the Planning Agreement Peter
Griffiths, then Managing Director of Chrysler UK, indicated that the input to the PAWP
meetings was heavily weighted towards management and issued the prophetic fallacy:
‘99% comes from the management side “but it will improve”’.763 There was little time for
improvements; in May 1978 the Chrysler Corporation had already begun formal
negotiations on the sale of its European operations with the French company PSA Peugeot
Citroen. The company omitted to consult the workforce at every level, or indeed the
government, upon the takeover on 10 August 1978.764 Chrysler’s disregard of the
conditions of the rescue agreement proved frustrating for politicians such as Tony Benn,
who claimed to have said to the Cabinet Committee (Economic Strategy):
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In 1976, in what was supposed to be a planning agreement, Chrysler gave us
assurances, in exchange for funds, that they would stay in Britain. Now we’re
supposed to just hand the company over to Peugeot.765
The situation was a fait accompli for Eric Varley, Secretary of State for Industry. Despite
entering into negotiations with trade unions and exploring the possibility of a British
Leyland merger with Chrysler UK, eventually he was forced to concede to the takeover
agreed on 28 September.
Within source material related to the PAWP, there are continual references to
management and employee representatives working together and of consultation. However
there is a significant distinction between involvement and influence.766 Despite advocating
a commitment to employee ‘participation’ in the planning process there is limited evidence
to suggest the Planning Agreement actually provided anything more than company
information – albeit the employee representatives received it first-hand. The omission of
major decisions from PAWP negotiations points to ‘participative management’ as a style
of management underpinned by an unstable coexistence between company, employee
representatives and workforce. At this stage in the plant’s ownership the rhetoric of
‘participation’ by Chrysler management on the PAWP was use to placate the employee
representatives long enough to satisfy the government’s conditions of the Rescue Plan:
investment on evidence of joint consultation.
4.5 PSA Takeover: ‘Any strikes and we’ll move out’
In August 1978 attempts were made to protect the British subsidiaries of PSA through a
commitment obtained from the company in the form of a Declaration of Intent, adapted
from the earlier Chrysler version of January 1976. Clauses within the Declaration
advocated a commitment to integrate Chrysler UK into the PSA operations and a guarantee
that the UK subsidiaries would be in a position to supply component parts throughout PSA
as well as a commitment to employment.767 In an information booklet that was delivered to
the workforce, it was detailed that within the UK subsidiaries ‘There will be a smooth
transition [to PSA ownership] with no major changes to management organisation’.768
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Intended to reassure the workforce, it promoted a commitment to continuity of the Chrysler
style of management and employee involvement, ‘CUK [Chrysler UK] will continue to
work with its employees on the basis of employee participation to improve productivity
and long-term performance’.769 Despite these assurances there was some cause for alarm in
that PSA structured its operations in a tripartite fashion with three distinct product ranges
of Peugeot, Citroen and Talbot. From 1979 the Chrysler UK operations ran as Talbot. For a
workforce that had experienced a diminishing input into the global market under Chrysler
it is understandable that this may have been viewed with some scepticism as a deliberate
attempt to sideline the British subsidiaries, preventing greater integration with the
European operations.
Upon takeover the Linwood workforce was informed that improvements had to be
made to both productivity and quality.770 Furthermore the plant was promised a new
model.771 However, shortly after takeover it was becoming apparent to the workforce that
the Linwood plant was unlikely to feature in the long-term strategy of the multinational
management. A sense of the inevitable closure of Linwood is revealed in the oral
testimonies of former Linwood employees:
well ah think we all knew the writin was on the wall anyway, long before they
announced it, cos ehm, ah didnae see anythin happening … ah think we knew when
PSA was takin over that the writin was on the wall for Linwood. Ah don’t know
what other, the people thought but me personally, ah thought it was, that it was
finished.772
Ye knew they were away because, there wis things on the telly at that time, it was
even tellin ye on the telly at that time the British cars werenae sellin…that’s when
aw the Hondas were startin tae come.773
A new model promised for Linwood never materialised and that from the time of the PSA
takeover there were redundancies and short-time working throughout the Talbot group. At
Linwood, October 1979 saw the announcement of 1550 redundancies with a further 1300
in June 1980.774 Thus to all extents and purposes it may well have seemed that the plant
was being run down and that there were clear indications that PSA did not intend to
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continue production at Linwood. Indeed what is interesting from the commitment to
providing employment in the PSA Declaration of Intent was that it was based on the caveat
that this was ‘to the extent consistent with prevailing economic conditions’.775 In the end
PSA did in fact attribute the closure of Linwood to larger macroeconomic problems.
Following losses of £91 million in 1980, Peugeot’s first experience of financial loss since
1945, the decision was taken on 11 February 1981 to close the Linwood branch plant.776 In
a letter to Strathclyde Regional Council PSA explained that ‘A combination of difficult
market conditions in the U.K. coupled with a big fall in exports, caused by the high level of
sterling, has made it impossible for the Talbot motor to continue the operation of the
Linwood plant’.777
Bain and Lockyer argued that despite the continuation of the Planning Agreement,
plant management at Linwood had little influence on parent company strategy relating to
the branch plant, and alongside the unions did not hold positions of influence with the
MNC.778 Regardless of the aforementioned warning signs that the plant may close the
announcement appears to have come as a surprise to some workers; on the level of the
senior stewards due to the continuation of the PAWP and on the shop floor as productivity
at the plant had been improving and there were fewer industrial relations problems. The
introduction of a new pay agreement at Linwood in July 1979 may have produced an
optimistic response to the PSA takeover. This agreement was dissimilar to the productivity
bargaining of the 1960s and early 1970s in that it was not based on achieving productivity
increases. Marsden et al., note that by the early 1980s, throughout the UK operations,
Talbot had been able to utilise a period of adverse market conditions in the late 1970s to
achieve productivity improvements of forty per cent by ensuring ‘continuous working, and
the elimination of what they call “petty” disputes, unofficial relief time, late starts and
early finishes, as well as tighter manning assignments’.779
At Linwood, the 1979 wage agreement introduced a new common grading
structure, brought about the final pay increase to bring parity throughout the Talbot
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operations and also a five and a half per cent pay rise for all work grades.780 With the
benefit of hindsight it appears that this may have been a very effective strategy for
placating a weakened labour movement, especially as the management had made it clear
that it would not tolerate industrial action. The Talbot Action Committee (hereafter TAC),
which was a collective of shop stewards set up to lead the fight against closure, commented
in response to George Turnbull, Managing Director of Chrysler UK then Talbot:
He asked for extra production – he got it – we kept our part of the bargain – did he
keep his – perhaps the wrong people are going!!781
This attitude is reflected in the oral testimonies:
so when Peugeot took it over, the first month they made their target and then the
second month we made our bonuses and we’d never had bonuses in all the time we
were there so that’s why ah couldnae understand why they shut the place because,
there was never a strike when Peugeot took it over, no strikes whatsoever because
they warned em “Any strikes and we’ll move out.” But within two years of them
takin over they shut the place down.782
A mixture of factors influencing closure is in evidence within the oral testimonies.
However, many interviewees felt that labour relations had improved under Peugeot as had
levels of production and wages. Therefore, this led to the accusation of asset-stripping such
as within the TAC report on Linwood which was reminiscent of the document produced
under Chrysler management, Chrysler’s Crisis the Workers [sic] Answer, where the MNC
was accused of asset stripping and taking advantage of government funding while running
down the Linwood Plant. It was a sentiment reflected in Rodger McGuiness’ testimony:
Peugeot was to blame for its closure because if you’re making bonuses then that
means that they’re making money and there were never a strike. If there were
strikes then ah’d say “right, fair enough, you did warn us. Shut the place, we’ve got
ourselves to blame… When we heard about that it was just the machinery they
wanted, they didnae want the staff, not from day one did they want Linwood, that
was it, they wanted the work shop, they wanted the paint shop, they wanted these
bits of Linwood. It was like strippin a factory down; you take what you want of it
and get rid o the rest.783
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Therefore, from the oral testimonies and shop floor documentary evidence there is an
awareness of the power of MNCs to utilise the branch plant labour force, take advantage of
favourable economic conditions, as well as government investment as it suited its
organisational strategy but ultimately the Linwood branch plant was expendable regardless
of the performance of the plant.
In many of the oral testimonies, the interviewees linked the closure of Linwood
back to the original regional policy decision that denied Rootes an IDC to expand its
operations in the Midlands:
A lot of people say the unions closed Linwood. I don’t believe that. When the
French took over the company was producing a lot of cars, on time, good quality.
To me it was a political thing, Peugeot-Citroen is still a successful company … the
problem with Linwood was geography.784
And ah always remember the chap, the chairman of PSA from France, a chap called
John Paul Parayre who came over and he, the exact words he used in the board
room was “this is the first and the last time you will ever see me here.” Thinking
wurselves “oh well we’re gonnae be all right” ye know. But, ah think it was two
months later they announced that it was not viable, geographically, for Linwood to
be here. Ah think they blamed the workers but, in fairness, ah think the
management overall, the seven years ah was there management eh, had quite a bit
tae blame for what happened eh, the escalated strikes.785
The ‘handicaps of geography’ mentioned at the official opening of Linwood, by Lord
Rootes, proved difficult to overcome. However, as is suggested in the above excerpt there
were numerous contingent factors influencing the closure, including industrial relations,
the economic climate and this also should be considered within the context of the
intentions of Peugeot SA in purchasing Chrysler UK. The irony being that as industrial
relations had improved and parity finally achieved, closure was announced.
4.6 Conclusion: Polarity between Rhetoric and Reality
The focus in this chapter has been the interactions between successive managements and
workforce at the Linwood car plant and the significance of political economy. Attention
was drawn to initiatives such as inclusion of unions through shop stewards in the structures
of management and the EEP and PAWP that were introduced to reconcile organisational
pluralism with unitary policies by giving the worker a ‘voice’ within the branch plants,
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promoting the sense of collaboration and encouraging a willingness to increased
commitment to productivity. Management in successive companies at the Linwood plant
devised strategies based on consultative arrangements and facilitated communication.  The
inclusion of shop stewards, many considered to be militant by the company, functioned to
manipulate the power relations between management and workforce to persuade
employees that there was equity in the interactions between the two groups, motivating
workforce compliance in managerial decisions. These processes of consultation and
decision-making occurred within the context of unequal power relations and as such
sustained the asymmetry of influence between management and employee representatives
contribution to decision-making strategies at the Linwood plant. Such schemes were
transitory in nature and a means by which management contained the power of labour
rather than being a demonstration of a sustained commitment to worker influence in
decision-making.786
Firms managing Linwood had to not only negotiate periods of difficult industrial
relations, but the shift towards more interventionist economic management from the late
1940s meant greater interaction between government and industry as successive
governments sought to control inflation.787 Therefore, while the actions of management at
Linwood point to a managerial strategy that was driven by, ‘a continual search for control
of the shop floor organisation and to redefine the bargaining structure and agenda to meet
production needs’, the political economy was also an influential factor in the nature of
management.788 The search for control was a dialectic process in which the interaction
between the firms that owned the Linwood car plant, the government, the economy and the
labour force, all served to shape management rhetoric and practice.
The interactions between management and workers at the Linwood plant explored
in this chapter reveal a dichotomy between the rhetoric and reality of industrial democracy.
Information asymmetries persisted that facilitated the flow of information from the shop
floor to senior management, with little or no consideration of the worker’s ‘voice’, and
used to enforce the best conditions for the company’s profitability. Despite democratic
rhetoric, employee involvement schemes and participatory management functioned within
the structural control of management and did little to disturb the hierarchical structure of
power relations. Hence, shop floor representatives were rendered impotent by their
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resigned compliance in consultation processes of involvement with little or no influence.  It
was a dialectic process where transactions between management and workforce appeared
as tokenism. Consequently, there were no significant changes in company policies to
accommodate worker or government demands for greater commitment to industrial
democracy.
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Source:  http://www.scran.ac.uk
Accessed 1 September 2009.
Workers casting votes outside the Rootes Linwood factory.
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Chapter Five
Structures of Authority: Compliance and Coercion
5. 1 Linwood Lives: David Crawford
Ma initial thoughts on the plant were it was a great, great place to work. A lot of
good companionships but [pause] ah’ve been told we went into the car, car business
it was not as, it was a happy enough time then but there was a lot of politics then an
you’ve heard various stories about the, the strike for this and the strike for that.
There was a lot a, silly, silly things. But the management were not eh blameless
either. Ah can quote ye an instance where, ah was goin up the road, one night. … a
fella who worked in production control at the other side came over an we’re
speakin in the car park for a minute. An he said, “David, don’t bring any pieces
[sandwiches] wi ye in the morning.” Ah said, “what ye talkin aboot?” “Awe” he
said, “they’ll be up the road by ten o’clock.” Ah says, “ah never heard anything
aboot it”. He says, “we have no power train”, the power train … was a thing that
wis sent up from Coventry, it eh powered, it powered the, the motor. He says,
“there’s been a, there’s trouble down in Coventry an’ they cannae get any o’ these
parts, we’ve run out o’ them. We’re gonnae run out tommorra at nine o’clock an we
cannae get anymore for a week.” So he says, “they’ll have them up the road”. An as
sure as fate, ah went in in the morning an’ says tae ma, ma fellow, by this time ah
was a foreman inspector, tae ma colleagues, “Ah hear we’ll, they’ll be up the road.”
“Auch nonsense” they says, “nonsense.” Low and behold, they were. Next thing we
knew, Trim shop, which ah also worked in for a wee while, they were away oot on
strike. It turned out, it was a [pause] a case had been pending of a, of a guy
urinatin’ outside at the other end o the building’. An he’d been called over to the
personnel three weeks or so before it, this instance. An this case was pending. An
they knew … if they put this bloke up the road, his mates would go with him. An
that’s exactly what happened. That was only one instance a think. There was a lot o
times when, ye were sure that the strikes were manufactured but eh, couldnae prove
it. That instance we could.789
David Crawford worked for the inspection department from 1954, initially with Pressed
Steel, until the closure of the plant in 1981. Throughout his period of employment at
Linwood he worked in many different areas of the car plant and was also promoted to
inspection foreman therefore became a member of staff. In the above excerpt Crawford
constructs a narrative in which strikes occurred for ‘silly’ reasons. This explanation for
strike activity is repeated later in his testimony and reflects a dominant popular narrative
about Linwood, namely that strikes occurred over seemingly petty and insignificant
issues.790 Crawford’s reference to one of the dominant discourses suggests his narrative is
constructed in relation to the ‘cultural circuit’.791 That is not to say there is a lack of agency
in the construction of his testimony: he states that many strikes were ‘silly’, but
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demonstrates awareness of a complex variety of issues and influences operating at
Linwood and constructs explanations for poor industrial relations.
In the above testimony Crawford makes a linkage between ‘silly’ reasons and strikes,
which he attributed to a shortage of component parts, without which car bodies in the
mechanical engineering blocks on the North Side could not be transferred along the track
to the South Side for finishing and inspection. Two key points arise here; first, structural
factors such as breaks in the supply chain were significant impediments in the continuity of
production, exacerbated by the reliance on components parts from for example, Chrysler’s
Coventry plant and secondly, the causal role of management in strikes. Crawford’s
narrative highlights the need to look beneath the prevalent reasons for strikes and
stoppages at the plant that are usually attributed to union militancy and a politically
motivated shop steward system. This thesis asserts that inherent tensions existed at the
Linwood plant that sustained a prevalent undercurrent of potential for disputes, which
could be exploited by management and workforce. Hence, the chapter will advance the
examination of power relations discussed in Chapter Four by extrapolating the layering of
causes and significance of the wider context in which industrial action occurred,
considered here from the shop floor up.
5.2 Main Themes
Among the central power relationships in industrial society are those between workers and
management. As a consequence of post-war economic growth, full employment in the
1960s provided the context for a shift in power relations in favour of labour. A dominant
narrative at the time attributed economic problems to industrial relations including the
growth of the shop steward system, ‘unofficial’ strikes and union militancy driven by pay
disputes and resistance to new technology that hampered the productivity of British
industry.792 In the Royal Commission survey undertaken as part of The Donovan
Commission reporting in 1968, it was noted that shop steward power, in the context of
post-war full employment, had resulted in fragmented workplace bargaining. Such
bargaining occurred alongside union officials and employers’ organisations, resulting in
both formal and informal systems of industrial relations co-existing ‘in conflict’.793
Subsequently, the trend toward worker representation, not necessarily determined by union
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demarcation, gave rise to a shop steward system that began to function independently of
union backing and affected the power balance within the labour movement.
Full employment coupled with fragmented bargaining meant that in the 1960s
strikes became endemic in the motor industry with fifty-five per cent of major strikes
attributed to wage disputes.794 A corollary was identified between the development of
independent shop steward systems and the proliferation of unofficial and unconstitutional
strikes that heightened tensions in industrial relations in the industry.795 Beynon posed that,
as many of the struggles faced by shop stewards were related to the ‘effort-bargain’,
namely control over the job, dismissals and discipline, as opposed to wage demands, this
could be perceived as evidence of political motivations among the shop stewards that
reflected, ‘the potential for a grass-roots, extra Parliamentary, socialist movement within
the working class’.796 However, Hutton is dismissive of this notion and argues that the
cause of much conflict that underpinned strike action can be attributed more to a desire by
workers to protect jobs and status within the industry than any belief in or commitment to a
‘class war’.797 Goldthorpe et al., identified the link between the orientation people have
towards their work and their orientation towards trade unionism. Thus leading them to
argue that for process and assembly workers, unionism provides the opportunity for
‘instrumental collectivism’ as workers use collective means to attain individual goals.798
Discussion on industrial conflict was prominent in the oral testimonies of plant
managers:
Stoppages, stoppages, stoppages, stoppages. Eh, they would stop just, just to make
the point they would have a stoppage. Not realising that the effect was quality and
the effect was lost production. And that meant there was, the company was gonnae
lose money. … so therefore, it was down tools, you know, send for the buses.799
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As well as workers:
But, the unions still, they had, they had our, they had killed the place before they
[Chrysler] even got it. They didnae have a lot o, [pause] it was a bad, bad thing fur
them. They couldnae afford it, eventually ah don’t suppose they could afford it. Ye
cannae afford strikes everyday of the year.800
These comments correlate with the dominant narrative that the Linwood plant ‘failed’
because of the militancy of employees that contributed to problematic industrial relations
and industrial disputes. 801
Current analyses of industrial relations at the plant have tended to focus on external
reasons to explain strikes, such as fluctuations in the economy and the centrally developed
style of management associated with multinationals.  Large strikes are well documented
but are often discussed within the framework of Chrysler’s entire UK operation,
summarised within the UK car industry as a whole as are reasons for stoppages.802  In the
mid 1960s it appears the majority of strikes in the motor industry lasted four hours or
less.803 It is a trend mirrored at Linwood during Rootes ownership of the plant but reflected
sectional disputes based on maintaining wage differentials. Subsequently, the Manpower
Paper Strikes in Britain, published in 1978, identified pay issues as the primary cause of
recorded strikes.804 It concluded that in an average year between 1971 and 73 only two per
cent of manufacturing plants experienced strikes large enough to be recorded by the
Department of Employment. Thus British industry was not: ‘widely or continually affected
by industrial action; it … [was] not “riddled” with strikes’.805
Albeit Strikes in Britain recognised that in large car plants there was a corollary
between the size of the plant and concentration of stoppages, two major weakness in the
analysis are: first, the recording threshold omitted stoppages of less than one-day duration
thus did not accommodate short sectional strikes within a plant.806 Secondly, such
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stoppages tended to be unofficial and unconstitutional and the document presents a
narrowly defined analysis of stoppage activity, particularly within the car industry. This
obscures behavioural trends in strike motivation that may have been particular to specific
sections within an individual plant. Such constructions diverge from the more informed
analysis of strikes pursued here, namely examination of the relative power of labour and
management to highlight the persistence of industrial as opposed to political militancy,
with strikes revolving round the organisation of production and job control.
The pattern of strikes at Linwood differed from that experienced by the car industry
in the rest of the UK as well as during Chrysler’s period of ownership, from that of its
other UK subsidiaries. It was a trend of strike activity at the plant characterised by short
strikes, often less than four hours, sectional and not directly linked to pay. In Chapter Two
attention was drawn to the number of strikes in the Scottish car industry noting three
hundred strikes between 1963 and 1969.807 Chrysler company records of annual strike
statistics from 1973 to 1975 alone show Linwood experienced 239 then 261 and 116
stoppages consecutively, of under four hours duration during this three year period,
compared to Chrysler’s Midland’s operation where the stoppages of the same duration
were 80, 106 and 54 during the same period.808 Strike statistics kept by the company show
very clearly that in comparison to the industry as a whole, at Linwood there was a
prevalence of short stoppages of fewer than four hours.809 Therefore, Linwood’s
experience of disputes was unusual in comparison to other plants owned by the company.
Strikes were driven by events on the shop floor and were likely to have been unofficial due
to the absence of a union official at the time of the strike. Many strikes were over before
there was time to obtain official union approval. Most of the strikes mentioned in the trade
union diaries (TGWU) were unofficial stoppages that lasted for less than one shift.
While the secondary literature on Linwood is limited, it is even more restricted by
the lack of detail provided on industrial organisation at the plant. It is therefore useful to
utilise a variety of trade union documentary material as well as the oral testimony to piece
together an account of the organisation of shop floor unionism in the Linwood plant. This
discussion shall begin with a brief introduction to unionisation in the industry at large and
the changing position of shop stewards, before moving onto a detailed examination of shop
steward organisation at Linwood. By doing so the discussion will consider the contested
nature of trade unionism in the plant; the role of shop stewards and recognition of their
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functioning in the plant by management and shop floor, as well as political motivations.
There were crucial differences in understanding between the stewards and management, as
well as between stewards and the workers they represented, thereby challenging the notion
of the all-powerful shop steward system. The discussion will include ‘narratives of tension’
that emerged in the oral testimonies to explore its significance in the interactions between
different groups in the Linwood plant. The main finding that emerges from this discussion
is the enduring importance of the workforce’s search for autonomy on the shop floor.
Management attempts to overcome this phenomenon through industrial relations policy
were analysed in Chapter Four of this thesis and this chapter duly reinforces how difficult
it was to restructure industrial relations in the Linwood plant through the exploration of
informal industrial relations and factors contributing to tension on the shop floor.
5.3 Multi-Unionism
The labour organisation of British car manufacturing displayed a fairly unusual pattern in
comparison to the United States and Japan where one union represented all workers, and
Western Europe where, although there could be more than one union representing car
workers, the number was limited. Within Britain the experience was that of ‘multi-
unionism’ with many unions representing different workers within the car industry. During
the 1970s the Downing Street think-tank, the CPRS identified seventeen main unions
representing workers of the car industry in the UK and asserted that this fragmentation
provoking high number of disputes over demarcation and recruitment and impacted on
continuity of production in the car industry.810
At Linwood there were at least eight unions representing the manual workforce as
well as union representation of foremen, supervisory and clerical staff by unions such as
the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff.811 In the 1960s the Transport
and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) and the National Union of Vehicle Builders
(NUVB) together represented sixty per cent of the hourly-paid employees with six other
unions, mainly representing craft workers. 812 During Chrysler’s phase of ownership the
majority of manual employees were represented by the TGWU and the Amalgamated
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Engineering Union. In the 1960s the problem of disputes related to wage claims was
compounded at Linwood, as it was for other car plants, by ‘multi-unionism’.813 For
example, a dispute in 1964 involved 270 workers staging a ‘go-slow’ as they were
dissatisfied with the unilaterally imposed bonus scheme throughout the entire plant, instead
of a bonus system agreed with the individual unions.814 It is noteworthy that in the TGWU
documents consulted, including shop steward diaries and branch minutes, there were very
few references to inter-union or demarcation disputes. The diaries consulted were in the
main from the end of the Chrysler phase of ownership and are limited in that they represent
something of a snap-shot of particular sections at that period in time.
Depicting a different scenario are sources such as the Robertson Inquiry that noted,
in the 1960s a Joint Negotiating Body could not be organised at Linwood due to ‘difficulty
between the unions’.815 Furthermore, National Union of Vehicle Builders reports highlight
that when pay negotiations broke down between management and the Amalgamated
Engineering Federation (AEF), all unions were forced to cease negotiations as these
occurred through a joint committee.816 It is conceivable that there would have been
tensions between the unions in the early years of this car plant, however by the late 1970s
there is more evidence of multi-union communication and support between unions:
Discussions have taken place with other unions on the problem of representation.
Allied Trades called a meeting with the T&G [TGWU] and wanted to know if they
could mediate and try to solve the problem they declared their position in support
of T&G.817
This is supported in testimonies of individuals such as David Crawford who asserted that
industrial relations improved at the factory as time went on. Similarly, Craig Marsden, who
worked as an industrial relations officer, suggested that there was a marked change in
industrial relations following the Robertson Court of Inquiry.818 As a result of the Inquiry
the personnel manager819 was sacked and Marsden stated that numerous convenors were
replaced and industrial relations officers employed who had either been convenors in the
factory or were convenors from other factories. He claimed this did result in a, ‘new era of
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industrial relations’ but believed this to be based in part on, ‘informal deals done between
Rootes-Chrysler … and the local trade unions’.820
Prior to the Court of Inquiry many disputes at Linwood were sectional and evolved
around systems and rates of pay based on maintaining wage differentials.821 This changed
following the Inquiry as the agreement led to a shift from:
about a hundred an eighty ish rates of pay, to five grades of pay. That distorted a lot
of historical differentials. So there was still groups, ye know, one got it, the other
one wanted it, you still had that. But basically what the company had established,
although I don’t think many people realised at the time, as flexibility of labour,
across five grades, common agreement across the twelve unions.822
So whilst inter-union rivalry did not completely disappear, greater flexibility and fewer
grades of work seem to have quelled that aspect of multi-unionism. That said there is
evidence of apathy amongst workers at the plant, in terms of participating in union activity
at both branch and shop floor level that may have been considered pointless by the
functioning of the shop steward system. Shop floor representation developed on a cross-
sectional basis. For instance, in the diaries the TGWU, stewards commented on the
behaviour of all workers in their section, including members of other unions. In addition,
shop steward notebooks from the early 1980s reveal that the unions worked together in
coordinating campaigns against redundancies and the eventual announcement of closure.823
This concurs with Clack’s study that found the important issue for stewards in mixed union
departments was not the union a worker belonged to, rather that the individual was a union
member.824 In many of the car plants strong shop steward systems operated as an
independent form of trade unionism distinct from the branch and official union control, a
form labelled as ‘parallel unionism’.825 Before exploring the position of shop stewards in
car plants it is worth investigating the level of recognition of unions by management.
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5.4 Union Recognition
The post-war period marked significant development in industrial organisation due to the
expansion of the general unions and the emergence of shop stewards. Ford management at
Halewood and Dagenham signed a Procedure Agreement in 1955 recognising the right of
workers to be members of a union, although this agreement solidified the company
intention that negotiations over wages and productivity were to be carried out with national
union officials.826 The development of trade unionism at Ford was different between
Halewood and Dagenham. According to Beynon, in the Ford Halewood plant there was a
TGWU stronghold that virtually existed as a closed shop. Although stewards were
provided with full time status from 1963 and granted other provisions such as an office,
they found their power was somewhat limited, as one steward said:
You’ve got to be requested before you can get involved in a dispute.  You can’t
initiate anything.  You’re always on the defensive.827
Management was keen to contain the power of shop stewards therefore carefully controlled
much of their activity on the shop floor. The resulting tensions over control of the shop
floor gave rise to conflict as continual short stoppages were attributed to management
refusal to negotiate with shop stewards.828 Darlington argues shop floor militancy at
Halewood was a response to the management’s strict treatment of the stewards.829 On the
other hand, at Dagenham the shop steward system developed differently due to the
existence of multi-unionism.830 As shop stewards tended to represent men in their section
who were of different unions, this led to a shop steward system independent of the unions
and increased the power of the stewards. The potential power of the shop steward system
was recognised in the Cameron Report noted in 1957, which observed that the shop-
steward system at Dagenham was in essence:
a private union within a union, enjoying immediate and continuous touch with the
men in the shop, answerable to no supervisor and in no way officially or
constitutionally linked with the union hierarchy.831
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It was a similar experience in the Linwood car plant. From its opening in 1963
Rootes recognised that every employee had the right to join a union and made union
membership compulsory. This continued throughout the Chrysler phase of ownership but
by contrast the involvement of official macro-level unionism diminished with centrally
coordinated labour management promoting micro-plant unofficial unionism. Therefore,
during the Chrysler phase of ownership, plant management sought to negotiate with shop
stewards rather than union officials. This was sustained during the Peugeot period of
ownership however, stewards at the plant believed the company to be ‘anti-union’. During
this period of ownership, the Talbot Action Committee (hereafter TAC) was formed. This
group of stewards and convenors, responsible for organising the campaign against closure,
endorsed a report to the European Trade Unionists Meeting in May 1980, which argued
that the firm was attempting to weaken trade union organisation and had refused to
‘negotiate with or communicate through the unions (Talbot, UK)’. 832 As a consequence of
the development of the shop steward system, ‘bottom-up’ workplace organisation occurred
in the British car industry, which resulted in the union officials conceding some power
over the movement.833 This trajectory will now be discussed in more detail.
From the 1960s onwards shop stewards were acknowledged as worker
representatives on the shop floor, with the number varying per section and according to the
size of the department. They were elected from within their section on site between the
November and December monthly shop stewards’ meetings. Out with that period elections
would occur upon a steward retiring or ceasing employment.834 Other industrial
organisation existed at the plant in the form of Works Councils and Works Committee.
Eleven shop representatives, from eight areas of the plant, sat on this committee with two
additional shop stewards elected on a bi-annual basis. The Works Committee met weekly
in the Convenor’s rooms and the shop representatives would hold weekly meetings of shop
stewards to relay the details of the meeting. At the Bi-Annual General Meeting held in the
union meeting room in Paisley, two sub-convenors would also be elected by the shop
stewards to represent the North and South plants at Linwood. 835
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Although this appeared to be a comprehensive structure that could enable improved
communications between management and workers, the key point here is, acknowledging
the benefit of communication with the shop floor did not always mean accommodating it.
Management sustained control over the stewards’ ability to facilitate effective
communications by the imposition of restrictions on for example, their physical movement
out of their own sections. For instance, in response to shop stewards leaving their place of
work and visiting different sections, in 1970 a company statement was issued entitled,
‘Correct Use of Facility Afforded to Union Representatives’ that began by stating:
The Company recognises the need for Unions to be adequately represented and wan
[sic] to ensure that properly elected Representatives are afforded the proper
facilities to do their job and process all matters through procedure.836
With reference to shop stewards it later states, shop stewards were:
not allowed to depart from that area [the area he represents] without the permission
of his Foreman or Manager and he is not allowed to enter or go into another area.837
Hence, shop stewards and their role on the shop floor were acknowledged, but the
functioning of that role was impeded by variables identified by the management.
Following a period of poor industrial relations the Chrysler management began
discussions with unions on working towards improved relations between the two parties.
Subsequently, a Recognition and Procedure Agreement was produced in 1971 that outlined
the expectations of each party towards each other in terms of labour organisation and
formal procedure for resolving disputes. In addition, a Joint Representative Council
(hereafter JRC) was organised that noted its purpose as being:
to enable the view of employees to be considered before decisions are taken by
management which affect the employees in their work.838
It was envisaged that this council would give workers the opportunity to contribute to
negotiations over employment conditions. The unions were supportive of this initiative and
from the TGWU alone six representatives sat on the JRC including the Convenor, two
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Sub-Convenors and three representatives from the Works Committee.839 So at a plant level
workers were represented on the JRC by shop stewards rather than branch officials.
In 1968, whilst the TGWU and the NUVB had plant branches, the AEF district
committee comprised shop stewards out with plant who could therefore influence the
actions of Linwood stewards.840 The company had begun to recognise the importance of
communicating with shop floor representatives who were more in touch with the
workforce than branch or national union officials. It was similar to changes in industrial
organisation at Ford during the 1960s, which had included the establishment of Joint
Works Committees. While the size of these committees varied according to plant size,
there was a maximum number of eight company representatives and eight shop stewards.
Election of shop stewards to the Joint Works Committee was by shop stewards from all
unions at the particular plant.841 As discussed in Chapter Four, this formed part of a
strategy by Chrysler on the withdrawal of the company from the EEF and the SEEA in
1969 to handle labour relations in-house.
The prevalence of such organisational structures suggests that Chrysler
management had acknowledged the benefit of entering into discussion on local issues with
shop stewards rather than national union officials. It pointed to a more flexible
management style promoted in the 1971 Recognition and Procedure Agreement noting that
‘Agreement will not be unreasonably withheld’.842 Similar to the Rootes’ condition of
employment, Chrysler stipulated union membership as a condition of employment at
Linwood, as it was perceived by management as the most appropriate method of dealing
with grievances.843 This flexibility extended to greater shop steward mobility and allowed
them to have meetings on site. The company provided areas to meet if a request was made
to the Industrial Relations Manager. Conscious of the importance of settling grievances
quickly, if permission was sought from their supervisor, stewards were allowed to leave
their place of work to conduct duties.
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This suggests a somewhat balanced relationship between management and shop
floor, enhanced by the rhetoric of participation and joint consultation during the 1970s,
previously discussed in Chapter Four. However, management’s reluctance to extend joint
industrial regulation becomes apparent when consideration is given to events on the shop
floor. Following the announcement that two hundred white-collar workers were to be made
redundant a dispute occurred in January 1975 because management refused to let the
workers meet in the canteen.844 In addition to seeking permission to pursue union duties
the company requested that it was provided with a list of union representatives and
informed of other activities such as elections. Even here, and at other times managerial
intransigence and inflexible approach predominated and sustained an undercurrent of
tension between both. In the four years following the 1971 Recognition and Procedure
Agreement little had changed. Communications between management and workforce
remained the prerogative of the management with its control and involvement in union
responsibilities. It was a significant, contributory factor to tension within the plant and a
pattern that prevailed until its closure, exemplified in the following examples.
The number of shop stewards representing each union was a figure that had to be
agreed with management rather than simply a union decision.845 Shop stewards facilities
were discussed at the JRC meetings:
Shop steward facilities. Times of meeting confirmed. 16-17 men full time Union
activities. Week on tues. no full time facilities back to work – deputies to get
released as required through Industrial Relations [department] (Not for regular
meetings) Released through request from Convenor. Senior Stewards in Building to
be released when required.846
The shop stewards clashed with management in November 1977 when the latter refused to
recognise TGWU elected stewards:
I had a word with M. Stearns regarding the 3rd shop steward in D. Bld [building]
and he told me that as far as he is concerned there are only two official S/S [shop
stewards] in D. Bld.847
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Presumably M. Stearns was an IRO. This subject is raised in a future diary entry:
The company (M. Stearns!) is refusing to recognise 2 of our shop stewards, Bro’s
Reid and Elder in D. Bld. 848
The following day developments are mentioned in the source however, the details are not
discussed, which highlights a limitation of the source:
M. Stearns phoned me just after I talked to you today, he said he had told A. Weir
the facts of the case in “D” Bld, and that Kerr was going to see Stearns early
tomorrow, phone me tonight and I’ll give you more details of what action we took
today on this.849
However, the next diary entry reads:
Stearns took on E. Elder that he was not recognised as a Shop Steward during this
time.  When we[e] Dermott told the cutters and indirects they stopped work.  I got
over their [sic] and asked them to start back till we took this through procedure they
did this after being off the clock for 30 mins.  We then went to a Stage 2.  After
telling Stearns and Thompson, that we don’t tell the management who to pick as
foremen, they shouldn’t tell us who to pick as Stewards.  We failed to agree and
will leave you to arrange the Stage 3.850
These diary entries point to the tension caused by management involvement in, and control
of what were union responsibilities. In particular feelings of animosity were generated
when the actions of management, or individual managers, undermined the status of shop
stewards. The following example is an excerpt from a steward’s notebook in which they
comment on being reprimanded for consulting workers during work time:
Harry McBaron stopped me about 8.30 – and said I was to stop talking to Mech +
Electricians – I spoke to them twice this morning – keeping them off their work.
Okay to say Good Morning Good Afternoon – I said he was going over the score.
After words he said I should forget it – he would – as long as I did what he said –
pointed out men still worked on or he would do something about it. Considered the
matter – need a Stage II – not working under Prison regulations.’851
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From 1975 the Industrial Relations Department of Chrysler UK began working
towards an Employee Participation Programme in order to develop communication
between the workforce and management – examined in depth in the Chapter Four.  The
aim of this scheme was to solve the problems of ‘monotony, frustration and overall
working environment’ by providing workers the opportunity of contributing to the
direction of the company in terms of local issues as well as larger plans such as product
design.852 Part of the programme was to organise Plant Employee Representative Councils
within each plant that would be composed of manual and staff union members. The
function would be to ‘discuss and review the operation of the plant on a weekly basis’ as
well as to maintain communication between management and the unions.853 Yet in the
stewards’ diaries and TGWU branch-meeting minutes there is little evidence of this
programme coming to fruition at Linwood. Ronald Rigby, convenor of the AUEW
(formerly the AEU) announced in the Talbot Voice newspaper that after three years of
engaging with the planning agreement, the trade unionist representatives ‘reluctantly
withdrew’.854 Management undermined the authority of the unions, which put a strain on
industrial relations at the plant. So far the discussion has focused on the shop steward
system, as the unofficial unionism within the plant. The chapter will now turn to a fuller
exploration of the role of the shop stewards in regulating industrial relations.
5.5 Politics and the Shop Stewards' Movement
The post-war period marked an important development in industrial organisation as within
car manufacturing shop stewards were recognised and participated in factory and
departmental committees.855 Within Linwood the shop stewards were recognised by
management, therefore received full earnings even when undertaking union duties. Their
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responsibilities included weekly section meetings at which they would report both factory
and union branch information to members. 856 In addition stewards had to attend a monthly
shop steward meeting that for the TGWU was held in the union halls in Paisley.857
Therefore they played an important part in linking the rank and file unionists with the
branch. There was a marked difference in the role of the shop steward compared with
union officials and the issues dealt with by these two groups. A brief examination of
branch minutes highlights that discussion at meetings focused on the branch finance issues;
donations to other organisations and charities; support for other social movements; wide
financial issues such as changes to the Chrysler pension scheme; lengthy disputes and the
development of trade union policy.858 The shop stewards diaries reveal a shop floor
organisation that responded to the immediate needs, grievances and day-to-day concerns of
the workers rather than a unionism driven by the objectives of a left-wing labour
organisation.
This is concurrent with secondary literature, portraying low worker interest in
branch affairs reflected in low attendance at branch meetings even when they occurred on
the premises.859 It was a similar experience at Linwood, with attendance remaining so low,
even when meetings were held in the work canteen; a quorum could not be obtained.860 For
management the shop steward was the formalised face of the union, for the worker the
steward was the union. Indeed the contact of trade union members with their branch union
official was generally minimal:
Most factory workers saw their union officials only at strike meetings – at which it
was more than likely that they were being exhorted by the officials to return to
work.861
Contact was made with union officials when entering into a grievance procedure. In the
post-war period many companies introduced procedures to be followed when disputes
arose. While at some car plants shop stewards were not involved in procedure from the
beginning of the process, Chrysler management placed the steward as a central figure in
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the three stages of disputes procedure.862 From Stage 1 ‘Procedure for Resolving
Problems’ then Stage 2 ‘Method of Dealing with Major Breaches of Discipline for Which
Employees Would Be Liable to Dismissal’, the shop steward could be present at meetings
between the worker and management in order to provide union support. It was only upon
Stage 3, failure to reach agreement between the worker, shop steward/ convenor,
Department Head and Industrial Relations Manager that the shop steward had to organise
the attendance of the full-time union official.863 Therefore it was the shop steward who not
only dealt with the daily discipline issues in the plant but was also the first union point of
contact for workers.864
Goodman argues that these formal disputes procedures were not always adhered to
and that the majority of stewards had methods of speaking to management out with formal
procedure that at times would mean side-stepping their foreman. He goes on to argue that
such action suggests that both the management and stewards pursued different approaches,
other than formal procedure, as they may not find ‘formal procedures entirely appropriate
for handling their relationships’.865 Within the diaries there are references to stages of
formal procedure; however, more informal communication with management was referred
to in the oral testimonies.
A limitation of utilising documentary material is that the more informal procedures
are sometimes not noted. However, within the oral history evidence it is evident that
managers and trade unions at a sectional level would attempt to resolve issues in an
informal manner, even if this meant ‘turning a blind eye’ for instance when workers were
sleeping at work, ‘Gaffers turned a blind eye. Shop stewards would go to a gaffer and tell
them, “so and so is under there”’.866 IRO Craig Marsden spoke of the delicate balance that
had to be maintained between official procedures and independent ways of resolving
issues. He claimed that the relationship between stewards, IROs and managers was
influenced by the personalised response of these individuals to industrial relations issues.
Individuals that were viewed to be fair and that had the respect of their colleagues would
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normally be able to ensure unproblematic relations and would be able to find ways of
diffusing tension. In referring to his style of working he said:
you had to operate the procedures with a consistency so that you had credibility. So
in the end, you could ask a favour of of a steward … But you can only ask a favour
if you’d reciprocated, ehm an, an yeah, if they trusted you, then you got far more
than those they didn’t trust.867
Therefore, it seems that IROs, as well as stewards and managers, would developed highly
individual strategies in labour relations that operated alongside, and adapted, industrial
relations policy so as to avoid going through official procedure. Yet what is clear is that
centralised management attempts to enforce procedure reflected a determination to
maintain control of the involvement of personnel at different stages as well as the overall
process of resolving grievances.
The role of shop stewards within car plants was diverse and stewards had to deal
with a variety of different issues. Beynon notes that:
At its simplest they see their job as a steward to be to ensure that the lads on the
line don’t get messed about. To keep the lads happy – to look after their interests.
It’s not for nothing that the steward has been termed “a badly paid personnel
manager”.868
The shop steward had the responsibility within Chrysler of dealing with a multitude of
issues ranging from individual grievances and discipline problems to raising safety
concerns with the appropriate department. The stewards acted as the point of contact
between management and the workforce playing a significant part in the ‘day-to-day
regulation of industrial relations’.869 In addition they had the added responsibility of
recruiting members and informing the workforce of trade union policy.
The role of the shop steward was not one that automatically commanded the respect
of members.870 Several studies have noted that the position of shop steward was not the
most sought after position and there were many incidences where there were not enough
candidates to have an election therefore people had to volunteer to take on the job.871
Indeed, of the sample undertaken as part of the Donovan Commission forty per cent of
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stewards said they ‘had to be persuaded’.872 It was difficult for stewards to strike the
balance between accommodating workers as well as adhering to union policy line. Whilst
the shop stewards held a degree of autonomy from their union, ultimately representing
their members was done via the trade union organisation. As the shop steward had a
responsibility of educating and informing their members on union policy, this had the
potential to lead to a ‘conflict of loyalties’. 873 A TGWU Shop Stewards’ Handbook points
to the different functions of shop stewards:
If you do your work well as a shop steward the workers will see daily evidence of
their trade union membership. You need nevertheless to seize every opportunity of
taking action to build up the strength of the Union – by recruiting new members, by
keeping existing members up to scratch, and by turning “cardholders” into trade
unionists.874
However, contrary to the argument that shop steward organisations formed a powerful but
autocratic movement within factories, Clack found that the shop stewards’ organisation
within his study was not driven by individual stewards or branch policy but instead: shop-
floor influence on the stewards’ policies was strong – if not overwhelming.875 This seems
to be reflected in the stewards’ diaries where the stewards responded to the needs of other
members. Stewards at Linwood did not necessarily take all grievances to management.
They listened to individuals and would go round the workers of the section to gain their
response and views on the issue.876
Beynon, has noted that there were occasions within different Ford plants where
there were differences of opinion and splits between stewards and workers, which served
to undermine the stewards’ authority. 877 Within the Linwood TGWU diaries there were
few incidences of major divisions. There are various references throughout the diaries of
stewards at times condemned stoppages and encouraged workers back to work. For
example, in July 1977 a member of the sequence line had been sent home for turning up
for work under the influence of alcohol, following this the sequence line stopped in support
of their colleague however, the TGWU steward wrote, ‘At 2.42 I advised them to start and
let us take it through procedure in the morning’.878 Within the diaries there are many
examples of the stewards’ work being dictated by the work place and incidents on the shop
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floor rather than the stewards dictating to the work force. This view is evident in further
documentary evidence. For example, the Donovan Commission asserted that while
stewards did have the ability to direct attitudes, they were aware of their position in
relation to the shop floor so at times agreed with the majority views regardless of direction
in an effort to avoid isolating themselves.879
5.6 Political Militancy or Industrial Militancy?
In the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a shift to the political left observable in trade
unions, symbolised by the leadership of the TGWU by Jack Jones and of the AEU by
Hugh Scanlon, both on the labour left. Their opposition helped to block the Labour
government’s In Place of Strife trade union reforms. The politicisation of industrial
relations continued with trade union opposition to the 1970 Conservative government’s
Industrial Relation Act, and various high profile strikes including the 1972 and 1974
miners’ strikes, which weakened and then defeated the government.880 It was in this
context that strikes in the car industry were also sometimes understood in terms of the
political motives of motor industry stewards.881
It is difficult to establish the political motivations of the workers at Linwood from
existing documentary source material. A persistent presumption, particularly in the media
during this period was, as many of the workers came to the new plant from the traditional
shipbuilding, engineering and coal-mining industries, where sectors were more but not
uniformly militant, that the workforce at Linwood displayed similar attitudes. This
reflected a view held on the motivations of workers in the car industry in general. The
Economist attributed many of the short stoppages lasting less than an hour at Morris
Motors and Rover Solihull – often workers returning late after lunchtime union meetings
outside the factory gates – to the influence of ‘bowler-hated Stalinists among foremen’.882
Within the documentary evidence at the Mitchell Library there are a small number
of Communist Party (hereafter CP) and Young Communist League leaflets containing
information on unemployment figures, Northern Ireland, rising rents and rights for young
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people as well as a tear off section for potential members. There is also a copy of a
Chrysler Branch, Communist Party Newsletter with brief general comments on the effects
of multinationals on living standards in Japan, Canada, United States and E.E.C
countries.883 This is followed by criticism of Labour government policies of 1974-79, as
only benefiting, ‘industrial and financial companies who dominated the economy’. The
subsequent three paragraphs comment on Chrysler’s multinational style of management as
disregarding the interests of its workforce; criticism of Chrysler’s failure to invest in
Linwood; the problems for unions in dealing with a company taking final decisions in
another country and expressed doubt as to PSA Peugeot-Citroen being able to save the
plant from closure:
We must realise that the only effective way we can control Multi-nationals be they
based in Detroit, Paris or London, is by ensuring we have got democratic political
control through Parliament, in conjunction with strong Trade Unionism over the
decisions which can effect tens of thousands of British workers and their
families.884
The presence of such literature implies the existence of CP members within the
workforce. Furthermore, Knox and McKinlay’s study highlights the general acceptance
that the CP ‘wielded considerable influence within the AEU’, which was one of the two
main unions at Linwood.885 However, there is limited evidence within the documentary
evidence or oral history interviews of a strong CP organisation at Linwood dominating
industrial militancy.
Revolutionary politics existed at Linwood in a minority form. There is evidence of
the presence in the plant of the International Socialists which became the Socialist Workers
Party in 1977.886 Indeed, Lyddon has argued that the lack of communist organisation in the
car plants does not necessarily reflect a lack of militant influence. He points out that in the
1970s ‘revolutionary socialist groupings’ took on the work of the communists.887 Shop
floor union convenors appear to have been more politically motivated, such as leading
convenors Peter Bain and Alec Porter who were members of the International Socialists
and Socialist Workers Party (hereafter SWP) respectively. The SWP politics emphasised
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the raising of consciousness among the workforce and the importance of stewards in
organising workers. The group also produced a newsletter from May 1973. The Chrysler
Bulletin coincided with the start of the dispute that led to the strike at Ryton. It contained
articles on The Press Shop Lockout and The Layoff Claim that stressed the importance of
solidarity between shop stewards and workers and between sections of the plant.888 Yet by
the late 1970s The Socialist Worker was critical of the stewards at Linwood due to their
involvement in the Planning Agreement. Tony Cliff saw this as a policy of ‘incorporation’
by management, which would lead to divisions in the trade unions movement as the
convenors and senior stewards involved became increasing detached from the workers they
represented.889 This perception is understandable and probably shared by many trade
unionists as it reflected scepticism of the motives of greater interventionist management
through participation schemes, as well as employee representatives increased inclusion and
function in the structures of managerial control within the workplace.
The lack of evidence relating to CP and SWP activity within the plant may be a
deliberate omission from the diaries to avoid management hostility or recriminations,
although in all probability the diaries were not read by management as entries included
comments on IROs, managers and other supervisors. The content and tenor of the diary
entries suggest shop floor unionism motivated by day-to-day issues and protecting the
rights of workers within their sectional working environment, rather than an organised
politically motivated movement. Thus, the spontaneous nature and cause of disputes at the
plant was reactionary rather than revolutionary. Party members operated more as industrial
activists rather than political militants in their determination to support workers’
grievances.890 In terms of the car industry as a whole, Beynon has asserted that there is
remarkably little evidence to support the idea that many of the strikes and industrial unrest
in the car plants in the post-war period were actually due to the work of CP activists.891
Comparing CP membership and strikes in different car plants further supports this
assertion. Notably the CP branch at Ford’s plant in Dagenham had 100 members including
three convenors and one deputy convenor. Jaguar had a similar strike record to Dagenham
yet there were no CP members and notably, one of the leading ‘militants’ at the plant was a
member of the Conservative Party.892 Therefore the link between political affiliation and
militancy is complex and clearly involves the interplay of various factors. This link became
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more tenuous in the post-war period with the development of a distinct shop floor
unionism. Consequently, there is an apparent distinction between the politics and aims of
the nation delegates and union officials in comparison to those of the rank and file.893
This thesis is not dismissive of the existence of CP activity within the rank and file
and shop steward system at the plant. Equally, although the work of Tony Cliff points to
the presence of the International Socialists’ party at the plant, evidence to support its
presence in the plant has not been found in the source. Political activity underpinned by CP
influence at the plant appears to be circumstantial. The TGWU diaries studied support
Cliff’s supposition that shop stewards tended to react to events rather than initiate them.894
Oral history material indicates that many shop floor workers were not politically
motivated, inciting other workers to strike. What does seem clear is that shop stewards had
a solidaristic rather than instrumental commitment to trade unionism.
5.7 Industrial Organisation and the Motor Industry: solidaristic or
instrumental?
Various commentators have pointed to a prevalence of strikes within the motorcar industry
that can be attributed to pay disputes. This was a problem endemic in the British motorcar
industry: in the 1960s fifty-five per cent of major strikes were due to wage demands and
disputes.895 The predominance of short unofficial stoppages at Linwood was less likely to
have been about wages directly but linked to job control, conditions, flexibility or other
situations rooted in the desire for individual or group control in the workplace. As noted in
Service’s testimony some strikes were labelled as ‘silly’ and accompanied with the
accusation that, ‘Some of them … they would call a strike fur anythin’.896 The causal role
of management in short strikes will be considered later in the chapter.
The influences on strike behaviour require further examination by giving
consideration to the types of strikes that occurred at Linwood, as this will reveal the issues
important to workers. Recently commentators have questioned whether workers in the car
plants were actually fully supportive of solidaristic strikes and instead, as Roberts
suggests, ‘endorsed collective means in pursuit of private objectives’ that was, to secure
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higher wage rates.897 As pointed out in Chapter Three, there were strikes of solidarity in
support of workers deemed unfairly dismissed. The shop stewards’ diaries and oral
testimony provide some indication of the level of worker support for such strikes and the
motivation behind this support. As many of the problems faced by shop stewards were
related to the ‘effort-bargain’ – that is control over the job – as well as sackings and
discipline rather than purely wage levels, Beynon suggests this could be interpreted as
evidence of political motivations among the shop stewards.898 Rootes denounced the
Paisley and District Committee of the Amalgamated Engineering Federation, which
represented the majority of workers on the North Side, as ‘militant’.899
Based on the assumption that workers from the declining heavy industries sought
employment in the car plant, a dominant narrative is that these workers had a militant
industrial background due to their background of trade unionism:
Well thur wis a lot o them in the unions … an they’re the die hard union men … a
lot had came from they, the shipyards, ye know the, if they, ur getting kicked oot o
there, they wud go somewhere else. … If they wur trouble makers ye’know, they’d
get the sack.900
Indeed, three of the interviewees linked this to the militant reputation of workers in the
west of Scotland and the influence of socialism and communism:
Remember we’re talking about strong union, strong unions with a Clydeside
background, a communist background, a red background, socialist background.901
This is not reflective of the entire workforce. The oral history interviewees depicted a
workforce with a mixed occupational background and some of these workers would have
come from non-unionised industries.902 They may even have chosen not to be a trade
unionist prior to working at Linwood:
Well ye more or less got forced intae joinin’ ye know. Ye had nae option. Ye’d just
tae join it an that was it. … But prior tae that ah is, ah just ignored it … ah refused
fur a long time.903
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Some workers may have explicitly constructed their involvement in trade unionism in
opposition to militant activity. This was the case in the testimony of Barry King, who
started as a skilled coach-trimmer working in rectification before becoming a quality
control inspector and eventually quality control foreman. He became a member and
sectional representative of the ASTMS union and claimed, ‘Ah wis anti-strike, anti-trouble,
awe the rest of it,’ He goes on to recall telling his section:
And eh, ah said … “ah’ll represent ye, ah’ll go to management an represent” ah
said, “but ah’m not going to fight over anything, it’s got to be something which is
very important.”904
It does not appear that the majority of workers joined trade unions and sought shop
steward representation as part of a desire for social change. Particularly as from the
introduction of car manufacturing at Linwood, union membership was compulsory. Within
the oral history sample, most interviewees depict the majority of employees at Linwood as
being union members rather than engaged and active trade unionists:
oh everybody was in the trade union but, … maist people didnae actually bother. It
was just the shop stewards wid. They kicked the workin people intae a frenzy, “oh
we can’t do this an we can’t do that.” An ye’d say, “oh gie us peace.” [laughs]905
Also, despite trade union membership existing as a condition of employment at Linwood,
only two of the sample recalled going to branch meetings outside of the plant. This concurs
with Hutton’s argument that strike action was based on the desire to protect their jobs and
‘secure their relative status in the pecking order, as it was to a belief in any class war’.906
While it is accepted that shop stewards played a crucial role in collective bargaining, which
resulted in their elevated position and strength within the car plants, as Beynon concluded
on the shop steward movement at Ford, ‘The shop stewards within the car plants may be
militants but they are not revolutionaries’.907 The involvement of shop stewards in wider
issues was in fact still related to wage levels. In his study of car plant workers Clack noted
the main grievance with management control of the assembly line and the resultant stop-go
production was that gaps in production caused by the management affected wages.908
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The role of the shop stewards would therefore seem to suggest an instrumental
approach to trade unionism as outlined by Goldthorpe et al in The Affluent Worker study
on workers at Luton.909 In their consideration of the ‘embourgeoisement thesis’ that is, as
workers began to earn ‘to provide enough income to support a relatively affluent life-
style’, they would adopt middle-class identity and values, Goldthorpe et al. established that
individuals had a particular ‘orientation’ to work, trade unionism and leisure.910
Goldthorpe and his colleagues rejected the thesis and continued to argue that an
instrumental approach to work was evident among the ‘new working class’ at Luton in that
workers were not concerned that the work they undertook was not intrinsically satisfying.
This attitude was subsequently reflected in their relationship with trade unions. Their study
revealed that only a very small minority of workers were union members, which they
attributed to a ‘moral conviction’. They contended most workers joined unions due to an
obligation to do so within certain plants or because of the attitude that ‘union membership
pays’. The instrumental experience of membership was reflected in the low participation of
trade unionists in branch activity and elections and the greater involvement in shop steward
elections, which resulted in the growth of ‘unionism of the workplace’.911 Similarly,
Cannadine claimed there is little evidence that working-class ‘embourgeoisiement’ in the
1960s and 1970s led to workers emerging as right-wing Conservative voters; the term is
more of an ‘ideological stereotype’ than a political reality.912  Indeed Beynon argues that
instead of a thriving working-class trade union consciousness, what is more evident in the
car plants during the post-war period is a factory or plant consciousness.913
It was the lack of participation in branch activity that prompted Turner et al. to coin
the term ‘parallel unionism’; a development that saw official union bodies made redundant
in terms of everyday affairs.914 In the 1970s national trade union leaders concerned with
union democratisation, such as Jack Jones of the TGWU, supported this development and
attempted to forge closer links between the shop stewards and the official union body.
Similarly, Hugh Scanlon of the AUEW encouraged the development of the shop steward
system with increasing responsibilities, as he regarded the stewards as closely representing
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the rank and file and that this should influence not only union organisation but the
decisions and policies of the trade union leadership.915
5.8 Narratives of Tension
5.8.1 Tension in the Car Plant
To help understand the attitudes and actions of the Linwood plant workers this chapter
turns to an analysis of why the workers did what they did. Chapters Two and Three have
highlighted that intrinsic rewards related to skill and personal autonomy were extremely
important to the Linwood workforce. The various systems of job control introduced by
successive managements fuelled tensions on the shop floor because they disregarded the
value workers attributed to these intrinsic rewards. Significantly, they removed control
from the workers and created much resentment towards management intervention.
Identified in this thesis as ‘narratives of tension’, this undercurrent emerged in several of
the oral testimonies. When asked why there was industrial conflict David Crawford stated:
Tension more than anything else. Because if you, if you’re doin a job on the line ye
can shout all, all ye, ye like, that line just goes on, an on, an on, an on. An if ye
huvnae time tae do yer job, in the specific area, that’s allocated to ye, that can cause
tension. If your job isnae sort, eh, finished before the car moves intae the next
stage, that causes tension. … the usual match was eh, “It’s too much. It’s too much
work fur one man.” … ye got jobs that’s man assigned tae one an a half men. So if
you only got one, one man an it’s not enough fur two, where d’ye get the other half
fae?916
Tensions were further intensified by the structures of supervision that functioned to
maintain systems of job control. Structures of control became ‘visible’ with high levels of
supervision by management, supervisors, foremen and from within the ranks of the
workers – the shop steward.
Drawing upon Bentham’s Panopticon notion of control Foucault argued that power
within society is both ‘visible’ and ‘unverifiable’:
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Visible: the inmate [or the worker] will constantly have before his eyes the tall
outline of the central tower, which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate [or
the worker] must never know whether he is being looked at any one moment; but
he must be sure that he may always be so.917
When applied to the car plant, surveillance over the workforce was maintained in a number
of direct and indirect ways:
When we attended the meeting closed circuit television and tapes were there we
informed the company that this was not acceptable and they were removed.918
However, while the workforce rejected such overt signs of control, there were other
methods by which the management attempted to control the shop floor, such as making the
shop stewards instrumental in the disciplinary process. The following exchange took place
at a Joint Shop Stewards meeting where the management’s response to an ongoing dispute
was to dock the pay of any worker issued with a warning:
Bro O’Leary said that warnings were coming out in most buildings. Works
committee [sic] have said that that they do not recognise the discipline procedure
and every case will be judged on its merits….
Bro McLean This document is set out to make policemen out of shop stewards.919
This exchange reveals the distinction between a ‘disciplinary society’ and a society which
is ‘disciplined’.920 The functioning of the shop stewards in enforcing the conclusive
authority of management is clearly recognised, as is the distinction between receiving and
accepting structures that will maintain that authority, which is renegotiated by either overt
or covert individual or collective resistance.
In this thesis, primary source material has been used to highlight that there was
opportunity for workers actively to challenge managerial authority. As previously noted,
Beynon identified the existence of a ‘factory consciousness’ not necessarily driven by a
left-wing political movement, but instead by a politics whereby the workers were aware of
the hierarchical authority and articulated dislike of the management and the seeming attack
on workers’ job control through ‘taking the piss’ and stoppages.921At times some of the
assertions of autonomy by line and process workers, who claimed they enjoyed being able
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to organise their work so as to gain time away from the line to sleep or to leave the plant
through holes in the fence, may seem exaggerated. In constructing their narratives,
interviewees may have embellished the extent of this behaviour potentially as a response to
the extreme lack of autonomy over their work. Additionally, even if the detail in the
testimony is not entirely accurate or ‘true’ in attaining composure in the oral history
process, the narratives point to how the workers would like to have behaved at work and
the actions they would have taken in response to managerial authority. Such behaviour, in
particular ‘doubling-up’ to gain time away from the line occurs in other studies of working
in the car industry, thus lends support to these narratives.
5.8.2 Man Assignments and Job Control
The following examination will highlight areas of tension that put strain on industrial
relations in the Linwood plant. At Linwood control of production took the form of man
assignments. This was a contentious issue for the workforce. It underpinned much of the
conflict and was the cause of many disputes. Many of the workers would have worked
under a piece work system of payment before moving to Linwood where the South Plant
was Measured Day Work from 1963 and the North Plant changed to this in 1968.922 The
company calculated the number of men necessary to undertake tasks and the duration of
each job, and then issued man assignments accordingly. When interviewee George Wilson
was asked what he thought were the main reasons for strikes or industrial stoppages he
said:
The main reasons… puttin more, somebody’s trying to put more work on
somebody … Comes back to time and motion, two of us did my job but ah could
have done it on my own. If we had been told only one was to do it ah would have
gone to the steward, Ah’d ah went tae the thingmy, ah wid have.923
Wilson acknowledged that although the job had been assigned to two workers, one
individual could complete it in the same time. Here Wilson aligns himself with
Braverman’s argument that workers never fully divulge information on the amount of time
to complete a job.924 For Wilson this would have meant conceding greater loss of control to
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management. Conflict arose when shop stewards and the workforce disagreed with
management over the duration and number of workers needed to complete a job.
In the following example the steward had met with the diathermic section about
movement of labour:
They must have had a word with some of D/Shift regarding this they thought that I
had conned them into that decision last night…they are back to the original
agreement one moves then they all move so you will have to hold a meeting.925
When there were disagreements over man assignments these could be taken through
procedure.926 However, there are examples in the diaries of a compromise being reached
between the workers and the management:
The company told me that on the cutting/80kw man/ass [man assignment] thay [sic]
will agree to a month’s trial with 5 men per shift, on the prevision [sic] that, if in
the course of the trial thay [sic] find that the single man has to stop because he has
not a partner, thay [sic] can draught a man in from another area temporarily.  This
has been agreed by A Shift cutting / 80kw so I have asked C. Ferguson [steward]
for a name to go over.927
As the above diary entries indicate, the shop steward appeared to be instrumental in the
movement of labour.
Furthermore, movement to other sections was often with little notice. For the
workers this implied that all jobs required the same skills and subsequently created tension
among the workers themselves:
management have approached the Stewards in D Bld [building] on the possibility
of labour being transferred out of the building to general duties in other buildings.
The stewards insist that if any people are transferred out of a particular section then
the whole section should be closed. The decision being endorsed both by the day
and night shifts. On hearing of this decision the management withdrew their request
leaving it, as they say “until later”. Therefore we’ll “wait and see”.928
This supports Foucault’s understanding of control in that workers will challenge authority
and decisions being forced upon them.  Frequently, management response to lack of co-
operation was to enforce authority by ‘clocking off’ the workers until they re-deployed:
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Stage 3 today on movement of labour. Stemming from the Roofing Line moving
this morn [sic]. The company at the Stage 2 made a statement that if in the future
any section don’t [sic] move imediatlay [sic] when told, then that will be off the
clock.929
The consequent loss of pay as a result of resistance to man assignments contributed to the
number of wild-cat strikes experienced at the plant:
The situation regarding the millwright as far as I knowe [sic] was that it happened
last night on overtime. They were lined up to do this particular job and when they
started it the company came to them and asked them to do this other job. They said
that they were lined up to do this job and that they were not going to do the other
one, so the company put them off the clock. The Millwrights on our shift came in
and heard about this and outcome was they went home approx 11 o’clock.930
While there are a number of references in the diaries to stewards attempting to talk workers
out of stoppages and on occasions officially failing to support them at Works Committees,
workers frequently resisted explicit and covert attempts of managerial control with short
unconstitutional stoppages that characterised industrial relations at the plant.
To the extent that workers viewed the changing social situation in the Linwood
plant as increased strictness, their reactions were influenced by their notion of what was
causing these changes. It seems clear from the following entries from different years that
workers understood these changes as economically motivated:
Conveners [sic] feel the Company is to some extent manipulating events to bring
about stoppages. The rate of men leaving has been in the order of three or four men
per week – last week it was ten – this week seventeen and is in fact a way of
operating a hidden redundancy.931
Bro. James: shut down in C.A.B is Company policy of shutting down where it suits
them. Softening up men to make them grab at any offer on wages a [sic] more
likely to grab at any lump sum the Company may offer before the holidays. Suggest
we should put out a leaflet putting our views on Company strategy and dangers
in.932
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West [management] said that we were not making Avenger launch – 7,900 units
£4.7 mil [sic] lost. They felt that they could not continue to sign checks [sic] for
424. Discipline etc must be enforced. Hiring would not take place until schedules
are met.933
The key point here is, many in the workforce were or had become disengaged from their
work so the use of incentives could only ever be transitory to achieve short-term gains.
The workers felt coerced into complying by the company’s enforcement of restrictive
practices such as clocking off and non-payment if a warning was issued. Consequently, the
‘wild-cat strike’ was a vent for heightened tension; an expression of the workers’
resentment to increasing supervision and tighter discipline.
5.8.3 Communication
Marsden has argued that Chrysler was one of the better companies in terms of
communicating with the workforce. 934 Equally, for Lester the significance of the planning
agreements was not so much their content; rather they provided the channels for
communication between the two groups.935 These viewpoints conflict with that of Hood
and Young who have argued that under Chrysler management, greater attention should
have been paid to effective communication procedures.936 There is evidence of
developments in communication strategies in the car industry. In British Leyland, the
management endeavoured to communicate the company line directly with their workforce
either by requesting to speak at mass meetings or holding their own, as well as sending out
letters to employees. This was a strategy to prevent disputes occurring rather than simply
attempting to communicate with employees when there was a breakdown in talks. During a
pay dispute in 1984 the management of Ford went so far as to send letters to the
employees’ wives so that ‘employees could calmly and deliberately consider the situation
with their families’.937
Similarly, at Linwood at times during industrial disputes management would send
personalised letters to employees in an attempt to ‘encourage’ the workforce to reject calls
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for strike activity or to encourage them back to work. The workforce recognised these for
what they were as the repercussions of not concurring were evident in the management’s
rhetoric. For example, in October 1966, Managing Director of Rootes Pressings, Peter
Griffiths, wrote a letter to all employees asking them to reject a strike motion by the shop
stewards.938 Of the 4000 workers that voted at the mass meeting fewer than 100 supported
the strike motion. It was reported that the works convenor:
said he thought the men had made a wrong decision. The lack of support was
attributed to a “warning letter” sent out by the company yesterday saying a strike
would create more pay-offs.939
This practice continued under Chrysler ownership. In 1978 Production Director, Stan
Deason sent letters to 9500 employees at Linwood highlighting the ‘gravity’ of low
productivity at Linwood, which he attributed to high rates of absenteeism and lateness.940
It is clear in the discussion in Chapter Four that from 1971 strategies were
introduced to improve communications with the introduction of formal agreements
between management and the unions at Linwood, and distributed to all stewards.941
In the 1971 agreement the management at Linwood had asserted the importance of shop
stewards receiving training so that they would have ‘appropriate skills and knowledge
required that would enable them to carry out their duties.’ Yet management expected the
unions to assume responsibility for the courses even though they would be administered by
the Training Department. 942
Chrysler UK management accepted there were communication problems and in
1975 organised an investigation. The study on communication revealed that within
Chrysler, shop stewards and management received the least training and education: sixty-
five per cent of plant managers and seventy-five per cent of shop stewards said they had
received no training at all from the company to help improve communication in their
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work.943 While stewards may have received some training from their union, this highlights
a crucial problem that aggravated tension as managers and shop stewards did not know
how to deal with each other.
Unfortunately the study did not include the manual labour workers at Linwood. In
his summary Parsloe highlighted problems that sustain poor communications at the
Linwood plant:
Long experience has taught him to believe that management information, proposals
or actions are a combination of incompetence, class bias or downright
untruthfulness.944
Parsloe suggested stewards may not have understood ‘management jargon’. 945 The role of
the shop steward was compromised by joint consultations with management because
stewards believed that no matter what the management were told they refused to act upon
their advice, ‘without the threat of industrial action.946 Communications at the Linwood
plant was a site of constant strained interactions because both management and workers
recognised it as balanced towards the former. Thus, both were selective in what they chose
to, or retain from the other party. Compounded by historical and economic contingencies,
the dialectic processes of communication with little or no influence at the Linwood plant
thwarted ‘true’ dialogue on the divergent interests of management and workforce. They
were often the touch paper to underlying tensions and insecurities, particularly during
periods of economic downturn and three-day weeks that resulted in short stoppages, as ‘the
only language management listen to’.947
5.8.4 Stoppages Relating to Safety and Weather Concerns
Management unwillingness to accept input of stewards reoccurred frequently in the oral
testimonies and shop steward diaries as it often resulted in stoppages. A significant cause
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of stoppages was safety. Working conditions were the concern of stewards who would
communicate problems to either safety officers at the plant or supervisors. These ranged
from simple problems such as hinges on doors being broken to more serious incidents that
could lead to injury, and extended to the machinery used directly by the men. There are
several incidences in the diaries where safety concerns are recorded by stewards. Insistent
that the assembly line should not be stopped, management ensured compliance by
threatening the section workers with loss of pay:
Last night we had Harris in saying that the seats [car seat production] would be off
the clock if we stopped the line on the safety issue on STN 26-28. He agreed after
the …safety man was down that this job is a safety hazard and the line must be
stopped to get the job done.948
Equally, the factory temperature could result in stoppages:
I had a meeting with Walker on the temperature in “D” Building. There is no
heating what so ever and the main doors have been left half finished by the
maintenance…His reply was that 1. he would agree to keeping the wooden door
shut 2. he will start pushing the maintenance to complete the automatic doors 3. but
he did not hold out much hope that the heating would be on for tonight. I told him
that is the maintenance could not come up with an alternative source of heating
then we are in for a stoppage over there tonight.949
The heating situation did at times result in stoppages and the workers lost their wages
during such periods.950 The undercurrent for dispute was often not contained in such
situations because management did not always implement cold weather agreements.
The following example was one of several similar entries over a three-week period.
It refers to the poor condition of canvas screens above the sewing area that protected the
female workers from insects and pigeon droppings:
everything has been quiet to-night except the “D” Bld [ D Building] problem of the
overhead canvass. One of the sewing opps [sic] Agnes McWilliam had to go over
to the medical with a rash that was breaking out on her arms she is putting this
down to these insects that are dropping from the canvass [sic]. Agnes went home
after treatment…The rest of the opps  [sic] are getting very wrestless [sic] over the
delay at changing this canvass [sic]…we will probably find ourselves with a
stoppage of work on our hands if this position drags on much longer.951
                                                 
948 ML, Linwood Box 10, Item 8927252/1, TGWU Shop Stewards’ Diary, A Shift, 13 October 1977.
949 ML, Linwood Box 10, Item 8927252/1, TGWU Shop Stewards’ Diary, A Shift, 1 June 1977.
950 ML, Linwood Box 10, Item 8927252/1, TGWU Shop Stewards’ Diary, A Shift, 5 July 1977.
951 ML, Linwood Box 10, TGWU Shop Stewards’ Diary, Item 8927252/1, B Shift, 20 May 1977.
255
These examples highlight the length of time it took the company to attend to basic
concerns about the work environment. They occurred in 1977, a year of industrial unrest,
strikes and insecurity about the future of the plant. By marginalising these concerns
management’s slow response or inaction increased the level of underlying tensions in the
plant resulting in reactionary short stoppages until for example, the heating complied with
the agreements.
5.8.5 Uncertain Future
In seeking to explain feelings of insecurity among the workforce at Linwood existing
studies have placed much significance on instability in terms of the viability of the plant.
From the late 1970s increasing unemployment, in particular among the manufacturing
industry and traditionally industrial areas such as the west of Scotland posed a real threat to
workers in the Linwood plant.  Due to the decline of heavy industries such as shipbuilding,
many would have experienced redundancy prior to their work at the car plant.952
The nature of employment in the car industry in the 1960s and 1970s was characterised by
periods of short-time working , three-day weeks, layoffs and the ongoing threat of
redundancy that when juxtaposed  against wages  meant that ‘in relation to employment
and earnings such feelings [of insecurity] did seem widespread’.953 There was evidence at
Linwood of the ongoing reality of layoffs occurring throughout the car industry:
JRC [Joint Representative Council] met McDonald today on lay-offs, the company
statement is:-
Garanteed [sic] first week of start back, and every chance of a further 2 days, trim
manufacture will go on for an unspecified time after that, local talks in the trim will
take place in good time to determine how many, and for how many people.954
The car industry as a whole was subject to production cycles of boom and bust, which for
the workers meant a cycle of mass hiring then lay-offs and short-time working. Some of
the interviewees claimed that despite being aware of these fluctuations they had never
envisaged the plant would close:
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They were boom, boom an bust an things like that, but ye never thought fur a
minute, that the whole place, it was always downsized an then, the next year, they
would be a, an upsurge in, the knock a, the the they knock a shift off when they,
they were, they downsize, usually the night shift. An then, eh maybe six months
later yer back again, an eh, that shift was back on again. But ah never dreamt fur a
minute that eh, the whole place would shut down, both sides oh the road.955
Conversely, there were interviewees that recognised the plant would never be
economically viable due to the dependence on other plants and indeed the suspicion that
Linwood was being run down:
I think that was rapidly replaced by a sense that this place couldn’t survive. Ye
know, I felt, event though I was there … ten years eleven years before the place
actually closed, I couldn’t see how it could survive. It was chaotic, it was short-
term. Lot’s of people did there best and it would be wrong to demean that, but it
was being slimmed down to be essentially the hmm, production of [pause] it was
secondary importance to Ryton.956
The shop stewards commented on such threats in the TGWU diaries:
The company have made a statement regarding the work in the factory mainly CAB
[Car Assembly Building].  The company have said that if they don’t get a better
percentage of ok cars off the final line then they would lay off the car assy [sic,
assembly].957
A similar comment was made in the next entry of the diary:
Company had all the stewards in last night and told us that, unless the performance
of the … CAB area improved tonight and tomorrow, thay [sic] would be laying us
off tomorrow night.958
In the 1970s the viability of production at Linwood was in turmoil therefore unstable. The
fluctuations in employment were evident to the workforce as they could be dramatic, for
example as TGWU convenor Jimmy Livingstone, commented in the Talbot Voice, ‘In
1978, 8000 people were employed here on double-shift working. Now there are 4600 … on
a three-day week’.959 In the eighteen years it was manufacturing cars Linwood rarely made
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a profit.960 There were frequent threats of lay offs, short-term employment, scaling down of
production, transferral of finance by the Chrysler Corporation to alternative UK plants, and
the treat of closure. Whether the workforce believed the company threats or not, these
contributed to general scepticism and distrust of the management.
5.8.6 Role of Management in Strikes
The distinction is made here between strikes and stoppages: the former reactive
spontaneous collectivism and the latter a reactive response to structural factors. The key
point is the ambiguous nature of stoppages.  Structural factors were significant particularly
during Chrysler’s period of ownership because of the Linwood plant’s dependence on
other plants.  A break in the supply chain, for what ever reason, impeded productivity and
continuity of production, exacerbated by the reliance on parts from other plants. For
example, in February 1970 a stoppage in the trim department at the plant led to 3000
workers being sent home.961 Similarly, a dispute at GKN-Sankey in September 1970,
affected 38,000 employees throughout the UK. Four hundred of those workers were at
Linwood who were told not to report to work for a week because of this industrial
action.962 It was a prevalent problem at the plant, in May 1978, 550 workers in the paint
shop went on strike resulting in 8000 workers classed as ‘idle’ for two weeks.963 Shortages
of components or the linear effect of industrial disputes at other locations often impacted
on the Linwood workforce, as the following diary entry noted, ‘Lay offs due to Stoke/
Ryton Dispute’.964
 It is clear in Crawford’s testimony at the beginning of this chapter he make a
linkage between ‘silly’ reasons for strikes and shortage of components. Failure in the
supply chain meant workers in the affected sections were surplus labour, but had to be
paid. To negate this occurrence, at times ‘silly’ reasons such as, ‘… of a guy urinatin’
outside at the other end o the building’, escalated to disciplinary action and ensured a
reactionary response from the workers. The ensuing strike meant workers were home, ‘up
the road by ten o’clock’ without pay.965 Crawford was an inspector at the plant and was
considered to be staff. His perception of the management’s role in strikes draws parallels
with those of George Wilson. In his testimony at the beginning of Chapter One, Wilson
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961 The Times, 21 February 1970.
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963 The Times, 2 August 1978 and The Times, 5 August 1978.
964 ML, Linwood Box 10, Item 8927252/1, TGWU Shop Stewards’ Diary, A Shift, 14 August 1979.
965 Oral Testimony, David Crawford, Interview 1
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draws attention to the protracted strike following the disciplining of ‘a boy… peeing out
the back door’, which also prompted a strike in K Building on the North Side of the plant
with subsequent loss of wages. 966
It is difficult to ascertain or substantiate if these actions by management were
coincidental or deliberate. However, a re-occurring discourse in the oral testimonies is the
corollary between disciplinary action by management for petty incidents and sectional
strikes at times when there were shortages of components parts, which led to stoppages in
other Blocks along the assembly line. The crucial point here is the causal role of
management in some strikes. The insecurity felt amongst members of the workforce during
these strikes and breaks in the supply chain was heightened by the mistrust of managerial
actions that in turn could elicit a reaction from work sections directly affected by the
shortages.
5.9 Them and Us
In this chapter a ‘bottom-up’ examination of shop floor organisation at the Linwood plant
marked a departure from debates centred on the role of the unions and a ‘militant’ shop
steward movement in the failure of the plant, with the discussion focusing on exploring the
interactions of stewards and management, and stewards and the workforce they
represented. The analysis builds on the argument developed in Chapters Two and Three of
this thesis by highlighting the desire for control on the shop floor as well as demonstrating
the informal and unpredictable manifestations of tension and industrial conflict at the car
plant.
Workers at Linwood experienced an instrumental attitude towards their work –
evident in the disagreements over job control such as man assignments, movement of
labour and track speed. This was not always mirrored by an instrumental approach to trade
unionism. The contested nature of trade unionism in the plant was revealed. This was the
result of ‘bottom-up’ development of organisation at the plant that reflected the low
participation of the workers in union branch affairs. The assertion in this thesis is
solidaristic and instrumental engagements with trade unionism are tendencies and not
absolutes. There are many instances of solidarity in the diaries not necessarily rigidly
defined by union demarcation. These were neither solidaristic nor an instrumental use of
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the union, as multi-union solidarity was evident in sectional strikes. Instead this evidence
points towards workers that had previously worked in ‘gangs’ or teams and therefore
respected the commonality between themselves and their fellow workers, displayed in a
factory consciousness and sectional solidarity.
Foucault’s notion of control was introduced to develop an understanding of the role
of the shop steward in the Linwood plant. On occasions stewards become complicit with
management and facilitated enforcement of control, by preventing strikes and sticking to
procedure. On the other hand, the behaviour of the workforce demonstrates a resistance to
management’s authority and the stewards were often complicit in members of their section
evading the disciplinary actions of the management. There were crucial differences in
understanding between the stewards and management, impeded by the latter’s
intransigence and inflexibility. The thesis challenges the notion of the all-powerful shop
steward system in the Linwood plant inciting workers to strike, and reveals the persistence
of industrial as opposed to political militancy, with strikes revolving round the
organisation of production and job control.
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Conclusion
Source: http://www.scran.ac.uk
Accessed 1 September 2009.
Stockpiled cars outside the Talbot Linwood factory, 1980.
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Conclusion: Coalition of Interests
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, a dominant narrative, and popular conception, is
that the Linwood plant ‘failed’ because of the militancy of the ‘touchy’ workers that
contributed to problematic industrial relations and industrial disputes967 – reactive
spontaneous collectivism to petty and insignificant issues. The Linwood workforce was
perceived to have failed to adhere to company disputes procedures; was organised by a
powerful and autonomous shop steward body, so ignored official branch union calls to
return to work,968 and were an intransigent ‘hard-boiled bunch even by British labour
standards’.969 The focus in this thesis has been to shift away from an examination of the
reasons for the closure of the Linwood plant and, given the positioning of plant workers
within the dominant explanations of ‘failure’, providing a more nuanced approach to
understanding work culture and industrial relations at Linwood.
John Goldthorpe highlighted that within industrial sociology in the 1960s the
number of studies on car assembly workers was greater than any other workgroup or
industrial environment.970 Yet, despite the academic scrutiny of car workers, the dearth of
literature on Linwood is intriguing particularly given the dominant explanations proffered
for problematic industrial relations.971 Thus the exploration of work culture and industrial
relations at Linwood presents an ideal case study in which to explore the experience of
work in the context of industrial restructuring, especially given the assumption that the car
plant provided the site for a clash of work cultures.
This explanation points to the process of adjustment to work at Linwood as
problematic due to the clash between automated-assembly production and craft culture
associated with traditional industry. To a degree, the findings of this thesis are consistent
with this dominant explanation. The narratives of former employees point to the
occupational background of the Linwood workforce, as comprising people from the
contracting traditional industries, which therefore provided the potential for a clash of
cultures. But, the thesis also provides scope for further development of this explanation, as
what is also apparent is the variety and very mixed backgrounds of employees at Linwood.
It is significant that for many of the employees, working in an industrial setting, in a new
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industry, on the scale of Linwood, provided a stark contrast with former experience in
various ways.
Furthermore, implicit in the concept of a clash of work cultures is that there was a
shift from employment, which incorporated autonomous craft control as contrasting with
the relative absence of autonomy and skill in track work; which mirrors the Goldthorpe
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards associated with work. Whilst the
Affluent Worker study gave importance to the relationship between the nature of work and
the type of reward, the thesis does not support the use of these distinct concepts as entirely
distinct entities.972 The thesis found that there were workers who, due to being deprived of
autonomy in the work process, produced negative narratives on their experiences of work.
Similarly, supporting the clash of cultures narrative, at Linwood the organisation of
production and narrative of ‘pressure of production’ at times meant that those workers who
came from a skilled background, and who worked in Linwood at their trade, articulated
experiences of work at Linwood where their skill was challenged. This is supported in
press coverage of Linwood where throughout the history of the plant there were strikes by
skilled sections of the workforce when management were perceived to have undermined
their autonomy.973 This was the case in 1977 when there was a dispute by a ‘gang’ over
manning levels required for a job: the workers claimed six people were required whereas
the company decided four people.974 Yet, on the other hand the testimonies also reveal that
whilst semi-skilled process workers at first glance appear to have been attracted to seeking
employment at Linwood by extrinsic, primarily monetary, rewards in return for
relinquishing intrinsic rewards associated with work, upon closer analysis of their
testimonies it appears that for the workers interviewed, the locus of control could be sought
within the workplace but not necessarily within the job itself. Thus the thesis recognises
worker autonomy as a crucial factor influencing positive or negative engagement with
work, yet this can be achieved in different ways.
To this extent the notion of distinct rewards is challenged in Chapter Three where it
is highlighted that apparently extrinsic rewards can also provide intrinsic gratification to
workers. Through the exploration of occupational mischief, a variety of different interests
are shown to exist within the car plant. Whilst studies of mischief or misbehaviour have
tended to identify this activity as deviant or as a reaction to the relations of production
within capitalism, this thesis has shown that mischief not only takes a variety of forms but
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serves a variety of purposes to workers individually and collectively: cultural, economic,
and social. Yet again, the rewards associated with mischief do not necessarily neatly fall
into intrinsic or extrinsic reward. A worker who steals from the car plant may on the first
instance seem to indicate extrinsic reward, but upon further reflection this can also provide
intrinsic gratification: for example, through supporting a masculinity in which machismo
signs of strength were replicated in Linwood.
Demands for greater control, autonomy and initiative by the shop stewards and
convenors are evidence of a desire for intrinsic rewards. Consequently, job control and the
speed of the assembly line were two of the key areas of conflict at Linwood.  What are not
accounted for are worker effort and the degree of labour desired by the firm. Managerial
control was sustained due to the automated production process and scientific management
Man assignments and re-deployment of labour were contentious issues and elicited
particularly resistant behaviour, whereby workers evaded management control. The
necessity for economic return for these workers meant compliance with management by
escaping, evading and subverting the ‘functioning of discipline’ at the plant.975 There are
frequent references in the oral testimonies and the trade union diaries of people leaving
work early, sleeping, drinking and damaging cars.976 Although these were not explicit
demonstrations of conflict with management they did undermine managerial control within
the plant. The oral testimonies in conjunction with the shop steward diaries as well as
contemporary press report support the assertion in the thesis that despite democratic
rhetoric, employee involvement schemes and participatory management functioned within
the structural control of management and did little to disturb the hierarchal structure of
power relations in the plant.
The thesis challenged the Goldthorpe distinction between solidaristic and
individualistic categories of engagement with trade unionism. The evidence indicates that
solidaristic and instrumental engagement with trade unionism are tendencies and not
absolutes. Through an investigation of the variety of ways in which both individuals and
the collective seek to satisfy their interests within the workplace the thesis highlights that
‘workers’ are not an homogenous groups, and concepts devised to categorise behaviour
undermine the variety of experiences and interests at play in the car factory and that these
are dynamic. Crucially, this thesis highlights the importance of seeking to understand the
variety of interests within the workplace and that autonomy played a key role in the way
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the workers experienced work. However, it was recognised that this autonomy was
prioritised in the realm of production and in the wider realm of the factory environment.
The final chapter provides a bottom-up analysis of industrial relations within the
car plant drawing upon trade-union documentary evidence supplemented with the oral
testimony of members of the Linwood workforce. In keeping with national trends
industrial relations at Linwood were characterised by a strong shop steward system and
multi-unionism. In the 1970s popular opinion of trade unions held them responsible for
pushing up inflation and preventing the introduction of new technology therefore
hampering the productivity of British industry. The media played an important role in
depicting the unions as ‘greedy and stupid vehicles of militant shop steward power, solely
responsible for running down the country’.977
A fundamental problem at the plant would appear to be with the communication
and understanding between the workforce and management. There is evidence of the
unwillingness of both management and workforce to compromise. In the Linwood car
plant a cycle of action and reaction between workforce and management was informed by
mistrust of managerial rhetoric, as issues important to workers such as pay parity were
marginalised and exacerbated by the constricting nature of assembly-line work. The
resultant tension meant, ‘Ye knew if you didn’t hear anything, there was somethin
bubblin.’978 Likewise, embedded in McIntyre’s testimony, there was a, ‘feeling of dispute
the entire time.’ 979 As these interviewees worked in different areas in the plant, their
reflections indicate the pervasive undercurrent of tension that put strain on industrial
relations in the Linwood plant.
In Linwood productivity was dependent on variables such as labour and time, with
efficient shop floor organisation dependent on the control of sectional work. As examined
in Chapter Two, this ‘specialisation’ gave rise to jobs that were narrowly defined,
repetitive and often boring. Evidence in the TGWU diaries support the contention in the
thesis that management failed to engage in the workers’ individual needs at work thus
incentives were often extrinsic. As a result work failed to provide satisfaction for many of
the workers and was seen as providing labour for a company that was the beneficiary of
this asymmetrical relationship that left the workforce feeling disempowered.
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The locus of autonomy emerges as important to the Linwood workers, although this
is not necessarily achieved in the work process itself but sometimes in the wider workplace
environment. For the workers involved, the sense of ‘getting one over’ on management
recognised that managerial control was not absolute. It may not have been absolute but
nevertheless conflict was an enduring feature of industrial relations at Linwood that
intensified tensions between different groups in the plant. The thesis found that the
management’s constant attempts to balance productivity with the constraints of the
political economy often produced inconsistent responses to the workforce: sometimes
seemingly cooperative as in greater shop steward mobility, at other times using coercion to
encourage worker compliance, and at times implementing stringent disciplinary action for
‘silly’ reasons.
The paradox of shop floor relations at the Linwood plant was not always an ‘them
and us’ orientated conflict. At times the stewards cooperated with management. Placement
in the assembly line was determined by the market, decided by management and, although
there were renegotiations and compromises, enforced by the shop stewards. Thus, to utilise
man assignments effectively, movement of labour between different areas of the factory
was commonplace and created tension between the workforce and the shop stewards. As
work study was a particularly contentious issue industrial engineers could only carry out
their work overtly and with the permission of shop stewards, ‘If not, there would have been
a strike’.980
Management in successive companies at the Linwood plant devised strategies
based on consultative arrangements and facilitated communication. The inclusion of shop
stewards, many considered to be militant by the company, functioned to manipulate the
power relations between management and workforce to persuade employees that there was
equity in the interactions between the two groups, motivating workforce compliance in
managerial decisions. These processes of consultation and decision-making occurred
within the context of unequal power relations and as such sustained the asymmetry of
influence between management and employee representatives contribution to decision-
making strategies at the Linwood plant. Such schemes, introduced as successive employers
at Linwood negotiated the shifting systems of industrial relations in the UK during the
1960s and 1970s, reflected the organisational pluralism shaping industrial relations policy
at Linwood. However, changing historical contingencies meant that they were transitory in
nature and the continuation of unitary values held by management resulted in a distinction
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between rhetoric and reality in policy approach which appears as a means by which
management contained the power of labour rather than being a demonstration of a
sustained commitment to worker influence in decision-making.981
What is apparent in the thesis is strikes at the Linwood car plant were not simply
the collective action, with or without union backing, of a workforce motivated by a dispute
with management over pay. They were instead, in many cases, a spontaneous reaction to
work allocation, supervision and working conditions by workers in their sections. Tension
arose as management attempted to increase production, strengthen control and improve
efficiency in ways workers perceived as undermining their skill and autonomy. Many of
the problems associated with poor industrial relations at the Linwood plant can be
attributed to managerial intransigence and inflexible approach, which predominated and
sustained an undercurrent of tension between both. A fundamental problem at the plant
would appear to be with the communication and understanding between the workforce and
management. The evidence confirms unwillingness by both management and workforce to
compromise.
During its eighteen-year history, through different phases of ownership, the
Linwood car plant was the nexus of a coalition of interests that was ‘sensitive’ to the
inherent tensions that sustained the prevalent undercurrent of potential for disputes. The
interactions and transactions between the management, workforce and company through
productivity agreements, incentive schemes and participation were regulatory mechanisms
of co-operation, coercion, and compromise that functioned to assuage inherent tensions in
workplace relations.
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Appendix One: Interview Schedule
Although an interview schedule was compiled the researcher was aware that at times the
participant may want to discuss things not on the schedule thus opening up new areas of
discussion. Therefore, in the interviews, the researcher did not adhere to a rigid schedule of
pre-determined questions but instead allowed for the interview to be reflexive in response
to topics raised by the interviewee.  For that reason the schedule does not identify the
wording of questions but instead outlines general topics/issues for exploration.
• Employment history
1. Dates of work at Linwood, length of employment.
-Age upon commencement of employment.
2. Jobs previous to work at Linwood. Educational background or training.
-Apprenticeship at Linwood or elsewhere?
3. Why chose to work at Linwood?
4. Background of workers
-Workers from industries such as shipbuilding / engineering?
5. First impressions of work at Linwood.
-Starting work
-Comparisons with previous employment
• Experience of work
6. Department / building / section of work.
7. Job / jobs at Linwood
8. What did this work involve?
9. Experience of work
10. Discuss job control.
11. Changes to the experience of work?
12. The effect of different management on the experience of work
14. Impressions of the product
15. Relationship with other workers
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16. Relationship between men and women.
17. Behaviour of the workforce
18. Insecurity associated with type of employment or previous experience of
redundancy?
• Management
19. Management in particular section
20. Distrust of management?
21. Changes in management.
22. Management attempts at participation.
23. Top management – plant directors?
25. Management tactics for improving industrial relations
26. Perceptions of Industrial Relations Department and the staff.
27. How did this department and the staff deal with industrial relations?
• Trade unionism
28. Union membership.
- When
- Which union and why?
- Previous union experience?
29. Involvement in union affairs?
30. Impact union membership had on job.
31. Comparison between different unions / relationship between unions.
32. Opinion of shop stewards / convenors
33. Opinion of local and national union officials
34. Decisions to go on strike?
35. Main reasons for striking
36. Discussion of press and television media portrayal of industrial relations
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37. Relationship between trade unions at Linwood and other plants owned by same
company.
38. Militancy?
39. Evidence of Communist Party or IWP?
• Questions specifically for stewards / convenors
40.  Main responsibilities and duties of stewards.
41. Changing position / influence of shop steward within the plant?
42. Contact between local / national union officials and stewards at Linwood
43. Contacts with stewards in other Rootes/Chrysler/Peugeot plants?
44. Joint Representative Council, Joint Shop Stewards Committee
45. Did the stewards do a good job?
46. Where the stewards liked / popular?
47. Support and respect for stewards?
• Concluding discussion
48. What was your overall experience of Linwood?
49. What was to blame for the plant closing?
50. Discussion of campaign to prevent closure.
51. Was the venture a failure?
52. End of work at Linwood.
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Appendix Two: Sample Details
Anna Anderson
Previous Job: secretary (local stationary business)
Job at Linwood: secretarial staff
Mike Berry
Previous Job: hairdresser
Job at Linwood: spot-welder, progress-chaser, inspection
David Bright
Previous Job: n/a
Job at Linwood: office boy, wages clerk
David Crawford
Previous Job: butcher
Job at Linwood: inspector, foreman inspector
Mark Ellison
Previous Job: retail
Job at Linwood: Car Sprayer
Adam Fleming
Previous Job: work-study engineer (Massey Ferguson)
Job at Linwood: senior industrial engineer, Industrial Engineering Manager, Plant Manager
of Body, Paint and Assembly
Peter Gordon
Previous Job: pattern maker (Fairfield Shipyard)
Job at Linwood: inspector
Colin Jackson
Previous Job: clerical work (refrigeration company)
Job at Linwood: wages clerk
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Barry King
Previous Job: coach trimmer
Job at Linwood: inspector, foreman inspector
Iain MacDonald
Previous Job: forklift truck driver in small engineering firm
Job at Linwood: forklift truck driver
Rodger McGuinness
Previous Job: butcher
Job at Linwood: process worker (headlining)
Andrew McIntyre
Previous Job: electrician in Glasgow docks
Job at Linwood: maintenance electrician
Douglas McKendrick
Previous Job: building scaffolding in shipyard, window cleaner, ticket-collector
Job at Linwood: process worker (CAB)
Craig Marsden
Previous Job: n/a (University Student)
Job at Linwood: industrial relations officer
David Munroe
Previous Job: labourer
Job at Linwood: process worker, foreman
Dan Nelson
Previous Job: engineer (City Bakeries and National Service)
Job at Linwood: engineer, line engineer, foreman engineer
Bill Reid
Previous Job: n/a
Job at Linwood: Technician Apprentice
272
Bill Stewart
Previous Job: n/a
Job at Linwood: Apprenticeship Draughtsman , Press Tool Designer, Planning Engineer
Barry Stubbs
Previous Job: material handler, (Paisley mills)
Job at Linwood: viewer,
Craig Wallace
Previous Job: n/a
Job at Linwood: Apprentice
Archie Watson
Previous Job: National Service, optical firm making spectacles, labourer
Job at Linwood: process worker, UMB
George Wilson
Previous Job: slater and plasterer
Job at Linwood: process worker
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